VZCZCXRO0457
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHOU #1136/01 3421245
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081245Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5910
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0773
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0766
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0011
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OUAGADOUGOU 001136 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2019 
TAGS: PREL KPKO MASS PTER SNAR UV
SUBJECT: BURKINA FASO: MOD DISCUSSES WIDE RANGE OF REGIONAL 
SECURITY ISSUES WITH CDA. 
 
OUAGADOUGO 00001136  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b & d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Charge d'Affaires met with Minister of 
Defense (MOD) on December 3 to officially handover the Letter 
of Agreement (LOA) pertaining to the training and equipping 
of a Burkinabe Gendarmerie Battalion (COESPU) scheduled to 
deploy to Darfur under UNAMID leadership.  Engaging in a wide 
regional tour d'horizon, the MOD discussed the situation in 
Guinea, Mali and Mauritania, analyzed the overall pan-Sahel 
security situation, requested USG assistance within the TSCTP 
framework and provided an update on the Darfur deployed Laafi 
battalion. The Minister requested Africa Command's assistance 
in obtaining additional resources to ensure border integrity 
and surveillance. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) CDA initially met with MOD Yero Boly on December 3 to 
hand over the Gendarmerie COESPU Letter of Agreement (LOA) 
related to ACOTA training of a Burkinabe Gendarmerie formed 
police unit deployment to the UNAMID mission in Darfur.  The 
MOD said they would look it over one final time and return it 
to us signed as soon as possible.  Boly then proceeded to 
engage the CDA on Guinea, Mauritania and Mali and more 
generally discussed internal and regional security issues and 
provided an update on the deployed Burkinabe peacekeeping 
battalion already in Darfur. 
 
Guinea 
------- 
¶3. (C) "Guinea is a fragile country" offered the MOD, and is 
prone to further destabilizing acts (the meeting took place 
before the assassination attempt on Dadis).  The situation is 
preoccupying and needs to be monitored closely, but, still 
according to the MOD, Burkina's mediation efforts continue 
and President Compaore remains very engaged. 
 
Security in Northern Burkina Faso & Concerns about drugs and 
weapons trafficking 
--------------------- ------------------------ 
--------------------- ----------- 
¶4.  (C) Noting the recent AQIM kidnappings in Mali and 
Mauritania, Charge asked whether the Burkinabe armed forces 
were increasing their security measures.  Boly responded that 
Burkina Faso's intelligence services have been monitoring the 
Burkina/Niger/Mali border and collecting important 
information.  Despite these efforts, the country remains 
vulnerable from a security standpoint. The MOD mused about 
how to properly exploit the intelligence information and 
leads they had obtained thus far. The Minister of Defense 
explained that the northern cities of Markoy (and its 
market), Gorom-Gorom, and Deou are of particular interest as 
they are "infiltrated" and "Islamicized".  Burkinabe 
intelligence sources have uncovered Nigerian trained Nigerien 
nationals (particularly former students of Koranic school in 
Nigeria) who are operating in that region in a believed 
liaison with AQIM.  The GOBF has their names, they know who 
they are, but don't know how to move forward and properly 
exploit that information.  Boly noted that small cells of the 
type AQIM are know   to dispatch currently have a relatively 
high chance of circulating undetected by Burkinabe security 
forces. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ministries of Security and Defense are actively 
cooperating, they are talking and trying to chart a 
productive way forward.  Some military personnel now work 
under a special operating agreement with the Ministry of 
Security and are integrated as Special Military Assistance 
Brigades ("Compagnie Militaire d'Appui a la Securite"). 
Unfortunately while the manpower can be made available, 
transportation hurdles remain with a significant lack of 
vehicles to effectively patrol the border regions. 
 
¶6.  (C) Charge asked whether the GOBF has worked on a public 
media strategy to alert the population in the north 
especially to the risk of terrorism and radicalization.  Boly 
responded that they had not but that such an initiative would 
be useful.  Charge noted that Africa Command MIST teams would 
probably be willing and able to assist the GOBF in such a 
campaign should they decide to move forward. 
 
¶7.  (C) The GOBF is concerned about drug and weapons 
transiting through Burkina Faso particularly in its northern 
Sahelian region.  The MOD is keen to know what USG 
cooperation and resources might be made available, either 
through TSCTP or Africa Command, to assist in the monitoring 
and interdiction of these drugs and weapons.  Charge noted 
that there are additional USG programs that may also be 
brought to Burkina Faso's assistance in counter-narcotics 
programming.  Clearly the MOD was looking to the USG to offer 
 
OUAGADOUGO 00001136  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
to fund the purchase of vehicles to patrol the border zone. 
 
