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INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
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SUBJECT: BELARUS ELECTION LAW AMENDMENTS: AN EXAMPLE OF NON-INCLUSIVE 
DEMOCRACY 
 
REF: MINSK 413 
 
¶1.  Summary.  The GOB is in the final stages of amending 
Belarus' electoral law in anticipation of local elections next 
April and presidential polls in 2011.  While Lukashenka and 
other regime officials have publicly addressed proposed changes 
to the code, the amendment process has lacked transparency, 
offered no mechanism for interactive input by the OSCE, NGOs or 
opposition parties, and did not invite open public debate or 
discussion during parliamentary consideration.  Amendments 
emerged in final legislative form December 18, end of the 
current Belarus parliamentary session. Official announcement of 
a local (municipal) election date will follow, with the GOB 
looking at a late April timeframe.  Lukashenka is expected to 
issue an edict by mid-January giving the amendments force of 
law.  GOB officials have said the new code will remain in force 
and not be amended further before the 2011 presidential 
election.  Despite the non-democratic process and limited 
authority of local officials, the political opposition believes 
it is important to participate in the process with the goal of 
winning seats.  Seats on municipal councils can serve as a legal 
platform for reaching the public and influencing local 
authorities.  Nevertheless, a cooperative effort by all 
opposition forces can field, by their own estimates, a maximum 
of 300 candidates for the approximately 24,000 contested local 
positions nationwide.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
MINOR IMPROVEMENTS IN SOME CASES, BUT NO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶2.  The election cycle comes against a backdrop of economic 
challenges for Belarus in 2009, including a drop in exports and 
foreign reserves, budgetary pressures, and reliance on foreign 
borrowing, especially from the IMF.  The regime has been mindful 
of western concerns and would like to have its amended law 
recognized as a step toward establishing international election 
norms.  The Belarus Central Election Commission (CEC) told us 
they have adopted 90 percent of the OSCE's recommendations put 
forth in the spring of 2009; critics view the revisions as 
largely cosmetic and insufficient to ensure free elections in 
Belarus.  Amendments that passed a second parliamentary reading 
December 11 (reftel) are expected to remain in force, with only 
technical modifications.  Changes include minor improvements in 
local election board membership, candidate selection procedures, 
the appeals process and ballot security.  Tight legal 
restrictions on public gatherings will be eased somewhat during 
the campaign period, but venues for campaigning will be 
determined by authorities, a requirement that could force 
opposition candidates to hold rallies in locations inconvenient 
for them and prospective voters. 
 
¶3.  Political party representatives on local election 
commissions will no longer be required to hold formal membership 
in the party, a step that could offer some added flexibility for 
opposition groups.  One-third of local election board members 
will be drawn from political parties and NGOs, while no more 
than one-third may concurrently hold positions as public 
officials, moves advertised as a way to broaden public 
participation and curb both nepotism and executive control at 
the local level.  Parties will be allowed to field candidates in 
election districts, even where the party has not established a 
registered office.  Local election candidates themselves may 
seek a place on the ballot either through nomination by a party 
or independently by gaining a required number of signatures from 
citizens of the district.  There will no longer be a required 
minimum percentage level of participation in voting districts 
for results to count, a step that could keep authorities from 
using a low turnout in certain districts as a pretext for 
voiding results.  A controversial early voting period of five 
days preceding election day, when up to 40 percent of voters 
cast ballots, will remain part of the new law.  However, the CEC 
claims there will be added security to safeguard the early 
votes, with ballot boxes sealed by local boards at the end of 
each voting day. 
 
¶4.  Election law revisions fall short in several key areas. 
First, and most importantly, the GOB has reneged on its initial 
public commitment to allow observers a seat at the table as 
ballot boxes are opened and votes tabulated by election boards. 
When votes are counted, observers at polling stations will be 
kept at a distance from local commission members, not close 
enough to verify visually the accuracy of the vote count or 
monitor on-the-spot any disputes or irregularities.  Second, the 
CEC has rejected use of transparent ballot boxes.  Third, the 
 
MINSK 00000415  002 OF 003 
 
 
provision for one-third of the members of local election boards 
to be drawn from political parties and NGOs does not guarantee 
that opposition views will be represented. Critics fear that 
seats could be filled by compliant, pro-regime organizations 
under the guise of non-governmental groups, squeezing out 
participation by genuine independents.  In addition, opposition 
groups had sought an end to early voting, arguing that balloting 
over an extended period of time increases the risk of fraud and 
manipulation. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
POLITICAL OPPOSITION SKEPTICAL BUT WILL COMPETE IN ELECTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶5.  At a broader level, critics in Belarus remain skeptical and 
doubt that amendments to the election law will yield progress 
toward free and open elections.  Political analyst Valery 
Karbalevich told us the regime decided to enact changes to the 
election code under pressure from the West, especially the EU 
and OSCE, but he said that problems with elections in Belarus 
are the result of the way laws are implemented, not how they are 
written.  An honest election could be held under existing law, 
and a fraudulent election carried out under the new code. 
Dismissive of the importance of local elections, Karbalevich 
said that when compared to executive authority in Belarus, the 
public perceives municipal assemblies as institutionally weak 
and lacking independent decision-making power.  Without much at 
stake, local polls are unlikely to generate enthusiasm from 
voters in April or shift the status quo.  In addition, he does 
not expect local businesses or donors from inside Belarus to 
step forward to fund independent or opposition candidates, 
leaving anti-regime elements to look toward outside sources for 
support. 
 
