VZCZCXRO2110
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHLJ #0385/01 3551712
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211712Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7599
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0066
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 2425
RHMFIUU/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LJUBLJANA 000385 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/FO DAS QUANRUD AND DAS JONES, EUR/CE AND 
EUR/SCE, S/GC DAN FRIED 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN NATO MARR HR SI
SUBJECT: PUTTING U.S.-SLOVENIA RELATIONS BACK ON TRACK 
 
Classified By: CDA Brad Freden, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
1.(C) CDA requested a meeting with Foreign Minister Samuel 
Zbogar on December 17 to review developments from 2009 and 
discuss priorities for 2010, with an eye toward arresting the 
perceived "drift" in U.S.-Slovenian relations.  Both agreed 
that the dispute with Croatia over the border and Croatia's 
EU accession had overshadowed other bilateral issues in 2009. 
 When Zbogar asked what substantively Slovenia could do to 
secure a meeting for Prime Minister Pahor with President 
Obama, CDA used the opportunity to convey to the FM that 
Slovenia could do more on Afghanistan and Guantanamo detainee 
resettlement if it wants to attract higher-level attention 
from Washington.  Zbogar was confident that Slovenia would 
deploy an OMLT in 2010 and outlined the government's plans 
for reconstruction projects in Afghanistan.  On detainees, 
both agreed that current law made it difficult for Slovenia 
to accept detainees; a strong push from the Prime Minister, 
including possible legislation, would be necessary to 
overcome the obstacles.  Regarding the Slovenia-Croatia 
border dispute and Croatia's EU accession negotiations, CDA 
asked for Zbogar's commitment that the MFA will do all it can 
to ensure that both processes move along as expeditiously as 
possible.  Zbogar felt the arbitration agreement would 
survive ratification and a referendum.  The FM asked for 
Washington's understanding that the GoS needed more time to 
conduct due diligence on technical issues relating to 
Croatia's currently unopened accession negotiation chapters 
before it could go to Parliament for its review. 
 
2.(C) CDA acknowledged Slovenia's continued support for U.S. 
policy in the Western Balkans, especially in BiH, and its 
efforts to keep the European Union and NATO focused on the 
integration of these states into Euro-Atlantic institutions. 
Zbogar asked for close bilateral consultation, as Ljubljana 
plans to increase its engagement in BiH next year.  The FM 
stressed the importance of ensuring that the Bosniaks were 
not left feeling abandoned by the current process.  Finally, 
Zbogar said that PM Pahor's government is taking heat over 
the continued lack of a U.S. Ambassador in Ljubljana.  CDA 
assured Zbogar that the process of selecting a career 
ambassador was moving forward, and the State Department was 
fast-tracking its part of the process.  End summary. 
 
ZBOGAR ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENT, CROATIA'S EU ACCESSION 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
3.(C) FM Zbogar opened by providing CDA with an update on 
where the arbitration agreement with Croatia currently stood 
in Slovenia.  According to Zbogar, the GoS has provided the 
Constitutional Court with all of the documents it requested 
to continue its review of the arbitration agreement's 
constitutionality.  Zbogar was hopeful that the Court would 
render its decision by the end of January, but he conceded 
that it was not possible to be certain of the exact timing at 
this point.  The FM was confident that the Court would not 
find the agreement unconstitutional.  However, Zbogar said 
that he believed the question of whether a two-thirds 
majority was required for ratification would come to the 
forefront.  The FM explained that he personally felt that 
such a majority was unnecessary, as the trans-border 
cooperation agreement with Croatia adopted several years 
before was passed with a simple majority. 
 
4.(C) Once the Court delivers it ruling on constitutionality, 
Zbogar explained that the arbitration agreement would go to a 
referendum.  Based on his recent conversations with members 
of the Slovenian public, the FM said he felt there currently 
was good support for the agreement, as most Slovenians "just 
wanted move on."  Zbogar was confident that the referendum 
would have a positive outcome.  He believes the government 
has the momentum right now to push the agreement through, but 
it will need to ensure that supporters turn out in 
sufficiently large numbers. 
 
5.(C) Zbogar dismissed opposition leader Janez Jansa's recent 
strong statements against the agreement as part of Jansa's 
overall strategy to attack Pahor's government on all fronts, 
 
LJUBLJANA 00000385  002 OF 004 
 
 
calling the current political climate a "very poisoned 
atmosphere."  Zbogar explained that he believed it would be 
hard for Jansa to keep quiet, because PM Pahor has staked his 
government's survival on successful ratification.  Zbogar 
lamented the fact that our engagement with Jansa has not 
stopped him from speaking out publicly against the agreement, 
to which CDA noted our intent to remain quietly engaged with 
Jansa and his party. 
 
