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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001611 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/23 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR KISL OPDC BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: NEGATING "DEFAMATION OF RELIGION" RESOLUTION 
 
REF: 09 STATE 128320 
 
DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 B, D 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Bolivia regularly votes for the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference's UN resolutions against "defamation of 
religions," most recently on December 18 in the UNGA plenary 
session.  Given our thorny bilateral relationship, the GOB's ALBA 
membership, and its growing ties with Iran, it is unlikely we can 
quickly change Bolivia's stance -- especially if we are perceived 
as dictating our position to the GOB without regional support. 
Still, human rights is one of the less politicized issues within 
the GOB, and by engaging directly with the Foreign Minister, GOB 
Charge to the UN Pablo Solon, and key deputies, we may be able to 
progress over time toward GOB abstention on similar resolution 
votes.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Embassy La Paz is working to help defeat future UNGA 
resolutions by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
that could lead to persecution of minority religious groups under 
the guise of punishing defamation of religions, but gaining 
Bolivia's support will be difficult.  In recent years, Bolivia has 
increasingly defined its foreign policy goals as opposing whatever 
it perceives as in our interests, often doing so in concert with 
Cuba, Venezuela, and other members of the ALBA (Bolivarian 
Alternative for the Americas) group.  ALBA members consistently 
support OIC's resolutions.  In addition, as these countries deepen 
their relationships with Iran, there will be pressure on the GOB to 
continue to vote in favor of the "defamation of religions" 
resolution. 
 
¶3. (C) The GOB is also sensitive to any suggestion that the USG is 
dictating its foreign policy.  Headlines in the Bolivian press 
regularly address GOB statements -- often by President Morales 
himself -- on the perceived lack of USG respect for Bolivian 
sovereignty, and contacts within the GOB leadership advance this 
argument with us as well. 
 
¶4. (C) Ongoing bilateral talks may provide a way to engage 
constructively.  We hope to reach agreement on a bilateral 
framework agreement in early 2010 that would establish ad hoc 
working groups on areas of concern.  Two of our key interlocutors 
in these discussions are FM David Choquehuanca and GOB Charge to 
the UN Pablo Solon.  By engaging them, we may be able to reach 
President Morales indirectly and frame this issue as one of 
supporting oppressed minority groups -- an approach that could find 
some traction with the country's first indigenous president. 
 
¶5. (C) We have also found human rights to be one of the less 
politicized elements within the GOB.  We will discuss the 
"defamation of religions" concept in greater detail with the 
leadership of the legislature's standing Human Rights Commission, 
many of whom have direct contact with President Morales and could 
make the argument without being tied to the USG. 
 
¶6. (C) Firm support by friendly governments in South America would 
also help our cause.  Chile voted against the resolution on 
December 18.  If Brazil and Argentina, which also both abstained, 
were to turn solidly against the "defamation of religions" concept, 
the GOB would likely receive our arguments more warmly.  An OAS- or 
UNASUR-hosted discussion could help South American countries take 
ownership of the issue and avoid the perception that the USG is 
dictating our preferred position. 
 
¶7. (C) Any progress will likely take time, and expectations for 
change in what has been fairly steady GOB support for the 
"defamation of religions" concept should remain low. Still, if we 
coordinate our efforts with partner countries and frame the issue 
as one of minority rights, we might eventually achieve an 
abstention by the GOB in future votes. 
Creamer