VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMD #1146/01 3350917
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 010917Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1509
INFO RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0298
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001146 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA 
ALEXANDRA MCKNIGHT AND STACIE ZERDECKI, EUR/WE 
RICARDO ZUNIGA, WHA/CCA 
USEU FOR BARBARA THOMAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SP CU EUN
SUBJECT: SPANISH EU INITIATIVE COULD REQUIRE MORE FROM CUBA 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
REF: A. MADRID 1121 
     ¶B. MADRID 983 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM William H. Duncan for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (SBU) Foreign Minister Moratinos continues to press 
publicly for a new mechanism to replace the European Union's 
1996 Common Position toward Cuba, indicating a willingness to 
spearhead such an effort during Spain's EU presidency in the 
first half of 2010.  Most recently, following the fourth 
EU-Cuba political dialogue held in Brussels November 28, 
Moratinos expressed the Spanish hope for "a bilateral 
cooperation framework" with Cuba.   Moratinos participated in 
the meeting between Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs Bruno 
Rodriguez and the EU Troika, as did European Commissioner for 
Development and Humanitarian Assistance Karel de Gucht and 
Swedish Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Frank 
Belfrage.  Moratinos told the media, "Now we have the Common 
Position, but it is a European unilateral position, and . . . 
it does not meet (Cuba's) objectives.  I think it may be time 
to make a bilateral commitment, so it is not just a 
unilateral reference."  He held that such an agreement would 
force Havana to approach "more sensitive issues," including 
basic human and civil rights. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Spain seeks political and economic engagement with 
Cuba and plays a leadership role in the EU's political and 
human rights dialogue with Cuba.  Spanish officials allude to 
Spain's hopes for even greater EU-Cuba engagement during the 
Spanish presidency, and FM Moratinos has spoken increasingly 
of the possibility of replacing the Common Position.  Spain 
is expected to encourage the EU27 to start negotiating an 
alternative cooperation agreement with Cuba, to include a 
"democratic clause" and requirements with regard to Human 
Rights and Rule of Law, as a precursor to eliminating the 
Common Position. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) During his October 17-19 visit to Havana, Moratinos 
argued that a different kind of agreement would provide 
greater human rights guarantees.  Following a three-hour 
meeting with Raul Castro on October 18, Moratinos told the 
press that Spanish-Cuban bilateral relations were 
"normalized" and that as of one Spain's priorities during its 
EU Presidency, Madrid would seek the elimination of the EU's 
Common Position and its replacement with a mechanism that 
seeks to condition the normalization of relations between 
Member States and Cuba on the latter's democratization 
efforts and respect for human rights, in particular civil and 
political rights.  Speaking in Brussels on November 28, 
Moratinos reiterated that a bilateral deal initiated by Spain 
would require commitments from the Cuban government 
 
¶4.  (C) FM Moratinos has been criticized for what some 
perceive to be caving to GOC pressure or, at best, carrying 
Cuban water within the EU.  Since his October 17-19 visit to 
Havana, Moratinos has defended his remarks publicly and MFA 
officials admit they have answered hundreds of related 
congressional as well as diplomatic and media inquiries.  In 
October, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania asked 
Moratinos to further explain his public remarks calling for 
the EU to eliminate 0uBQonsensus-based approach in reaching an accord to replace the 
Common Position.  The same GOS sources told the media that if 
the Lisbon Treaty were implemented, any revision of the EU 
Common Position would not need to be determined by unanimous 
vote. 
 
¶5.  (C) MFA Director General for IberoAmerican Affairs Juan 
Carlos Sanchez Alonso told POLOFF October 29 that Moratinos 
had never said Spain would eliminate, and Spain alone could 
not do away with, the Common Position.  Rather Spain sought 
to initiate an EU process to find a new way to relate to 
Cuba.  He admitted the GOS had initiated an internal legal 
inquiry into the need (post-Lisbon) for unanimity to 
eliminate the Common Position, but had stopped short of a 
conclusion.  While Spain could, by virtue of its expertise 
and competence, act without the EU on Cuba policy, Sanchez 
Alonso suggested a Spanish political decision had been 
reached following Moratinos's trip and "trial balloon" 
(perhaps in the face of pushback from other Europeans) to 
work instead to convince the remaining 26 members of the 
wisdom of a new country strategy paper stricter than the 
 
existing Common Position.  No one wanted a united front vis a 
vis Cuba more than Spain.  With a democratic clause, 
everything would at last be on the table.  Sanchez Alonso 
cited U.S. acquiescence to the elimination of the OAS 
resolution barring Cuba from membership, asking why, if the 
United States could allow the OAS prohibition to fall, the 
GOS could not seek EU exploration of a possible alternative? 
He implied that Moratinos's statements had been a way to 
sound out European support and intimated Spain would not 
likely complicate its EU presidency with such an effort if it 
was not perceived to be well viewed.  (NOTE:  Conservative 
Spanish media pointed out November 19 that the agreed-upon 
multi-party agenda for Spain's EU presidency did not include 
Cuba, after the conservative opposition Partido Popular and 
ruling Socialist Party were unable to agree on language.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
¶6.  (SBU) During an October 28 meeting with Foreign Minister 
Moratinos, European Parliament Commission for Foreign Affairs 
President Gabriele Albertini reportedly said it was 
"understandable" for Spain to maintain special relations with 
Cuba and Latin America due to historical and cultural reasons 
but warned that improved relations between the European 
Parliament and Havana depended on "steps toward democracy." 
Albertini said that democratic development in Cuba "leaves 
much to be desired" and noted that Moratinos "negotiates in 
his role of Minister of a Member State, not of the European 
Union." 
 
¶7. (SBU) FM Moratinos nonetheless testified in the Senate on 
November 17 that not a single EU country had spoken against 
his intention to replace the Common Position on Cuba during 
Spain's EU Presidency.   According to Moratinos, some other 
European countries might try to make adjustments, but the 
Spanish proposal -- to negotiate a bilateral EU-Cuba 
agreement that would lead to greater Cuban compliance with 
human rights and engagement on reform activities -- was not 
encountering any opposition. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Cuban FM Rodriguez on November 28 voiced his 
agreement with the Spanish Foreign Minister's assessment of 
the positive trend in European-Cuban relations and offered 
his own assessment that a majority of EU member states 
favored "standardizing relations."  Rodriguez called the EU's 
Common Position an "insuperable obstacle" that should be 
discarded as soon as possible. 
CHACON