6.(C) Regarding the negotiations on Croatia's EU accession 
process, Zbogar underscored that Slovenia was not posing a 
new blockade, but simply needed more time to work out the 
technical issues surrounding the remaining unopened chapters. 
 Zbogar noted that Slovenia has worked hard to open 16 
chapters in two months, which the FM admitted was a large 
amount of material for the relevant parliamentary committee 
to digest in such a short period.  Because the government did 
not actively work on the currently unopened chapters during 
the blockade, it now has to do all of the technical 
groundwork before formally going to the Committee, as is 
required by Slovenian law before any chapter can be opened or 
closed. 
 
7.(C) The FM offered that the government is trying to avoid a 
situation where Parliament feels it is being rushed and 
forced to act on the remaining chapters.  Zbogar is concerned 
that parliamentarians will equate the government's urgency to 
outside pressure from both the U.S. and European Union.  Such 
a perception would ultimately not be helpful, according to 
the FM.  Zbogar told CDA that the GoS needed "to let 
Parliament know (they) are taking time to defend (Slovenia's) 
interests."  At the end of the day, it is in Slovenia's best 
interests for Croatia to complete its accession negotiations 
as soon as possible, because only then will the arbitration 
tribunal be able to formally start its work.  Zbogar was 
confident that at least two of the three chapters (13, 27 and 
31) could be opened at the next IGC in January. 
 
ZBOGAR ON BiH AND THE BUTMIR PROCESS 
 
8.(C) CDA told FM Zbogar that we would welcome more-frequent 
consultations with Slovenia on the Western Balkans.  Slovenia 
has a unique insider's perspective and can help Brussels keep 
its focus on the region.  Zbogar responded that Slovenia is 
planning to ratchet up its engagement in this area in 2010. 
He noted that Slovenia had come out more forcefully on BiH's 
NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) than had the U.S.  Zbogar 
said that Ljubljana felt that NATO should have offered BiH an 
invitation to join MAP at the December NATO ministerial. 
Slovenia is convinced that it is critical to send a strong 
message on territorial integrity to BiH as the presidential 
campaign looms.  It is also important for NATO allies to 
consider what can be realistically achieved in BiH by the 
time of the April ministerial.  Zbogar said that Slovenia 
hoped to see BiH join MAP at that time. 
 
9.(C) Zbogar was somewhat critical of the message that has 
come out of the Butmir process.  He explained that the 
decision to continue moving forward on trying war crimes but 
not organized crime was perceived by the Bosniaks as a 
concession to Dodik.  Zbogar explained it was important to 
give the Bosniaks something like MAP to show that the 
international community's commitment to BiH's territorial 
integrity is more than just rhetoric.  Visa liberalization 
has to happen at the beginning of the Spanish presidency. 
The EU can send a strong message to the Bosniaks prior to the 
elections by doing this, according to the FM, and Slovenia 
plans to push the EU members to move forward on the visa 
issue. 
 
10.(C) Slovenia also plans to dispatch additional advisors to 
BiH to maintain an open bilateral dialogue.  Zbogar said that 
he has been to BiH twice in recent weeks, and that he feels 
the Bosniaks have really opened up to the Slovenes.  The FM 
explained that the Bosniaks have provided the Slovenian 
delegation with their frank thoughts on how they interpret 
the Butmir process.  As a result of this information, 
Slovenia is skeptical about the prospects for success in the 
short term.  The Spanish are trying to restart Butmir in 
February, but the window for progress will close shortly 
 
LJUBLJANA 00000385  003 OF 004 
 
 
thereafter.  Zbogar fears that the Bosniaks will radicalize 
if they start to believe that they are being left behind. 
Butmir simply gave too much to Dodik, according to Zbogar. 
The FM said Slovenia wants to work closely with BiH, and that 
consultations with the U.S. would be very useful for this 
process.  CDA agreed that this was a good area for further 
cooperation, and suggested that the January visit of MFA 
Western Balkans Coordinator Vojko Volk could be the start of 
a series of more structured semi-annual talks. 
 
