VZCZCXRO9496
PP RUEHDU RUEHJO
DE RUEHSA #2507/01 3411508
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071508Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0493
INFO RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 7406
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 1474
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 9761

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 002507 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KGHG AF WI ZI IR SF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GIPS MEETS WITH DIRCO DEPMIN EBRAHIM 
 
REF: A. STATE 122234 
     ¶B. STATE 123222 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Walter N.S. Pflaumer for reasons 1.4 
 (b) and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
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¶1.  (C) On December 3, Ambassador Gips met with Ebrahim 
Ebrahim, Deputy Minister of the Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).  Ebrahim cordially listed 
points on which the SAG was content with its relations with 
the U.S., he cited areas for collaboration in resolving 
African conflicts, and he appealed for U.S. re-engagement on 
the status of Western Sahara.  On Afghanistan, where he 
argued that resolution must come through political dialogue, 
the SAG was willing to lend its good offices and share its 
experiences in peaceful transition.  The SAG supported U.S. 
initiatives in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but it was 
unimpressed by the Israeli "moratorium" on settlements in 
lieu of a more definitive freeze.  On Iran, Ebrahim urged the 
U.S. to pursue bilateral talks, to engage instead of isolate 
Iran, and thereby strengthen more Western-leaning elements 
over anti-Western extremists.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
SAG Content with USG Relations 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) After the Ambassador conveyed the USG's very strong 
commitment to its relationship with South Africa, Ebrahim 
expressed appreciation on a number of counts.  He thanked the 
U.S. for being the largest foreign donor on HIV/AIDS, and he 
was aware of the Ambassador's November 30 announcement of an 
additional US$120 million to help purchase ARVs.  He was glad 
of President Obama's focus on Africa, as articulated at 
Accra.  Approving of Secretary Clinton's proposal that 
bilateral consultations be elevated to ministerial level, he 
said the SAG was working toward that goal.  Overall, he said, 
DIRCO was "pleased and happy" in its relations with the U.S., 
whose citizens were now its second largest pool of tourists. 
South Africa was now a lead beneficiary of AGOA and would 
like to see more African countries follow suit.  (The 
Ambassador agreed, saying the U.S. would like to help 
overcome infrastructure hurdles to intra-African trade.) 
Ebrahim rounded off by hoping that President Obama would soon 
visit South Africa. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Africa: "Areas to Work Together" 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) With this segue to the President's agenda, the 
Ambassador explained that President Obama was ambitious for 
rapid progress across many foreign policy fronts, and that 
the Embassy would always be eager to talk with DIRCO to 
explain and consult on our approaches.  The two countries' 
objectives were usually the same, he argued, with only 
occasional disagreements on tactics.  If the SAG would share 
insights with the U.S., and enable us to align our actions, 
the USG and SAG could be powerful together.  Ebrahim said 
there were many areas where we could work together, 
especially in conflict resolution, particularly in the Horn 
of Africa and Sudan.  He spoke of Zimbabwe as "making 
progress" although there were problems, especially on the 
Zanu-PF side.  The SAG remained heavily involved, aware that 
"we have to make a big push there."  He said he had not yet 
received a readout from the SAG's new faciliation team, which 
had just returned from Harare. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ebrahim was most emphatic in his concern over Western 
Sahara, which he saw as a "last vestige of colonialism" under 
an unjust occupation.  Having visited refugee camps there, he 
feared that heretofore "secular" refugees could easily fall 
Qfeared that heretofore "secular" refugees could easily fall 
prey to radicalizing influences.  As elsewhere around the 
world, the camps there were "an example of our reluctance to 
deal with these issues quickly, letting them fester, (and) 
creating an ideal situation for extremists."  The U.S. had 
been engaged some years ago, inter alia through the Baker 
Plan, but since 9/11 had been diverted by its desire to work 
with Morocco on anti-terrorism issues, he said.  In the Obama 
administration there had been no apparent movement toward a 
re-involement with the Western Sahara.  The Ambassador 
promised to convey to Washington South Africa's appeal for 
re-engagement on the issue. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Af-Pak, Mideast: SA Offers to Foster Dialogue 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
PRETORIA 00002507  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) On global conflicts, Ebrahim said President Obama 
rightly saw the Israeli-Palestinian issue in its regional 
context.  Afghanistan, he said, was problematic in relying on 
conventional forces to fight an insurgency.  He hoped the 
troop surge (announced this week) could succeed.  As in any 
conflict, however, the solution would be political dialogue 
not military victory, and he referenced the President's 
comments regarding outreach to moderate Taliban.  The SAG, 
and the ruling ANC party, had shared its post-apartheid 
experiences in peaceful transition and reconciliation in 
Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Ireland, and DIRCO was "prepared to 
assist" again.  South Africa, said Ebrahim, had a standing in 
the world to undertake this role, without a hidden agenda. 
In Finland, the SAG had arranged talks among Iraqi Sunni, 
Shi'a, and Kurdish factions -- and it would be willing to 
serve an analogous role, discreetly, for Afghan dialogue 
outside Afghanistan. 
 