¶6.  Other critics agree that Lukashenka will maintain a firm 
grip on the process and point out that key improvements 
recommended and agreed to earlier, especially for a closer 
monitoring of the vote count, have not been adopted.  Leu 
Marholin of the United Civil Party told us that when Belarus 
began to look West, the opposition's principal task was to 
promote election reforms.  He sees local elections as a test 
that will reveal how the government plans to approach the 
presidential election in 2011.  His party will attempt to 
recruit people for seats on election commissions in larger 
oblasts and encourage the GOB to accept ODIHR monitors, a 
proposal the CEC has already rejected.  Any pressure on the part 
of authorities to keep opposition recruits off election boards 
for April's local polls will be read as an important signal of 
intent as the country looks ahead to the presidential election. 
Marholin would like to see the EU establish benchmarks that 
would include incentives by the West in return for tangible GOB 
progress in election transparency.  He reasoned that if 
incentives proved unsuccessful, failure to meet benchmark goals 
would highlight shortcomings in the election process. 
 
¶7.  Opponents of the regime hope to benefit from what they see 
as a growing "pro-European" outlook by the Belarus public and 
signs that the GOB wants better ties with the West. Viktar 
Karniayenka of the For Freedom movement told us it would be a 
mistake for the opposition to boycott local elections.  Despite 
the obstacles, including the lack of an independent judicial 
system upholding electoral law, he expects it will be somewhat 
easier to propose candidates, participate in local election 
commissions, and meet with voters. The goal should be to win 
seats, not just to show that the process is non-democratic. 
Seats on municipal councils can serve as a platform for reaching 
the public and influencing local authorities. He supports 
cooperation among "democratic forces" and said factions should 
be willing to step aside in favor of well qualified candidates 
from other opposition groups. In Karniayenka's view, the 
opposition will aim to field a maximum of 300 candidates 
nationwide (out of approximately 24,000 total seats) focusing on 
larger oblasts and Minsk. He hopes that, if elected, independent 
council members would look for areas of cooperation with the 
government, especially on issues related to promoting 
integration with Europe. 
 
¶8.  The basic impediment to a free and fair election process 
reaches well beyond the new election code amendments.  Without 
recourse to independent courts and administrative agencies fraud 
cannot be challenged effectively.  Officials at the 
Belarus-Helsinki Committee (BHC) told us that fraud pervades the 
system because each element up and down the line in the Belarus 
power structure, including the judiciary and executive 
 
MINSK 00000415  003 OF 003 
 
 
authority, is under pressure to ensure pro-government outcomes. 
Real independence at any point in the regime's vertical 
administrative structure would undermine the entire system. 
Modest improvements in the election law and GOB interest in 
fostering a perception of transparency may serve as a check on 
more overt forms of fraud, but the BHC expects to see a shift 
toward "sophisticated manipulation" in order to achieve desired 
results.  Early voting and portable voting provisions are areas 
especially susceptible to such manipulation.  Also, according to 
BHC officials, authorities will mobilize state enterprise 
employees to turn out on election day and provide massive 
support for candidates loyal to the regime.  BHC chair Aleh 
Hulak stated flatly that Belarus does not have the conditions 
for democratic elections.  At the same time, he added 
paradoxically that while the public does not see elections as a 
means for change, a substantial majority (60%) of Belarusians 
view their elections as credible, a perception that continues to 
provide support and running room for the regime. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. Comment.  Despite the problems, local elections can offer an 
opportunity for aspiring politicians outside the regime to gain 
seats on local councils.  Once in public office, they will have 
a legal platform to openly discuss matters of governance, an 
important step if Belarus is to progress in the future.  The 
Belarus opposition remains weak and divided, but even in the 
face of modest expectations, there are early positive signs that 
regime opponents are prepared to take part, cooperate in 
fielding candidates, and seek places on local election boards. 
However, Lukashenka's association in the public's mind with 
positive steps toward Europe will most likely mitigate this as a 
factor in the oppositions favor despite their hopes to the 
contrary. 
 
¶10.  Comment continued:  GOB actions through the amendment 
process, campaign period, election, and vote count will stand as 
a gauge for regime intentions as it seeks to maintain control of 
domestic affairs, while weighing possibilities for moving along 
a track toward resetting ties with the West.  However, the 
latter as a policy priority has in the last month come into 
question as GOB increasingly believes it has weathered the 
economic crisis, and through the proposed single economic space 
with Russia and Kazakhstan found a way to once again obtain oil 
and gas at subsidized rates and unfettered access to the Russian 
market for its export based economy.   End comment. 
SCANLAN