GUANTANAMO 
 
11.(C) CDA took the opportunity to request again that 
Slovenia consider resettling Guantanamo detainees.  Zbogar 
told CDA that he has spoken to Interior Minister Kresal about 
this, and understood as a result of their conversation that 
there is currently no legal basis for Slovenia to accept a 
detainee.  Zbogar underscored that accepting detainees was 
not a decision for the government to make, as the law simply 
would not allow for it.  CDA told FM Zbogar that the United 
States needed Slovenia's help, and suggested that legislation 
might be an option if the laws were indeed as restrictive as 
the Ministry of Interior portrayed them.  Our experience with 
other countries that have accepted detainees indicates that 
"where there is a will, there is a way."  CDA noted 
Slovenia's Interior Minister was not alone in her skepticism; 
this has generally been the case across Europe.  Zbogar and 
CDA agreed that a strong push from the Prime Minister's 
office would be required in order to succeed.  (Note: CDA 
will discuss Guantanamo with the Prime Minister's foreign 
policy advisor on December 22.  End note.) 
 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
12.(C) Zbogar told CDA that he was confident Slovenia would 
deploy an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) to 
Afghanistan in 2010.  The FM had testified the same day with 
Defense Minister Jelusic in front of Parliament's Defense 
Committee, where he reaffirmed the U.S. message that the 
situation in Afghanistan was getting worse and that NATO 
member states needed to do more to stabilize the country. 
Zbogar noted to CDA the challenges the government faced in 
selling the deployment to Parliament, but was also glad to 
report that even the skeptics among the MPs admitted that 
they finally understood the urgency of the mission.  As a 
result, the Committee agreed to the deployment, with only the 
proviso that the government provide a detailed status report 
in one year.  At that time, Parliament will reevaluate 
Slovenia's deployment.  In the meantime, Zbogar said the 
government needed a proactive public diplomacy strategy, to 
which CDA responded with an offer to assist.  The government 
also presented its plans to move forward with two civilian 
reconstruction projects that will focus on the vaccination of 
nomadic family animals and establish a cooperative program 
with the Agricultural University of Herat.  CDA thanked 
Slovenia for their commitment, which involved not only an 
increase in the number of Slovene troops deployed in 
Afghanistan, but also a qualitative change in their mission. 
 
BILATERAL RELATIONS IN 2009: RUNNING JUST TO STAY IN PLACE 
 
13.(C) FM Zbogar told CDA that while he personally understood 
the ambassadorial selection process in Washington very well, 
others in Slovenia, especially parliamentarians, did not. 
Zbogar said the question of why the United States has yet to 
send an ambassador to Ljubljana came up in Parliament during 
a recent session.  Some MPs have been very critical of the 
delay, noting that not having an American ambassador was 
reflective of PM Pahor's government and its abilities, or, 
rather, the lack thereof.  Zbogar added that this was the 
second time in the past several years that there has been a 
significant gap between U.S. Ambassadors, and the government 
is taking political "heat" as a result.  CDA assured the FM 
that the Department was fast-tracking the process to fill the 
position as soon as possible with a career diplomat.  Zbogar 
responded that the timely dispatch of an ambassador would 
send a positive signal regarding the bilateral relationship. 
The FM noted his concern that Washington saw Slovenia as "the 
problem" behind the deadlock in 2009 over the border issue 
and Croatia's EU accession.  Zbogar said that Washington's 
 
LJUBLJANA 00000385  004 OF 004 
 
 
policy was perceived within some parts of the GoS as 
overly-focused on helping Croatian PM Kosor push the 
arbitration agreement through her parliament.  CDA reassured 
Zbogar that Washington's policy was not to support either 
side, but to support a bilateral solution that benefits both 
sides. 
 
COMMENT 
 
14.(C) The lack of an ambassador in Ljubljana is a perception 
problem that will soon be resolved.  The real reason for the 
drift in U.S.-Slovenian relations in 2009 was the border 
dispute with Zagreb and concomitant blockade of Croatia's EU 
accession talks.  The dispute quickly became Washington's top 
bilateral priority, eclipsing other issues on the agenda.  On 
the Slovenian side, it left the GoS with no appetite for 
other potentially-controversial foreign policy issues.  With 
Croatia's accession talks back in session and the border 
dispute on its way to resolution, Slovenia is once again 
ready to engage with us on a wide spectrum of issues, from 
the Western Balkans to Afghanistan to Guantanamo.  We can 
almost guarantee that there will be bumps on the road to 
ratification of the arbitration agreement -- opposition 
leader Janez Jansa is still a potential spoiler -- but the 
difference now is that the government seems to have regained 
its confidence.  On the other hand, the GoS' top bilateral 
priority -- a meeting between PM Pahor and President Obama -- 
may be out of reach, even if they do everything we ask of 
them.  One of our major tasks in 2010 will therefore be to 
manage expectations.  End comment. 
 
FREDEN