¶6.  (C) Ebrahim lamented that President Obama's initiatives 
toward Israel and Palestine had "stalled a bit," and he did 
not share the optimism of some U.S. visitors.  The SAG was 
disappointed that Israelis were continuing to build 
settlements.  Taking the Ambassador's point that Israeli had 
announced a "moratorium" on settlements, Ebrahim said what 
the SAG wanted was not that, but rather a definitive "end" to 
them altogether.  In another example of fostering dialogue, 
the SAG had hosted Israeli and Palestinian delegates for a 
dialogue in South Africa and had provided "capacity building" 
to the Fatah party.  Unfortunately, for these adversaries the 
exercise did not seem to bear fruit. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Iran: U.S. Should Engage (not Isolate) 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The Ambassador asked for DIRCO's assessment of Iran's 
nuclear intentions, and recommendations for U.S. action. 
Ebrahim said the SAG had established binational commissions 
with Iran (as with the U.S. and China), and during recent 
consultations there Iran had assured him of their purely 
peaceful intentions.  (Note: Ebrahim led the SAG delegation. 
End Note.)  He chided Canada for being "stuck" on censuring 
Iran at the U.N., which "creates problems for us."  Urging 
the U.S. to meet with Iran alone, i.e. without any EU allies, 
Ebrahim suggested "This is what Iran wants... You will get 
more that way than by sanctions."  Although the SAG had 
expressed "great concern" to Iran over post-election 
repression, it still felt Iran could play a critical role in 
the Mideast, Iraq, and even Afghanistan.  Iranian society was 
divided, with the younger generation leaning westward.  While 
"axis of evil" rhetoric united Iran against the U.S., talks 
would instead isolate the fundamentalist elements, he argued. 
 
¶8.  (C) The Ambassador affirmed that President Obama had made 
multiple attempts to engage Iran, but each attempt had been 
rebuffed.  The President had repeatedly extended the olive 
branch to Iran, and despite domestic political heat from 
opposition voices in the U.S. he remained committed to the 
goal of dialogue, but he was frustrated to have had no 
positive response from Iran.  In IAEA talks, similarly, the 
U.S. had thought it was close to striking a deal with Iran, 
only to be ultimately disappointed.  The Ambassador urged the 
SAG, when next speaking with its Iranian counterparts, to 
convey that the Iranians needed to react more positively to 
U.S. outreach if real dialogue was to be achieved.  President 
QU.S. outreach if real dialogue was to be achieved.  President 
Obama continued to seek ways to enable communication. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Climate Change: U.S. Views Conveyed 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador shared Department perspectives on 
climate change, emphasizing U.S. recognition of the challenge 
to developing countries.  He relayed President Zuma's comment 
to him appreciating how far President Obama's own vision had 
developed and progressed on this issue.  Ebrahim commented 
that South Africa would also participate at the summit in 
Copenhagen and hoped for a positive result there. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Ebrahim Speaks Softly, but Carries Great Weight 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶10.  (C) COMMENT: Deputy Minister Ebrahim is considered 
President Jacob Zuma's closest advisor on foreign policy, 
reputedly wielding great influence behind the scenes in 
Zuma's inner circle, alongside his overt role in 
international outreach.  As Chair of the ANC's International 
Relations Committee, he (not Minister Nkoana-Mashabane) leads 
foreign policy discussions within the party.  He is said to 
 
PRETORIA 00002507  003 OF 003 
 
 
weigh in personally and decisively on key issues, lately 
including votes at the U.N.  An older man, whom an Embassy 
staffer described as a "wise owl" saying little but observing 
much, Ebrahim is not to be underestimated.  Although in this 
opening meeting he remained on the level of pleasantries and 
generalities, we will work to deepen our relationship with 
this unassuming but pivotal SAG insider.  End Comment. 
GIPS