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OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0621/01 3620834
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 280834Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7535
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000621 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM MARR SU CD
SUBJECT: CHAD-SUDAN:  "SUCCESSFUL" CHAD-SUDAN TALKS IN 
KHARTOUM, DEC 24-25, CHADIANS REPORT 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 617 
 
Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
------------------ 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) The Chadians consider that FORMIN Faki's visit to 
Khartoum December 24-25 was "very positive and successful" in 
advancing the bilateral normalization process and the end of 
their "proxy war," Chad's U.S. Ambassador Bechir told 
Ambassador Nigro December 26.  The apparently very frank 
discussions between the Chadians and Sudan President Bashir 
and his senior advisors seem to have achieved clarity on the 
need to end the "proxy war" once and for all and to have 
outlined next steps in the normalization process between the 
two feuding neighbors. Bechir said that Deby was President 
Deby and the GOC were definitely willing to sacrifice their 
relationship with JEM in order to achieve "true 
normalization" of relations with Sudan, including the ending 
of the Chad rebellion based in Sudan. 
 
¶2.  (C) The two sides agreed that within 15 days a Sudanese 
military/security delegation would come to NDjamena to 
discuss the modalities of implementing the 2006 Protocol. 
Fifteen days after that, the first "mixed border control 
groups" of security and intelligence officers would be 
operational. The GOC agreed to go to Doha to continue to lend 
its weight to Darfur negotiations. Bechir said that the 
Chadian delegation were convinced that President Bachir was 
indeed "serious" about normalizing relations at the expense 
of his Chad rebel clients, but that convincing President Deby 
of Sudanese good faith was not yet a given.  FORMIN Faki was 
scheduled to brief Deby December 26 or 27, Bechir said. 
 
¶3. (C) The quiet, persistent bilateral track inaugurated last 
summer between Chad and Sudan continues to produce results, 
building on the changed correlation of forces in the "proxy 
war" since 2008 and on the two government's changed strategic 
priorities based on an evolving geopolitical situation and on 
political developments within both Chad and Sudan.  We have 
analyzed that President Deby would trade his relationship 
with Khalil Ibrahim for assured security from Chad rebels 
based in Darfur. If President Bashir and the Sudanese can 
deliver on such "assured security," true normalization of 
Chad-Sudan relations may be at hand, to the detriment of 
armed rebel groups, including JEM in Chad and the rump Chad 
rebellion in Sudan. We will try to see Faki after he briefs 
Deby on this visit and its results:  Senior USG encouragement 
to Deby to "stay the bilateral course" might be worth 
considering at some point.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
-------------------- 
XMAS DIPLOMACY: CHAD 
DEL TO KHARTOUM 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The Chadians consider that FORMIN Faki's visit to 
Khartoum December 24-25 was "very positive and successful" in 
advancing the bilateral normalization process and the end of 
their "proxy war," Chad's U.S. Ambassador Bechir told 
Ambassador Nigro December 26.  The Chadian delegation, which 
was led by FORMIN Faki and included Bechir, other MFA 
experts, and the governors of the four Chad regions bordering 
Darfur, met with Sudan President Bashir and his senior 
advisors, including Dr. Ghazi and Intelligence Chief Atta. 
 
¶5.  (C) Bechir said that Faki's message to Khartoum included 
acknowledgment that Sudan had fulfilled its commitment to 
"canton" most (but not all) of the Chad rebels it supports in 
Sudan away from the border; discussions on "mechanisms of 
verification and monitoring" of the border; renewed Chadian 
commitment to normalization of relations; and a strong 
commitment to "resolve the JEM issue." 
 
¶6.  (C) President Bashir told the Chadians that the GOS 
wanted to enter a new phase in the bilateral relationship. 
 
NDJAMENA 00000621  002 OF 003 
 
 
The first phase of friendship and cooperation (1990-2005) was 
flowed by a phase of opposition and war (2005-present), in 
which Bashir said that the GOS sought regime change in 
NDjamena through the victory of its Chad rebel clients over 
Deby's forces and Deby's overthrow.  Bashir said that he knew 
that Deby had supported JEM's May 2008 attempt to do the same 
to him, and defied the Chadians to prove him wrong.  But the 
two countries could now enter a new phase of friendship and 
cooperation, because he judged that both Khartoum and 
NDjamena needed their resources, especially financial 
resources, for other more important goals. 
 
------------------ 
JEM ON THEIR MINDS 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C)  President Bashir said he had taken a "firm decision" 
to "neutralize and liquidate" the Chadian rebellion on 
Sudanese soil. President Bachir's demands included that the 
GOC "stop mediating" with the JEM and simply end all Chadian 
aid to JEM:  The GOS could take care of the rest of the JEM 
problem.  The Chadians and Sudanese agreed to move forward on 
"mechanisms to control and monitor" their frontier to 
eliminate threats from rebels in either direction, along the 
lines of the 2006 Bilateral Protocol, which called for mixed 
Chadian and Sudanese border patrolling and establishment of 
ten border control posts.  Both sides also agreed to end the 
"propaganda war" of official and officious public attacks on 
each other. 
 
¶8.  (C) Ambassador Bechir said that President Deby and the 
GOC were definitely willing to sacrifice their relationship 
with JEM to normalization of relations with Sudan, including 
the ending of the Chad rebellion based in Sudan. Bechir 
repeated that breaking with JEM was not without risks to Deby 
and the GOC, including the threat of intra-Zaghawa "war" (see 
Reftel).  Bechir said that the Chadian delegation were 
convinced that President Bashir was indeed "serious" about 
normalizing relations at the expense of his Chad rebel 
clients, but that convincing President Deby of Sudanese good 
faith was not yet a given, because of all the bad blood that 
had run between them the past five years.  FORMIN Faki was 
scheduled to brief Deby December 26 or 27, Bechir said. 
 
---------- 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The two sides agreed that within 15 days a Sudanese 
military/security delegation would come to NDjamena to 
discuss the modalities of implementing the 2006 Protocol. 
Fifteen days after that, the first "mixed border control 
groups" of security and intelligence officers would be 
operational. The GOC agreed to go to Doha to continue to lend 
its weight to Darfur negotiations. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The quiet, persistent bilateral track inaugurated 
last summer between Chad and Sudan continues to produce 
results, building on the changed correlation of forces in the 
"proxy war" since 2008 and on the two government's changed 
strategic priorities based on an evolving geopolitical 
situation and on political developments within both Chad and 
Sudan.  We have analyzed that President Deby would trade his 
relationship with Khalil Ibrahim for assured security from 
Chad rebels based in Darfur. If President Bashir and the 
Sudanese can deliver on such "assured security," true 
normalization of Chad-Sudan relations may be at hand, to the 
detriment of armed rebel groups, including JEM in Chad and 
the rump Chad rebellion in Sudan. We will try to see Faki 
after he briefs Deby on this visit and its results:  Senior 
USG encouragement to Deby to "stay the bilateral course" 
might be worth considering at some point. 
 
¶11.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
NDJAMENA 00000621  003 OF 003 
 
 
NIGRO