VZCZCXRO1564
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #3056/01 3550755
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210755Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5724
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003056 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019 
TAGS: PMIL PREL MARR NATO OSCE RS
SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV'S PROPOSED EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY:  HOW 
TO RESPOND 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 2906 
     ¶B. MOSCOW 2781 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) After considerable build-up, President Medvedev 
unexpectedly released a draft European Security Treaty on 
November 29 and Russia introduced a parallel draft 
NATO-Russia treaty at the December 4 NATO ministerial 
(collectively the ESTs -- European Security Treaties).  The 
ESTs seek to redress Russia's grievances from the last 20 
years over NATO enlargement and the Balkan wars and to 
reestablish Moscow's role as a great power with influence on 
par with any other Euro-Atlantic country.  In reality, the 
ESTs break little new ground conceptually, foundering on the 
tension between progressive European ideals and Russia's 
instincts to protect state sovereignty.  The resulting text 
tries to subordinate existing structures and norms to the 
idea that one party to the treaty cannot take actions related 
to security that "affect significantly" the security of other 
parties.  The purpose is to limit NATO's activities (e.g. 
enlargement and exercises) and render redundant the OSCE's 
conflict-prevention structures.  Ru 
ssia insists the new treaty must be "legally binding," but it 
contains no enforcement mechanisms or sanctions provisions. 
 
¶2.  (C) While this draft is clumsy and tendentious, it is 
another loud signal that Russia is interested in a serious 
dialogue on European security.  While recent Russian actions, 
e.g. the war in Georgia, have made such a dialogue more 
difficult, a rejection of Medvedev's proposal would further 
alienate Russia from Euro-Atlantic institutions and 
ultimately detract from regional security.  With skillful 
diplomacy, we can use Medvedev's proposal to try to overcome 
deadlocks on CFE and A/CFE as well as enhancing transparency 
measures.  Engagement will also help preserve improved 
Russian cooperation on Afghanistan and Iran.  In the long 
term, gaining Russian buy-in on incremental changes to 
Europe's security architecture offers a way to build on the 
successes of European integration and spread security and 
prosperity to former Soviet countries.  End Summary. 
 
Now in Black and White 
---------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) President Medvedev announced Russia's intent to 
spearhead a legally binding treaty on European Security in 
June 2008.  The impetus is the Russian perception that the 
West in the 1990s failed to capitalize on the end of the Cold 
War to build new European security structures inclusive of 
Russia, but instead chose to humiliate Russia by enlarging 
NATO and ignoring Moscow's objections to military 
intervention in the Balkans.  On November 29, Medvedev 
abruptly unveiled a draft of his European Security Treaty 
(EST), sending letters to President Obama and other leaders 
and posting it on his website.  While the timing seems to 
have been intended to capture the agenda of the OSCE and NRC 
ministerials, the lack of advance notice has undercut the 
roll-out and Foreign Ministry contacts tell us some senior 
officials there are unhappy with the draft and were reluctant 
to release it in its current form. 
 
¶4.  (C) The treaty's stated intention is for parties (all 
countries "from Vancouver to Vladivostok," probably meaning 
current OSCE member-states) to cooperate on the basis of 
principles of "indivisible, equal and undiminished security" 
and agree to refrain from activities that affect 
significantly the security of other parties to the treaty. 
Moreover, parties that are members of military alliances 
pledge to ensure those alliances will not take decisions that 
affect significantly the security of others.  This language 
is apparently intended to subordinate NATO and other 
organizations to a new code of conduct and provide redress 
for parties that believe their security is being compromised. 
 While the broader treaty spells out OSCE-like consultation 
mechanisms to deal with security threats, all decisions are 
based on consensus and there are no enforcement mechanisms or 
sanctions provisions. 
 
¶5.  (C) The broader draft as written would give Russia and 
its allies a platform for opposing (but not stopping) NATO 
enlargement, exercises, operations, and Partnership for Peace 
activities.  In addition, it could make the OSCE's role in 
hard security redundant and could further reduce Russian 
cooperation with the OSCE on the human and economic 
dimensions.  The draft is silent on the mechanics in 
 
MOSCOW 00003056  002 OF 003 
 
 
confronting new threats and challenges from outside the 
Euro-Atlantic space, arguably the issue creating the most 
pressing need for alterations in existing structures. 
 
The treaty that should have been... 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The parallel "NATO Treaty" that Lavrov delivered at 
the December 4 NRC ministerial echoes much of the language of 
the Medvedev draft, but also includes provisions designed to 
insulate Russia from NATO by limiting military deployments on 
the territory of countries that joined the alliance after 
1997, making legally binding the commitments undertaken in 
the NATO-Russia Founding Act.  The proposal suggests Russia's 
threat perceptions are still focused westward notwithstanding 
the NRC's professed goal of fostering cooperation.  While the 
MFA and Medvedev have highlighted the broader EST proposal, 
they have made no public statements on the parallel NRC 
proposal. 
 
