VZCZCXRO5659
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHOU #1158/01 3481619
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141619Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5935
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY 0071
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0769
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0734
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA 0009

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OUAGADOUGOU 001158 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12928: DECL: 11/23/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GV UV
SUBJ: GUINEA - U.S./French Meeting with President Compaore 

Classified by Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and 
d) 

¶1. (C) Summary: AF DAS Fitzgerald and French MFA Africa Advisor 
Montel urged President Compaore to take advantage of the window of 
opportunity provided by the assassination attempt against CNDD leader 
Moussa Dadis Camara. The U.S. and France emphasized that acting CNDD 
leader General Sekouba Konate offered the only real hope for a 
political transition that could meet all parties' concerns and allow 
for a real democratic transition. Compaore agreed that the 
assassination attempt had dramatically changed the situation but said 
he would have to meet Konate personally this week to determine if he 
was willing and able to accept the leadership role. If so, Compaore 
is prepared to ask Morocco to have Dadis stay and to tell Dadis there 
was no point in going back to Guinea. End Summary 

¶2. (C) AF DAS William Fitzgerald and Foreign Minister Kouchner's 
Africa Advisor Charlotte Montel met with Burkinabe President Blaise 
Compaore on December 14 -- the day following the Ouagadougou meeting 
of the International Contact Group for Guinea (reported SEPTEL). 
Charge and French DCM attended as note takers. Compaore was joined 
by Foreign Minister Bedouma Alain Yoda. Compaore said he had wanted 
to meet with the two delegations given the important role the U.S. 
and France are playing in the Guinea crisis. 

¶3. (C) DAS Fitzgerald assured President Compaore that the U.S. and 
France support his mediation efforts but voiced a shared concern that 
there was a window of opportunity available now because of Dadis' 
absence from Conakry that will be lost if something is not done 
before Dadis tries to return from Morocco. Fitzgerald noted the risk 
of reprisals should Dadis be allowed to return. Montel, noting the 
frequent discussions about Guinea between Foreign Minister Kouchner 
and Secretary Clinton and the unity of vision between the two 
capitals, emphasized the deterioration of the situation and our 
belief that Konate could be a viable and acceptable alternative to 
Dadis through a democratic transition period. Recognizing that 
Konate suggests he is "tired" and not interested in the leadership, 
Montel called for a "dynamic" to get him to accept and to keep Dadis 
out. Fitzgerald noted that the Forces Vives had clearly stated their 
willingness the day earlier to work with Konate but, given the last 
minute change in the CNDD delegation that put pro-Dadis hardliners in 
charge, were unsure whether Konate had authority. Montel emphasized 
that Konate would be hampered by a lack of control posed by pro-Dadis 
troops "as long as the fiction of his return" remains. If Dadis 
could be kept out, she felt Konate would be able to maintain order 
through the transition. 

¶4. (C) Compaore shared his view of the current situation and of his 
strategy. His approach has been admittedly "prudent" given the risk 
of escalated violence inherent in Guinea's fractured and 
undisciplined military. "This is not a normal army where one general 
is replaced by another. Each has his own troops loyal to him and now 
we see the creation of militia as well." His original negotiating 
paper did not specifically call for Dadis to step down since that was 
likely only to provoke violence. He asesses Konate as someone who 
would be the "ideal" solution for the crisis saying that, in his 
previous encounters, he had seen someone who did not seek power. 
That said, he is not sure Konate is politically willing or physically 
able to displace Dadis through the transition. He will try to meet 
with Konate in Conakry within the next few days to see if Konate is 
up for the job. If not, pursuing this "ideal" solution is fruitless 
and likely to provoke violence. If so, he is prepared to urge 
Morocco to keep Dadis in Morocco and tell Dadis there is no hope for 
him to gain any legitimacy. Compaore saw Dadis as a clearly unstable 
element but, if Konate will not take the leadership, he sees the 
continued need for a "Plan B" that accepts Dadis in some minimized 
role but does not exclude him. In that vein, he continues to work on 
a second draft of his mediation paper that establishes the artifice 
of the "Council of the Republic" -- a collective body performing the 
role of head of state but not head of government. Dadis could be 
subsumed in this body while Konate might serve as the executive 
agent. 

¶5. (C) Compaore directed the Foreign Minister to share the current 
draft with the U.S. and France. That document (e-mailed to 
Department, Embassies Conakry, London and Paris, and USAU) does not 
make reference to a "Council of the Republic." Instead, it presents 
an amalgam of entities that apparently aim to diffuse power. It 
includes: a "National Transition Council" -- a 150 person body 
representing "the components of Guinean society" headed by a 
president coming from the religious community who is selected by 
consensus by the members of the National Transition Council; the 
"Head of State of the Transition" coming from the security and 
defense forces who names the Prime Minister; The "Government of 
National Unity" directed by the Prime Minister (who shall come from 
the Forces Vives). The document stipulates that legislative 
elections should be held in May 2010 and presidential elections in 

OUAGADOUGO 00001158 002 OF 002 


October 2010. The document makes no specific exclusions of 
individuals wishing to run for president but stipulates "The members 
of the National Transition Council, the members of the Government of 
Transition, and the members of the defense and security forces must 
resign at least four months prior to the election. 

¶6. (C) Comment: Compaore remains cautious to a fault in his 
willingness to exploit Dadis' absence. He does, however, recognize 
the opportunity and is certainly now engaged in sounding out Konate 
as an alternative transition figure to Dadis who could be acceptable 
to the Forces Vives and the international community. Compaore says 
he already started talking with members of the CNDD to prepare them 
for a transition without Dadis. Compaore is clearly aware of U.S. 
and French interest and, according to the other delegations at the 
ICG-G meeting, is hearing from ECOWAS, the AU and the UN that Konate 
offers to one viable hope for a peaceful and consensual transition. 
He still comes across as timid and reticent to push things too far, 
too fast. 

¶7. (U) DAS Fitzgerald cleared this cable. 

¶8. (U) Conakry Minimize Considered. 

HANKINS