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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 002613 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM KJUS KCRM EAID ASEC RP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES ELECTIONS, MASSACRE, AND 
BILATERAL TIES WITH INTERIOR SECRETARY PUNO 
 
REF: MANILA 2448 (CLAN VIOLENCE) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) In a December 21 farewell call on Interior and Local 
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, the Ambassador stressed 
U.S. neutrality in upcoming Philippine elections, interest in 
accountability for the recent massacre in Maguindanao 
province, and appreciation for Philippine cooperation in law 
enforcement matters.  Puno discussed his shock on learning of 
the scope of the Ampatuan clan's accumulation of wealth and 
weaponry.  He expressed deep appreciation for training and 
assistance from the FBI and Regional Security Office, as well 
as for intelligence cooperation, and he shared thoughts on 
future areas on which we might focus training.  Puno said he 
worried about election mechanics, but he saw progress in some 
efforts to ensure a peaceful election environment.  He 
discussed leading presidential candidates as well as the 
negative impact on the government when key cabinet members 
resign to stand for election.  End Summary. 
 
MAGUINDANAO 
----------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Ambassador on December 21 paid a farewell call on 
Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno.  The 
Ambassador thanked Puno for his cooperation and the insights 
he had shared with her, most recently during discussions of 
the massacre in Maguindanao province (reftel).  Puno said the 
cabinet had been genuinely shocked by the amount of wealth 
and weaponry that Maguindanao's Ampatuan clan had 
accumulated.  Although Puno acknowledged it was common 
knowledge that the Ampatuans had a sizeable militia, the 
government had not known, for example, that this militia 
maintained four tanks.  Puno also related that, on a visit to 
the United States, at least one leading member of the 
Ampatuan family had been delayed at the American port of 
entry for bringing 200,000 USD in cash. 
 
¶3. (C) The Ampatuans had been expanding their influence well 
beyond Maguindanao province, Puno related.  The clan had been 
providing financial backing to candidates running in the Jolo 
and Basilan gubernatorial elections, among others.  Puno 
believed the accumulation of power and impunity by the 
Ampatuans reflected poorly on the governance capacity of the 
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. 
 
¶4. (C) Puno explained that the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines continued to pursue 300-400 armed followers of 
the Ampatuans.  He said the government had taken an unpopular 
step by transferring police officials under Ampatuan 
influence from their posts, and it had been difficult to find 
a non-Ampatuan who was willing to serve as Acting Governor, 
because many feared possible retaliation by the clan.  He 
observed that current Acting Governor Nariman Ambolodto was 
actually from Shariff Kabunsuan, an area that had split from 
Maguindanao in 2006 before being reincorporated in 2008, and 
her roots might make it difficult for her to retain support 
from the local population for her service as Acting Governor. 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador said she was closely following the 
security situation in Maguindanao, and the Embassy was 
reviewing ways in which it might be able to provide further 
development assistance there.  Puno welcomed the prospect of 
further USG efforts on behalf of the people of Maguindanao. 
The Ambassador encouraged the government to focus on ensuring 
speedy and fair trials of those responsible for the massacre. 
 Puno promised that the Department of Justice was taking the 
trials seriously and the cases would be handled in a 
transparent manner. 
 
ELECTIONS 
--------- 
 
¶6. (C) Puno said that the May 2010 elections would pose a 
tremendous challenge to the government.  He worried about the 
functionality of machines to be used for automated vote 
tabulation, and about the lack of voter education to date. 
He also believed there was a significant possibility of 
violence during the election.  Puno said he hoped that 
Filipinos would either surrender or register their 
 
MANILA 00002613  002 OF 002 
 
 
privately-owned firearms in advance of the elections, and he 
cited the relative success of the Jolo Governor Abdusakur Tan 
in this effort. 
 
¶7. (C) President Arroyo would easily win the congressional 
seat she was seeking, Puno predicted.  In the presidential 
race, Puno supported the administration-backed candidacy of 
Gilberto Teodoro, but he said that the other front-runners 
(Senators Aquino and Villar) were also serious, credible 
figures.  The Ambassador stressed that the USG was entirely 
neutral in the coming election but did care about the 
process, and she encouraged Puno to exert whatever influence 
he could to help ensure free, fair, and peaceful elections. 
 
CABINET DYNAMICS 
---------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Puno worried about the prospect of cabinet 
resignations in the near future, as some cabinet members 
would leave by March at the latest to engage in campaigning. 
He was particularly worried about the loss of presidential 
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, Agriculture Secretary 
Arthur Yap, and Presidential Management Staff Chief 
Hermogenes Esperon.  These were influential advisors of 
President Arroyo who significantly helped to keep the 
government functioning.  Once they were to leave office, 
their deputies would not be able to fill their shoes. 
 
¶9. (C) Tangentially, Puno characterized Secretary of National 
Defense Norberto Gonzales as a poor choice for his job.  In 
Puno's view, Gonzales had inadequate experience to run a 
large agency, was inconsistent, had a poor rapport with 
leading members of the armed forces, and had "odd" political 
views.  Nevertheless, President Arroyo liked Gonzales, Puno 
admitted. 
 
COLLABORATION WITH THE USG 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Puno expressed great appreciation for the wide range 
of support his Department had received from the USG, 
specifically citing the efforts of the FBI and the Regional 
Security Office, as well as U.S.-Philippine 
intelligence-sharing.  The Ambassador cited the recent arrest 
of Abu Sayyaf Group figure Abdul Basir Latip as an example of 
close U.S.-Philippine cooperation and also discussed U.S. 
work with the Philippine National Police (PNP) in the 
aftermath of natural disasters, as well as U.S. assistance in 
creating model police stations around the country. 
 
¶11. (C) Puno acknowledged the Philippines could not have a 
better partner than the United States.  He expressed 
satisfaction with efforts to date to modernize the PNP but 
said more work remained to be done.  He praised FBI technical 
training but added the PNP would benefit from further 
training in crime scene investigation, as well as in judicial 
matters, police/prosecutor cooperation, and combating 
trafficking in persons.  He agreed with the Ambassador on the 
necessity of ensuring that the PNP selected the proper 
officials for training, and of promoting human rights. 
KENNEY