Mixed Response 
-------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The response from Allied diplomats in Moscow to 
Medvedev's proposal has been mixed.  While French, German, 
British, and Italian colleagues said the document was thin, 
they called for a measured response so as not to injure 
Medvedev's pride and to maintain the hard-won change in tone 
in bilateral relations.  Many Eastern European diplomats, 
including those from the Czech Republic, Romania, and Poland, 
remain suspicious of Russian motives and see the treaty as an 
attempt to undermine NATO.  They argue that European states 
should ignore or publicly reject the document.  Russian 
commentaries have also given the proposal mixed reviews. 
Russian foreign policy experts, including the Carnegie 
Center's Dmitry Trenin and Russia in Global Affairs 
Editor-in-Chief Fedor Lukyanov, while sympathizing with the 
principles behind the document, acknowledge weaknesses in the 
text and see it as a starting point for discussions. 
 
The Ball is now in Our Court 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Medvedev's identification of the EST as his top 
foreign policy objective clearly signals Russia's 
dissatisfaction with existing structures.  And Russia's 
attack on Georgia last summer demonstrates the risks to the 
existing regional security architecture.  The successful 
expansion of Europe's zone of stability and prosperity during 
the last 20 years, achieved using the tools of NATO and EU 
enlargement, has now reached a plateau.  Continuing to follow 
the policies used during the past two decades will result in 
deadlock with Russia and insecurity in European regions that 
seek, but have not yet attained, close integration with 
European institutions.  A new paradigm that gives Russia a 
better sense of buy-in of European structures would create a 
smoother pathway for achieving the goal of European 
integration by former Soviet states and eventually Russia 
itself. 
 
¶9.  (C) Rejecting the European security proposal out of hand 
all but guarantees returning to the well-worn ruts at OSCE 
and could reduce Russian willingness to work with us on 
common security threats (Iran, Afghanistan, 
counter-proliferation, and North Korea to name a few). 
European security could be proposed as a major agenda item 
for the OSCE's Annual Security Review Conference in mid-2010 
to motivate meaningful interactions in the coming six months. 
 
¶10.  (C) On the tactical level, intensifying our dialogue 
with Russia on European security could create opportunities 
to overcome obstacles to reactivating the CFE Treaty and 
resolving the A/CFE impasse.  The draft treaty also opens the 
door to discussions of new and stronger confidence and 
security-building mechanisms that would avoid future 
recriminations on the nature or purpose of NATO membership, 
exercises or military facilities. 
 
¶11.  (C) An effort to elicit discussion on the EST by the 
U.S. and Allies would help smoke out whether Russia's agenda 
is sincere or focused on weakening a perceived adversary. 
For example: 
 
--Russia's demand for legally binding resolution mechanisms 
could be explored for existing OSCE tools. 
 
--If Russia wants beefed-up transparency/confidence-building 
in NATO-Russia interactions, then we should explore a package 
that includes Moscow ending its suspension of CFE and 
 
MOSCOW 00003056  003 OF 003 
 
 
following through on its Istanbul commitments on A/CFE. 
 
--In exchange for a definition of "substantial combat 
forces," we could seek an expressed, written commitment that 
neither NATO nor Russia poses a threat to one another, 
requiring a tangible Russian demonstration that its doctrine, 
training, exercises, and threat assessments no longer target 
NATO and its allies.  Such a demonstration could require 
greater transparency measures and notification of Russian 
deployments in "flank areas," thereby reinforcing A/CFE 
commitments. 
 
--Russia's essentially symbolic demands for the West to 
engage with the SCO and CSTO could be linked to higher 
priorities, such as assurances that all countries enjoy 
freedom of association and that our respective alliances 
remain open to new members. 
 
The Domestic Angle 
------------------ 
 
¶12.  (C) American reactions will be closely monitored because 
of the implications for Russian domestic politics.  Engaging 
seriously with Russia would reduce the amount of ammunition 
available to Russian conservatives intent on demonstrating 
that the West wants to undermine and weaken Russia and 
refuses to treat it as an equal.  While the struggle between 
Russia's "siloviki" (officials from the military and security 
services) and modernizers for the country's future will 
ultimately be decided by Russians themselves, Medvedev's 
proposal provides us the opportunity to influence one of the 
core points of this debate: the intentions of the West. 
 
¶13.  (C) Finally, an effective response to Medvedev's 
proposal should acknowledge Russia's apprehensions about the 
status quo and European security and accept the possibility 
of building incrementally on existing structures without 
compromising the centrality of NATO and OSCE.  This process 
could advance the long-term goal of moving Russia from 
"zero-sum" thinking to embrace more sincerely effective 
partnership to confront common challenges. 
Beyrle