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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0731
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA 0007

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OUAGADOUGOU 001141 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12928: DECL: 11/23/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GV UV GO IV
SUBJ: BURKINABE MEDIATION EFFORTS IN GUINEA, COTE D'IVOIRE, AND TOGO 
 
OUAGADOUGO 00001141  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
Classified by Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and 
d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Following the December 3 assassination attempt 
against Camara Dadis, the Burkinabe see the situation in Guinea as 
extremely tense with both new threats and opportunities.  They 
caution careful thought before moving to action for fear that some 
outcomes could lead to a bloody split within the CNDD and Guinean 
military.  They recognize that General Sekouba Konate could serve as 
a viable basis for a political solution if Dadis is unable to return 
and/or resume his functions.  The Burkinabe were pleased with the 
results of last week's Ouagadougou mediation on Cote d'Ivoire which 
they saw as a "forcing action" to put together the mechanical steps 
to resolve the vast majority on "Ivoiranite" issues and get a firmer 
date for elections.  President Compaore soon plans to convene a 
mediation session on Togo to address opposition demands for a 
constitutional change from a single to a two round presidential 
election.  End Summary 
 
GUINEA 
------ 
 
¶2.  (C) Charge met the morning of December 8 with MFA point person 
for the Guinea negotiations Vicent Zakane to get a readout on 
Burkinabe thinking following the December 3 assassination attempt 
against Camara Dadis.  Charge advised Zakane that AF DAS Fitzgerald 
was planning to attend the December 13 meeting in Ouagadougou of the 
International Contact Group for Guinea (ICG-G).  Zakane noted that 
while the meeting was still tentatively scheduled for the 13th, he 
would not be surprised if it was postponed because of the uncertainty 
following the December 3 attempt.  Zakane noted that it remained 
unclear what Dadis' prognosis is.  While he understands Dadis is out 
of mortal danger, the reported bone fragments in his brain leave open 
the question of whether Dadis will be able to resume his position at 
the head of the regime.  He noted that even the Forces Vives are 
being relatively moderate and careful in their statements because, as 
yet, nobody knows if Dadis will return and what the consequences of 
such a return will be. 
 
¶3.  (C) Zakane noted that the changed situation "offers both risks 
and opportunities."  If Dadis remains out of the country or out of 
commission, acting "president" Konate would certainly serve as a 
viable basis for a political resolution.  Since Konate "has no 
political ambition," Zakane believed the Forces Vives might be 
willing to accept his leadership of a national unity transition 
government -- something they would never accept with Dadis in charge. 
 Noting reports of particularly savage acts by the various military 
actors during the assassination attempt and following manhunt 
(raising particularly how would-be assassin "Toumba" Diakite is 
reported to have gouged out the eyes of Dadis' mortally wounded 
aide), Zakane said the Burkinabe fear was that the CNDD and Guinean 
military forces could lose their tenuous unity.  Military on military 
violence, the risk that Dadis' recently trained and equipped militia 
might be unleashed, or the risk of "Toumba" creating his own 
sectional rebellion could all lead to a greater level of violence 
than Guinea has already known.  Referring to President Obama's recent 
decision, after extensive thought and consultation, to increase U.S. 
forces in Afghanistan, Zakane stressed that now is not the time for 
rash measures.  He noted, "The international community wants 
everything at one time -- peace, justice, and democracy.  It may not 
be possible to deliver everything simultaneously, so you have to 
decide what is most important first." 
 
¶4.  (C) Turning to the state of mediation efforts, Zakane said the 
CNDD and Forces Vives positions on the key political points were 
"irrevocably opposed."  The Forces Vives "immediately want Dadis to 
step down, the CNDD to be dissolved, and an injunction against Dadis 
running for president."  Zakane noted, "we have studied Dadis' 
personality closely, and we know we will never sign anything that 
says overtly any of those things."  Zakane insisted that, "for those 
who know how to read between the lines," the first mediation document 
presented meets most of the Forces Vives goals -- just not in black 
and white.  He argued the Compaore's rather methodical approach had 
more chance of steering change through internal pressure than the 
international community could through external pressure.  "ECOWAS 
made an ultimatum, and nothing happened.  The AU made an ultimatum, 
again without result.  The ICG imposes sanctions, but it has no 
effect on him."  Zakane hoped that both the deadlock of the current 
opposing negotiating positions as well as a negative report on the 
events of September 28 would generate enough internal backlash that 
Dadis (assuming he returns) will see that he cannot gain legitimacy. 
 
¶5.  (C) Returning to a familiar theme, Zakane stressed the limited 
role and resources Compaore has as mediator.  "He is a 'mediator' -- 
neither an 'arbiter' nor a 'conciliator.'  He cannot impose a 
solution, neither is it his role to propose a solution -- he can only 
facilitate discussions between the two sides in reaching an agreement 
of their own making."  Zakane noted that Burkina Faso had not been 
given the means to go with the duty of mediator adding that all the 
 
OUAGADOUGO 00001141  002.4 OF 002 
 
 
travel and hotel costs for the various rounds of talks were being 
borne by the Burkinabe.  He emphasized that, "he doesn't have an army 
he can deploy to force a solution," and retorted to the idea of an AU 
military initiative saying, "they talk about an African response 
force, but when will it happen."  As for an ECOWAS-lead effort, he 
noted, "we tried that in Liberia and the results were less than 
ideal.  And if Nigeria doesn't commit troops to such an endeavor, you 
can't talk about an ECOWAS force." 
 
Cote d'Ivoire 
------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Zakane told Charge that Burkina Faso was pleased with the 
results of the 6th Permanent Consultation Forum on Cote d'Ivoire held 
in Ouagadougou December 2 and 3.  Zakane noted that the meeting, 
"that we have wanted to hold for some time," had been a forcing 
action that had led the parties to implement some of the steps needed 
to move out of the crisis.  Zakane felt the Ivoirians had put in 
place an "entirely viable" procedure to meet the central issue of 
exclusion of some residents as "non-Ivoirians." Zakane thought the 
status of most would be resolved satisfactorily and that the "small 
number" of those finally excluded will at least have been subject to 
a rational and legal review.  The declaration of the meeting had also 
forced the Ivorian electoral commission to set an election within the 
narrow "late February to early March" timeline.  Zakane said 
President Compaore had met with the Ivorian participants -- President 
Gbagbo, Prime Minister Soro and opposition leaders Outtara and Bedie 
-- behind closed doors before getting down to the business of the 
meeting.  "He reminded them of how long the crisis had run and each 
of their responsibilities," but, Zakane noted, it seemed the 
Ivoirians had already come ready to settle so the meeting "was much 
easier and far quicker" than we expected. 
 
Togo 
---- 
 
¶7.  (C) Zakane told Charge that President Compaore was getting geared 
up to re-engage on his third mediation effort -- that in Togo. 
Zakane noted that previous Burkinabe efforts had resulted in a period 
of relative calm, but that the upcoming 2010 presidential elections 
could spark tensions anew.  Zakane said Compaore will "very soon" 
call for a mediation session in Ouagadougou to discuss the 
opposition's demands for a constitutional change allowing for a 
two-round presidential election versus the current single round that 
offers significant advantage to the incumbent. 
 
¶8.  (U) CONAKRY Minimize considered. 
 
HANKINS