VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHOU #1173 3521134
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181134Z DEC 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5959

C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 001173 
 
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019 
TAGS: KISL KDEM PHUM PREL PGOV OPDC UV
SUBJECT: BURKINA FASO: STRATEGY TO COUNTER THE "DEFAMATION 
OF RELIGION" MOTION. 
 
REF: SECSTATE 128320 
 
Classified By: CDA Samuel C. Laeuchli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) Burkina Faso has regularly abstained on "Defamation 
of Religion" votes.  It will be a challenge to get Burkina 
Faso to change its position to align more closely with ours 
and will require direct interventions with President 
Compaore.  Burkina Faso's membership in the OIC and the fact 
that it is a Muslim majority country with a largely Christian 
leadership are factors that will need to be overcome. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
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Burkina Faso's Voting Record and the Way Forward 
---------------- ------------------- ------------ 
 
¶2.  (U) Burkina Faso abstained from voting in the November 
2009 motion on Combating Defamation of Religion.  The 
abstention posture is one that Burkina Faso also adopted for 
three other major the human rights votes concerning North 
Korea, Burma and Iran. 
 
¶3.  (C) It will be a challenge to get Burkina Faso to change 
its position to align more closely with ours.   In Burkina 
Faso, where  power is highly centralized and controlled, only 
the President has the capacity to direct votes or change the 
current course of action in favor of alignment with the U.S. 
Nobody else will have sufficient traction to address this 
issue nor will they be able influence the vote. 
 
¶4.  (C) In our opinion, a two pronged approach is the best 
way to convince the leadership to contemplate changing its 
"consensual position" of abstention.  First, the issue should 
be raised with the President.  The Ambassador or Charge 
could, on instructions from Washington, meet President 
Compaore to broach the issue, contextualize the debate, and 
explain that backing a U.S initiative at the UN Human Rights 
Council would be more productive than either abstaining of 
voting for the motion. 
 
¶5.  (C) The second step would consist in either setting up a 
high level phone conversation between Compaore and A/S 
Carson or the Secretary or in raising the issue during a 
face-to- face meeting to personalize the request and further 
stress the importance of the message.  A personal call or 
meeting would go a long way to making Compaore feel courted 
and consulted and may drive home the importance of this issue 
for the U.S. Appealing to Compaore's stature as regional 
mediator and elder statesman, explaining that other 
neighboring countries are watching, and perhaps looking to 
Burkina Faso's leadership for guidance, may also be a path 
worth exploring. 
 
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The Obstacles are Formidable 
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¶6.  (C) Burkina Faso is a member of the OIC, the very 
organization at the forefront of this debate. While not a 
leader in the organization, Burkina Faso usually follows the 
OIC lead on issues that have no immediate repercussions or 
that are benign enough to Burkina Faso.  The very fact that 
Burkina Faso has abstained from votes on the defamation of 
religion proposal is  indicative of its desire to please the 
United States, while mitigating the reaction from the OIC - 
abstention is the middle ground, the "safe" choice for 
Burkina Faso. 
 
¶7.  (U) Burkina Faso is also a country which prides itself on 
religious tolerance.  Burkina Faso is composed of 60 percent 
Muslims (mostly Sunni branch and to a lesser degree Shi'a, 
Tijaniyah or Salafi), 17 percent Christians (mainly Roman 
Catholics) . The President is not eager to undertake actions 
that might be considered hostile by Muslim voters, and 
getting him to go against positions supported by the 
international Muslim community will always be difficult.  If, 
however, we are successful in demonstrating to other Muslim 
countries and leaders that our way of providing protection of 
the freedom of religion has more to offer, it will be 
considerably easier to bring Compaore along. 
LAEUCHLI