VZCZCXRO5138
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHFR #1754/01 3581239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241239Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7978
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1233
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001754 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2029 
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGREV ETRD PHUM PINR GV MA NG MO
FR 
SUBJECT: SARKOZY'S AF ADVISOR FRUSTRATED BY GUINEA, 
MADAGASCAR, AND CLAIMS OF "FRANCAFRIQUE;" SEES NO IMMEDIATE 
THREAT IN NIGER 
 
REF: PARIS 1534 
 
Classified By: Kathleen Allegrone, Minister Counselor, for reasons 1.4 
(b and d). 
 
 ¶1.  (C) Summary:  During a December 22 meeting with Pol 
Minister Counselor, Deputy Diplomatic Counselor and Chief 
Africa Advisor to President Sarkozy, Andre Parant, was 
worried that Guinea junta leader Dadis Camara could return to 
Conakry very soon.  Parant expressed frustration with "all 
the parties" on the impasse in Madagascar, and stated that 
the process now needs to move towards elections.  He appeared 
confident that there is little chance for a coup or major 
political upheaval in Niger in the near term.  In Parant's 
view, assertions of the revival of an African policy based on 
secret deal-making in the "francafrique" mode should not be 
believed.  End summary. 
 
GUINEA 
------ 
¶2.  (C) POL Minister Counselor met on the afternoon of 
December 22 with Andre Parant, Deputy Diplomatic Counselor 
and Chief Africa Advisor to Presdient Sarkozy.  Parant had 
heard that morning that CNDD leader Dadis Camara is anxious 
to leave Morocco and the Moroccan government is "under 
pressure" to not make him stay more than a few more days. 
(Note:  This  apparently was a new assessment; on December 
21, Elysee MEA and North Africa Advisor Galey told us that 
France has "been persuasive" in putting considerable pressure 
on the Moroccans to ensure that Dadis spends "a long time 
getting to know Marrakesh," once he begins his convalescence. 
 End note.)  Parant stated that Dadis "absolutely" cannot go 
back to Guinea, despite the fact that the prospect of some 
kind of criminal indictment against Dadis makes it more 
difficult for Morocco or a different country to host him 
indefinitely.  Parant explained that he met with Burkina Faso 
FM Yoda on Saturday to encourage Compaore to push for Morocco 
to keep Dadis, but Parant was not confident that Compaore 
would make much of an effort in this regard. 
 
¶3.  (C) When asked if Morocco could threaten Dadis' assets in 
the Kingdom, Parant asserted that there was not much to seize 
and speculated that providing Dadis financial incentives to 
stay would be a more effective approach.  Parant also worried 
that if Dadis were to go to Libya or elsewhere we would 
likely soon be requesting that the new hosts not let him 
return to Conakry.  Parant was not optimistic on moving 
quickly to a new transitional government, and was critical of 
Compaore's efforts.  He added that Sekouba Konate is "afraid" 
to take steps towards a transition government as long as the 
possibility of Dadis' return exists. 
 
¶4.  (C) In an unrelated meeting on December 21, MFA Director 
for the UN and International Organizations, Sylvie Bermann, 
told visiting IO DAS Nossel that France wants to try to deal 
with Guinea and the issue of possible crimes against humanity 
in the Security Council.  Berman was not specific about what 
France might propose, and she deflected Nossel's efforts to 
see if some element of the effort could be handled in the 
Human Rights Council.  When asked during the December 22 
meeting, Parant, however, appeared both skeptical about this 
approach and fixated on the need for swift action to keep 
Dadis out of Guinea. 
 
MADAGASCAR 
---------- 
¶5.  (C) Parant was quite defensive about France's performance 
as a mediator to the political crisis in Madagascar, noting 
that "all parties" had made mistakes, including other ICG 
members and the AU.  He was critical of Andry "TVG" Rajoelina 
(TVG), but more so of the opposition.  In Parant's view, it 
is too late to go back to efforts on a consensus government 
and so we "need to be pragmatic."  Specifically, he feels 
that now is the time to convince TVG to reengage with the 
opposition and plan for elections that are fair and totally 
inclusive.  At the January ICG, France will argue that the 
focus should be on establishing conditions for elections that 
will establish a parliament that can revise the constitution, 
leading to new presidential elections. 
 
¶6.  (C) Parant believes that the current situation has 
potential for "positive progress" and so French sanctions or 
suspension of assistance would be counter-productive.  "Let's 
see what happens in January," he said, adding that if there's 
no progress by April or May, or should TVG make matters worse 
in the meantime, France could reconsider its position. 
Parant also asked if there could be some mechanism for the 
U.S. to postpone suspension of Madagascar's AGOA eligibility, 
 
PARIS 00001754  002 OF 002 
 
 
even as he acknowledged the congressionally-mandated 
requirements of the Act. 
 
NIGER 
----- 
¶7.  (C) Parant appeared most comfortable during a short 
discussion on the current security and stability situation in 
Niger.  In his opinion, a near-term coup or other major 
violence was unlikely, and there is no immediate risk to 
Tandja from Niger's military, which is "not, at this time, 
particularly dissatisfied." 
 
FRANCAFRIQUE 
------------ 
¶8.  (C) Parant appeared defensive and exasperated when asked 
about recent press articles that claim the GOF is moving away 
from President Sarkozy's stated policy of "strategic" 
relations in Africa and returning towards the insider deals 
of "Francafrique." (Note:  Parant's response on this topic 
was very similar to that of MFA Africa Director Stephane 
Gompertz in November, as reported in Reftel.  End note). 
Parant stated unequivocally that France is taking a different 
approach and blamed poorly-informed and malicious reporters 
(and sources) for sensationalizing France's African 
relations.  Parant pointed out that France has a long history 
with Africa, with thousands of citizens on the continent, a 
large number of business ties, and many people with 
long-standing high-level contacts (including some people 
close to Sarkozy), but in terms of GOF policy, "all has 
changed." 
 
¶9.  (C) Parant underscored the importance of France's new 
approach towards military relations with Africa, noting that 
in the 1970s France had 30,000 troops in sub-Saharan Africa 
and in the '80s there were still 15,000 troops.  Today, 
according to Parant, France has only around 4,500 troops in 
Africa, and that number will decrease further.  Parant 
reiterated that Sarkozy has committed to closing one of 
France's Atlantic military bases (in either Gabon or 
Senegal).  That decision will depend on the on-going 
negotiations with those countries on new military cooperation 
agreements.  The new agreements, unlike the "secret" ones of 
the past, will be ratified by the National Assembly and 
publicized, Parant said. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶10.  (C) Parant, who formerly served as Charge d'Affairs at 
the French Embassy in Beirut from 2007-09, has been described 
by French commentators as somebody who "is not dogmatic and 
who will not make waves."  Apparently close to Claude Gueant, 
Secretary-General at the Presidency, a figure frequently 
mentioned in discussions of "francafrique," Parant 
nonetheless is adamant that France's relations with Africa 
are changing.  Perhaps as proof of France's diminishing 
position in Africa, French officials are frustrated by their 
inability to positively influence the situations in Guinea, 
Madagascar, or Niger. 
 
¶11. (U) Conakry and Tripoli minimize considered. 
RIVKIN