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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #1667/01 3431442
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091442Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7789
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1058
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0924
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001667 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019 
TAGS: PREL NATO AF PA FR
SUBJECT: REINFORCING THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE ON AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: A. STATE 122731 
     ¶B. PARIS 1588 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles Rivkin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C/NF) Summary.  Embassy Paris has been actively engaged 
with French leaders in the MFA, MOD, and the 
President's office in the lead-up to and after the roll out 
of President Obama's message on Afghanistan last 
week.  In the lead-up to the President's West Point speech, 
Ambassador Rivkin spoke repeatedly with both FM Kouchner and 
NSA-equivalent Jean-David Levitte.  In addition, a visit by 
CJCS Admiral Mullen gave us an opportunity for a high-level 
push with the French Chief of Defense Forces for increased 
French military contributions in Afghanistan.  Each of these 
French leaders expressed support for the U.S. and promised 
further public support after President Obama's announcement. 
They also took on board our specific requests for additional 
French military and civilian contributions, but each of them 
noted that it is President Sarkozy, and Sarkozy alone, who 
will make any final decisions.  On the day of the speech, 
President Sarkozy released a solid public statement praising 
the U.S. strategy as "courageous, determined and 
clear-sighted," and he called on the international community 
to support it.  A presidential-level phone call before the 
speech yielded some movement in the French position, but we 
believe that additional French support is unlikely to be 
forthcoming until at least after the January London 
conference on Afghanistan, and possibly after the March 21 
regional elections have taken place in France.  End summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
PREPARING THE GROUND 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C/NF) French NSA-equivalent Jean-David Levitte told the 
Ambassador on November 25 that France "understood our 
messages" on Afghanistan and offered full support for the 
McChrystal Report.  Nevertheless, he underscored that 
President Sarkozy has effectively managed public opinion on 
Afghanistan by promising not to surpass current troop 
levels and can't simply change his mind "just because the 
U.S. says so."  Levitte said that Sarkozy would need to 
have a national debate on increasing French contributions to 
Afghanistan and that this debate would be more 
successful if led by Sarkozy and based on new developments in 
Afghanistan -- perhaps triggered by a President Karzai 
presentation at the January 28 conference in London.  Levitte 
expressed the hope that when President Obama 
announces the U.S. decision on Afghanistan that he 
acknowledges the long period of reflection needed to reach 
this decision, that he thank Allies and partners for their 
contribution and indicate understanding if others also need 
to take some time to reflect on the issues "so they will join 
us in time."  In a separate conversation, FM Kouchner 
made similar comments to the Ambassador about public opinion 
in France while noting that the French must make a 
"visible effort" to help the United States.  In his 
conversation with CJCS Mullen on November 25, French CHOD 
Georgelin stated that the French have additional military 
capabilities available for Afghanistan while underscoring the 
decision to enhance French contributions remains a political 
decision for President Sarkozy and would be favorably 
influenced by direct intervention from President Obama 
(reftel B).  Similarly, Patrick Maisonnave, Strategic Affairs 
Director at the MFA, and Francois Richier, Strategic Affairs 
Advisor to President Sarkozy, when pressed hard to think 
about the importance of France being among the active 
supporters, conceded that they had not looked at it from a 
Washington optic (France as a country with excess capacity 
taking no public steps to augment assistance) and agreed to 
refer it to more senior levels.  Like Levitte and Kouchner, 
they too deferred to Sarkozy as the sole decider. 
 
--------------------------------- 
NECESSARY FOLLOW-UP 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C/NF)  Following receipt of reftel A urging 
Ambassadorial-level support following President Obama's 
announcement, the Ambassador spoke again with Jean-David 
Levitte on December 3 to express appreciation for President 
Sarkozy,s supportive statement on Afghanistan and to urge 
France to move as quickly as possible to follow up on the 
ideas President Sarkozy put on the table during their 
November 30 conversation (which include possible additional 
 
PARIS 00001667  002 OF 002 
 
 
financial assistance and gendarmes as police trainers, as 
well as further consideration of more troops later). 
Levitte cautioned that there will be absolutely no public 
announcement of additional assistance before the January 
London conference.  The Ambassador urged that we keep our 
dialogue open in the meantime to try to push the process 
along.  Ambassador Rivkin also released a press statement in 
support of our strategy and approved an op-ed on 
Afghanistan which will be published in the December 9 Le 
Monde international daily newspaper. 
 
¶4.  (C/NF) In another follow-on meeting, Pol M/C spoke 
extensively with Francois Richier, Strategic Affairs 
Advisor to President Sarkozy.  Richier said that Sarkozy had 
personally approved his December 2 statement in support 
of the Obama strategy.  He cautioned that additional 
financial, civilian or military support would "take time" 
-- perhaps weeks -- to be confirmed.  As it was President 
Sarkozy himself who announced in October that "not one more 
soldier" would be deployed to Afghanistan, it will take time 
and a public debate to re-frame the issue and change 
the public's mind.  When pressed, Richier admitted that the 
March regional elections would not be won (or lost) on the 
question of Afghanistan, but stated that the Afghanistan 
strategy is "part of the total package" on voters' minds. 
He said that the first step will be the December 16 debate on 
Afghanistan in the National Assembly; the crucial 
element is to keep the President's majority UMP party from 
splitting on the issue.  French CHOD Georgelin and DefMin 
Morin will then visit French troops in RC-East over Christmas 
and New Year's to help create a positive 
dynamic.  Richier stated that the January conference in 
London would be key to the overall effort, with France 
pushing for a unified statement of support at this week's EU 
Foreign Affairs Council meeting. 
 
¶5.  (C/NF) Richier cautioned that the worst thing now for 
French leaders is to have a discussion based simply on the 
number of troops deployed.  The President's office wants to 
shift the debate to focus on the question of "what is our 
mission and how do we achieve it?"  In the meantime, they are 
"very discreetly" looking at possible options and 
interested in what Germany may do to reinforce their 
contributions.  When pressed that earlier contributions of 
financial assistance or trainers would not be so 
controversial, Richier stated flatly that France has no 
money to give.  Further, he admitted that Paris is unwilling 
to donate to the ANA or LOFTA trust funds as 
French leaders do not agree that building a national army or 
police force is the solution (rather, they have vague 
ideas about seeing these functions broken down along ethnic 
or regional lines).  They further worry about money going 
to high-cost consultants and rampant corruption.  Therefore, 
France is channeling its own limited budgetary 
assistance to projects in RC-East where they have more 
oversight and can choose projects they deem important to 
their efforts in the area. 
 
---------------------------------- 
COMMENT 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C/NF)  Comment.  The Obama-Sarkozy phone call provided 
an opening for political movement on additional 
contributions to Afghanistan, but it will still involve a 
substantial effort to confirm additional French financial, 
civilian, or military assistance.  It was Sarkozy who painted 
himself into a corner with his comment about "not 
one more soldier" to Afghanistan, and post agrees that it may 
take some time and preparation to walk back from that 
statement on military assistance.  However, financial and 
training assistance are clearly less controversial and the 
only thing that seems to be blocking them is bureaucratic 
intransigence and a political unwillingness to make some 
hard decisions on where France should spend its money in this 
time of budget constraints.  Post will continue to 
follow up with our French interlocutors and appreciates the 
recent high-level Washington support to reinforce this 
message.  End Comment. 
RIVKIN