Pan-Sahel Security situation and initiatives 
--------------------- ------------------------ 
¶8.  (C) Charge asked for the Minister's assessment of the 
chances for regional counter-terrorism cooperation in the 
face of the evidently increasing AQIM threat.  Boly noted 
that cooperation was fraught with difficulties adding that 
Mali's attempt to hold a regional counter-terrorism 
conference for well over a year is indicative of the problem. 
   There are many factors at play offered the MOD, Algeria's 
position, Libya as a player -- even if only on the perimeter, 
and internal political problems in Mali and Niger.  While he 
had seen some tentative steps following the Algerian 
conference in Tamanrasset, Boly suggested that the Sahelian 
countries were still unclear what Algeria really wanted -- 
suggesting Algeria was demanding much but offering little. 
Gauging Mauritania, Mali and Niger, Boly noted "Aziz (of 
Mauritania) is a soldier and understands the threat," but 
suggested that Mali and Niger -- while increasingly focused 
on the AQIM threat -- continued to see internal Tuareg issues 
as more important.  Boly  added that he had recently made a 
visit to Rabat and was told that  no tran-Sahara/Sahel 
solution could be developed with out Morocco's active 
participation.  That, he recognized brings in to complication 
of Western Sahara and the inability of the Maghreb group to 
function.  Part of the problem, Boly suggested, is that 
because some states can't get along in general, then they are 
precluded, de facto, from getting along on a sensitive issue 
like counter-terrorism.  It is first and foremost a political 
issue, and only then becomes a technical issue the MOD 
offered.  Niger/Burkina Faso and Mali can surely talk, but 
can Morocco/Algeria talk the MOD wondered.  Boly suggested 
that Burkina Faso might be better placed then Algeria to 
forge consensus between the three Sahelian countries while 
recognizing such an initiative could irritate Algeria and, 
perhaps, Libya.  That said, Boly recognized that Burkina Faso 
has probably only been lucky up to now that AQIM has not 
focused activities here so Burkina Faso has an interest in 
seeing the problem addressed. 
 
Assistance within the TSCTP framework 
---------------- --------------------- 
¶9.  (C) The MOD reiterated how happy Burkina was to be the 
newest member of TSCTP and suggested that through that 
program regional cooperation could be ameliorated.  He said 
that Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger did not always readily 
share important information on a strictly bilateral basis, 
but that perhaps through the TSCTP program that information 
exchange could be enhanced.  The Minister noted that Burkina 
Faso had already highlighted to the Embassy and Africa 
Command their need to enhance their border security 
capabilities in the North.  Charge noted that the proposal 
had been noted and was under review in Stuttgart. 
 
Peacekeeping operations 
--------------- -------- 
¶10.  (C) Charge asked how the Minister had found their first 
major deployment in a UN peacekeeping operation.  Boly noted 
the Darfur deployment had been a major increase in the 
professionalization of the military allowing them to gain 
expertice in multilateral operations.  The minister stressed 
that, without US assistance, deployment of the PKO battalion 
would have been impossible.  Despite US assistance, the 
financial burden on Burkina Faso's budget remains 
substantial, especially when factoring in costs and expenses 
that had not been initially anticipated.  This deployment was 
a much "heavier" operation then they had originally thought 
both in terms of manpower and financial constraints.  The 
GOBF has not yet been able to secure airlift to move 40-50 
metric tons of equipment remaining in Ouagadougou and needed 
in El Geneina. The Laafi Battalion, which has been flown into 
Darfur in tranches, is expected to reach full complement by 
December 27.  Boly added that the pending deployment of a 
formed police unit will be a further expansion of Burkina 
Faso's peacekeeping contribution.  He noted that the demand 
for police units far exceeded that for military units, 
indicative of the greater utility such units can have in 
urban settings. 
 
¶11.  (C) Chief of Defense Brigadier General Dominique 
Djendjere will spend Christmas with the Laafi battalion (he 
will fly out on December 23 and remain through December 27.) 
 
¶12.  (C) This meeting turned out to be far more substantive 
than originally anticipated.  A civilian trained at the elite 
French Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA), Defense 
Minister Boly is believed to be one of President Compaore's 
 
OUAGADOUGO 00001136  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
closest confidants.  Most telling, was Boly's recognition 
that Burkina Faso is also subject to the AQIM threat as well 
as his rather pessimistic view on the immediate prospects for 
effective subregional counterterrorism cooperation.  Building 
on President Compaore's regional initiatives in Togo, Cote 
d'Ivoire, and Guinea, the Minister is probably correct that 
Burkina Faso could be effective in trying to facilitate 
better cooperation between Mauritania, Mali , and Niger. 
 
¶13.  (U) Conakry and Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
HANKINS