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DE RUEHFR #1610/01 3360824
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 2351
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1815
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 2759
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1766

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001610 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SENV GB FR
SUBJECT: GABON:  PRESIDENT ALI BONGO'S VISIT TO FRANCE 
(NOVEMBER 18-20) 
 
REF: A. LIBREVILLE 467 
     ¶B. YAOUNDE 961 
 
PARIS 00001610  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:   President Ali Bongo of Gabon enjoyed a 
successful visit to France November 18-20, according to MFA 
DAS-equivalent Stephane Gruenberg.  The visit marked for both 
sides Bongo's assumption of the presidency and his initial 
steps to develop his own identity as national leader apart 
from that of his father.  Bongo met with a bevy of French 
leaders, the high point being his lunch with President 
Sarkozy on November 20.  Bongo also reportedly discussed more 
sensitive subjects such as the Gabon-France defense 
agreement, good governance, the BEAC financial scandal (he 
has proposed a new leader for BEAC) and Sarkozy's idea to 
have a meeting in Paris among Gulf of Guinea/Congo Basin 
states (tentatively scheduled for December 16) prior to the 
Copenhagen conference on environmental matters.  Gruenberg 
said that while there would always likely be an element of 
anti-French sentiment within the Gabonese public, he said 
that such sentiment had cooled considerably since the 
anti-French violence that took place during the August 30 
presidential election.  In sum, Bongo made a positive 
impression on the French, with both sides indicating a 
willingness to maintain the so-called "privileged 
partnership" which has formed the basis of bilateral 
relations since independence.    END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  MFA DAS-equivalent Stephane Gruenberg on November 27 
briefed on Gabonese President Ali Bongo's visit to Paris the 
previous week.  The visit had been relatively hastily 
planned, he asserted, with Bongo visiting Paris after stops 
at the FAO in Rome and in London.  The highlight of the visit 
was Bongo's November 20 lunch with President Sarkozy.  He 
also had separate meetings with PM Francois Fillon, Finance 
Minister Christine Lagarde, Interior Minister Brice 
Hortefeux, Environment and Sustainable Development Minister 
Jean-Louis Borloo, State Secretary for Cooperation and 
Francophonie Alain Joyandet, and the CEO of oil company 
Total, among others.  (NOTE:  Bongo thus saw virtually 
everybody worth seeing at the high end of the GOF, with the 
exception of Defense Minister Herve Morin.  END NOTE.) 
 
"Privileged Partnership" 
------------------------ 
¶3.  (C)  Gruenberg acknowledged that Bongo's visit amounted 
to a "coming out party" of sorts, with the overall aim of the 
visit to clarify the direction Gabon would take under Ali 
Bongo's leadership.  Gruenberg said that both sides 
understood that, because of Omar Bongo's long tenure in 
office and the elder statesman's status and influence that 
went with it, Gabon had "punched above its weight" for much 
of Omar Bongo's presidency.  The French and Gabonese 
understood that Ali Bongo could not expect at the outset to 
match his father's influence.  Gruenberg said that the French 
assured Bongo that France would continue to be a supportive 
partner and that Gabon would continue to enjoy a "privileged 
partnership" status with France.  When French leaders, 
including especially Sarkozy, made this clear to Bongo, he 
had in effect gotten from France what he had come here to 
obtain, Gruenberg suggested. 
 
Key Issues 
---------- 
¶4.  (C)  DEFENSE AGREEMENT:  Besides being personally 
accepted by France's leadership, Bongo also discussed a 
number of important substantive issues with the French, 
Gruenberg stressed.  First among these was the Gabon-France 
defense agreement.  (NOTE:  Sarkozy's intention to revise 
France's Africa policy involves renegotiating defense 
agreements with eight African countries, including Gabon. 
The agreements, products of the immediate post-independence 
period, are deemed to be obsolete, as some of them contain 
provisions that would allow, for example, one of the partner 
countries to ask France to send security forces to maintain 
internal security, something the France would not want to do 
today.  END NOTE.)  Gruenberg said that the renegotiation 
with Gabon was going smoothly, with a new accord likely to be 
signed early in 2010.  Without going into detail, Gruenberg 
said that the agreement would focus on training and 
professionalization programs the French would provide to 
Gabon's military.  Gruenberg did not mention the long-term 
status of France's present military base in Gabon. 
 
