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UNCLAS LIMA 001723 
 
SIPDIS 
S/CT: RHONDA SHORE AND NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC PE
SUBJECT: Peru: 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism 
 
REF: STATE 109980; STATE 122733 
 
Peru 
 
 
 
¶1.  (U) Peru's primary counterterrorism concern remained fighting 
remnants of the militant Maoist Sendero Luminoso (SL or Shining 
Path), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that wreaked 
havoc on the country in the 1980s and 1990s at a cost of more than 
69,000 lives. SL elements in the Upper Huallaga River Valley (UHV) 
sought to regroup and replenish their ranks following significant 
setbacks suffered in 2007 and 2008. Separately, the rival SL 
organization in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley (VRAE) maintained 
its influence in the area. Both factions continued to engage in 
drug trafficking, and during the year carried out more than 100 
terrorist acts in remote coca-growing areas and surrounding areas 
that killed at least 3 police, 26 civilians (mostly individuals 
perceived by SL in the UHV as police informants or collaborators), 
and 19 members of the military. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Although the Fujimori government nearly eliminated SL in 
the 1990s, the organization, now entwined with narcotics 
trafficking, remained a threat in 2009. The two SL organizations 
combined were thought to number several hundred armed combatants. 
While today's SL is shorter on revolutionary zeal than in the past, 
analysts believed leaders in both the UHV and the VRAE continued to 
use Maoist philosophy to justify their illicit activities. 
Involvement in drug production and trafficking provided SL with 
funding to conduct operations, allowing it to improve relations 
with local communities in remote areas and to recruit new members. 
While SL in the UHV worked during the year to recuperate from 
losses suffered in 2007 and 2008, insufficient government presence 
in the more remote VRAE allowed the organization there to continue 
operating: 
 
 
 
*         On April 9, SL terrorists ambushed two military patrols 
in the Vizcatan region of the VRAE (Ayacucho department) and killed 
13 soldiers.  SL launched the ambush by remotely detonating an 
improvised explosive device (IED), causing a rockslide, which 
crushed some soldiers.  The SL column then attacked the survivors 
with gunfire and grenades. 
 
*         On August 1, a group of about 40 SL terrorists attacked a 
police station in San Jose de Secce, in the highlands of Ayacucho, 
outside the VRAE, killing three police and two civilians.  Official 
reports indicated a highly coordinated attack with explosives and 
military grade weaponry. 
 
*         On September 2, SL forces downed a Peruvian air force 
MI-17 helicopter near the town of Sinaycocha in Junin department, 
killing its pilot, co-pilot, and one crewman.    (In various other 
attacks in 2009 SL had damaged helicopters with ground fire, but 
this was the first instance of a downed helicopter since 1999.) 
 
*         On November 5, one soldier was killed and four others 
wounded when SL terrorists attacked a provisional military base 
located near where the Vizcatan and Mantaro rivers meet. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (U) The Army's 2008 offensive in the Vizcatan region, called 
"Operation Excellence 777," continued haltingly in 2009, with the 
military maintaining a number of small provisional "bases" 
established in the area.  Confrontations in 2009 generally 
consisted in SL elements attacking Peruvian armed forces patrols or 
incoming supply helicopters, but in several cases SL attacked a 
military base.  Several of the significant attacks perpetrated by 
the VRAE faction of the SL occurred in highland areas outside of 
the VRAE.  Some analysts believed the attacks marked SL's attempts 
 
at expansion, while others said they were strictly aimed at 
controlling drug and chemical routes. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) Implementation of the Garcia government's "Plan VRAE," 
which called for, among other things,  2,000 troops and 19 
counterterrorism bases operated under a central command was still 
evolving.  In August, the Garcia administration named Fernan Valer 
as the civilian head of Plan VRAE.  Plans for new health, 
education, and infrastructure investment in these isolated 
communities where the state lacked presence were not fully 
implemented, but authorities made some improvements to roadways and 
rural electrification. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (U) Government efforts to improve interagency cooperation, 
especially in intelligence, and to strengthen prosecutorial 
capacity were somewhat successful. Police units specializing in 
counterterrorism and counter-narcotics conducted some joint 
operations with the Peruvian Army in the UHV.   Police captured one 
high-ranking SL terrorist in the UHV. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (U) President Garcia continued reauthorizing a 60-day state of 
emergency in parts of four departments where SL operates, 
suspending some civil liberties, and giving the armed forces 
additional authority to maintain public order. There was no 
movement on President Garcia's 2006 proposal calling for the death 
penalty for those convicted of acts of terrorism, but in October 
Congress passed a law removing parole and other benefits for 
convicted terrorists. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (U) The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) has not 
conducted terrorist activities since the 1996 hostage taking at the 
Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima.  Efforts to reconstitute 
an organizational structure were not in evidence in 2009, though 
former MRTA members established a political party called the Free 
Fatherland Party ("Partido Patria Libre") to compete in future 
elections, and sought alliances with other political parties. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (U) SL founder and leader Abimael Guzman and key accomplices 
remained in prison serving life sentences on charges stemming from 
crimes committed during the 1980s and 1990s.  In September, 
Guzman's attorney published a book of Guzman's handwritten 
manuscripts as compiled by Guzman's common-law wife, Elena 
Iparraguirre, who is also incarcerated for terrorism charges. 
 
 
 
¶9.   (U) The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
continued to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border 
to rest, regroup, and make arms purchases. Experts believed the 
FARC continued to fund coca cultivation and cocaine production 
among the Peruvian population in border areas. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (U) There is no known presence in Peru of Middle Eastern, 
South Asian, or other extra-regional terrorist groups. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (U)  Embassy Lima POC is Jessica Huaracayo, 
huaracayojm@state.gov, +511-618-2514. 
MCKINLEY