¶5.  (C)  GOOD GOVERNANCE:  Bongo also discussed with the 
French a range of good governance issues (a point the French 
were keen to discuss with him).  He made a commitment to 
 
PARIS 00001610  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
improve governance and curtail corruption in Gabon. 
Gruenberg found this commitment interesting because in 
raising governance issues and acknowledging a range of 
governance problems, Bongo was implicitly criticizing his 
father and the way he ran things.  As part of his reform 
plans, Bongo said that Gabon would adopt policies for a more 
rational exploitation of its natural resources and for 
improving Gabon's infrastructure.  Bongo asked France for its 
support in helping him reform Gabon in these sectors; 
Gruenberg said that France would support him, indicating that 
French support could well consist of technical assistance. 
 
¶6.  (C)  BEAC:  Bongo discussed with the French the BEAC 
(Central Bank of Central African States) banking scandal, 
involving large-scale corruption and embezzlement by a number 
of figures (reftels).  Bongo stressed to the French that he 
had taken decisive action by recalling the former BEAC head 
in October and proposing new leadership when the dimensions 
of the case became apparent.  The French appreciated his 
response but Gruenberg commented that Bongo had little choice 
but to act as he did, given the circumstances.  Gruenberg 
said the case arose from a series of bad investments and then 
the conversion of a significant amount of money, including 
by, apparently, BEAC's Paris office.  The French were 
conducting a law enforcement investigation and Gruenberg 
predicted that indictments (including probably against French 
citizens) would eventually result.  He noted that one 
sensitive aspect of the case centered on the fact that the 
head of the BEAC has traditionally been Gabonese, something 
that Gabon's neighbors (particularly Equatorial Guinea) 
increasingly resent.  Gruenberg had the impression that the 
fact that the bank has traditionally had a Gabonese in charge 
put Bongo in a position where he had to respond, and he did 
so. 
 
¶7.  (C)  PRE-COPENHAGEN MEETING:  Sarkozy raised with Bongo 
his idea of holding a meeting prior to the upcoming 
Copenhagen conference on environmental issues that would 
include the Gulf of Guinea/Congo Basin states and possibly 
Brazil.  Sarkozy hoped to develop a shared view of 
environmental issues, especially forestry issues, with the 
states of the region, prior to the Copenhagen meeting.  The 
Paris meeting was tentatively scheduled for December 16 and 
the invitations were in the process of being sent.  Gruenberg 
said that the invitations would be extended to member states 
drawn from COMIFAC (Commission for the Forests of Central 
Africa), the regional organization devoted to forestry issues 
(http://www.comifac.org).  Gruenberg was not sure whether all 
of COMIFAC's member states would be invited or whether all 
would be interested -- he noted that Chad, for example, might 
not view forestry issues important enough to attend.  Bongo, 
in any case, expressed his support to Sarkozy for the meeting. 
 
Anti-French Sentiment in Gabon 
------------------------------ 
¶8.  (C)  Gruenberg downplayed the notion that anti-French 
sentiment in Gabon would have a major effect on relations. 
He noted that the anti-French demonstrations and vandalism at 
the time of Bongo's election did not involve a large number 
of Gabonese.  A good number of the demonstrators were 
professional hooligans ("casseurs") always looking for 
excuses to loot and provoke violence.  That said, Gruenberg 
acknowledged that some Gabonese believed that French 
influence in Gabon was excessive and that Ali Bongo was 
"France's man."  However, he noted that if the opposition had 
been united, Bongo might well have lost the election. 
Gruenberg added that a recent cause of Gabonese ire against 
France centered on visas and the difficulties young Gabonese, 
especially, had in obtaining them.  This contributed to the 
lingering ill-will directed at France, in Gruenberg's view. 
 
"He's Ready" 
------------ 
¶9.  (C)  Summing up, Gruenberg said that Ali Bongo made a 
favorable impression.  He knew his subjects, signaled a 
willingness to break, at least partially, with the past, and 
was beginning to demonstrate leadership qualities.  He 
observed that one could always hope for a "more nearly 
perfect" leader, and that it was too early to say how Bongo 
would evolve, but for now, Gruenberg concluded, "he's ready 
to be President of Gabon." 
 
 
 
RIVKIN