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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001595 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/09 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR SNAR EAID ECON BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIAN FM: URGENT ACTION NEEDED ON BILAT ACCORD 
 
DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 B, D 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Charge met December 5 with Bolivian Foreign 
Minister David Choquehuanca, who said President Morales wants to 
finalize a bilateral framework agreement but that "certain cabinet 
members" do not want the accord to succeed and would prefer to 
maintain minimal relations with the USG.  He emphasized that 
success remains possible, but said "time is running out" to 
complete a deal with the current government.  Choquehuanca proposed 
a final negotiating session in Washington  the week of December 21. 
The GOB anticipates that Bolivia will not be included in ATPDEA 
renewal legislation, which he called a potential blow to relations. 
Choquehuanca said excessive expectations among Morales' 
supporters-which the GOB would inevitably fail to meet-would likely 
generate future  division and discord within the MAS.  End summary. 
 
Framework Agreement Possible, But Time Limited 
 
¶2. (C) FM Choquehuanca told Charge that the bilateral framework 
agreement could be successfully negotiated in a final round of 
discussions in Washington, which he proposed for the week of 
December 21.  Choquehuanca stressed that "time is running out," 
noting that negotiations would need to be resolved by December 27. 
Otherwise, the talks would have to wait until after the 
inauguration of President Morales' second government on January 22. 
 
 
¶3. (C) Choquehuanca said GOB Charge to the UN and primary 
negotiator Pablo Solon was already in Copenhagen to participate in 
the climate change summit, but that he would instruct Solon to 
share their latest framework plan draft with us.  He said changes 
were primarily in the cooperation section.  Choquehuanca suggested 
it might be better simply to include a statement that all aid will 
be defined government to government, with details left to a working 
group or future sub-agreements.  If this approach were deemed 
unacceptable and assistance remained an obstacle to improved ties, 
he suggested it might be better to terminate all USG aid programs. 
Charge noted that we had some proposed changes on the trade 
language as well, which we would share with Solon. 
 
¶4. (C) Choquehuanca said a framework agreement "based on mutual 
respect" still had President Morales' support, but that others in 
the cabinet (presumably Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera, 
Presidency Minister Juan Ramon Quintana, and Government Minister 
Rada) would prefer to maintain minimal relations, or even break 
ties, with the USG.  He added that these ministers "do not want an 
indigenous Foreign Minister to succeed, never mind conclude an 
accord with the U.S." 
 
¶5.  (C) Choquehuanca said he had prevailed to this point in cabinet 
meetings by arguing that the Cubans, Ecuadorians and others are 
seeking better relations with the USG, and that Bolivia should do 
the same.  He recalled his displeasure with Garcia Linera's recent 
comments criticizing GOB talks with the USG, describing him as 
"crazy."  Choquehuanca claimed that all sectors of Bolivian society 
were very pleased by the progress that was made on an accord during 
the negotiations last October.   Still, he warned that this group 
would continue to try to block any deal. 
 
¶6. (C) Choquehuanca identified USG policy toward Honduras and 
upcoming ATPDEA renewal legislation as potential stumbling blocks 
to finalizing a framework agreement.  He noted that the GOB 
anticipated that Bolivia would not be included in ATPDEA 
legislation, which he called a potential blow to the framework plan 
negotiations and overall bilateral ties.  In the end, Choquehuanca 
still thinks the framework agreement is achievable.  "I cannot 
imagine a Bolivia that does not have diplomatic relations with the 
U.S.," he said. 
 
MAS Victim of Its Own Success? 
 
¶7. (C) Choquehuanca said he participated in Morales' final campaign 
event (a huge rally in El Alto), where "the people's faith and love 
for Morales was palpable."  Still, he said the event left him 
troubled, because it showed that the expectations of the party's 
 
diverse social and political base are enormous.  Inevitably, he 
predicted, the GOB will fail to meet these demands, and the 
political base will be disappointed.  Choquehuanca expects the 
opposition will try to exploit any popular discontent with the MAS, 
but he called the traditional opposition" divided and ineffective." 
More damaging to the MAS, Choquehuanca said, would be disaffection 
among the social movements.  He recalled that in 1946 
then-President Gualberto Villaroel was loved by the people until he 
disappointed them and ended up being hanged from a lamppost in the 
Plaza Murillo.  Choquehuanca said his mother - a Villaroel 
supporter - witnessed the event. 
 
¶8. (C) Choquehuanca also noted that the MAS lacks the skilled 
administrators and technocrats needed to manage key portfolios such 
as tax and customs administration, as well as state enterprises 
such as the state hydrocarbons company. He complained that many 
"opportunists" have joined the party, leaving it vulnerable to 
corruption.  For example, Choquehuanca said recent measures to make 
the issuance of documents for Bolivians overseas more transparent 
and less costly had the unexpected side effect of reducing certain 
Ambassadors' " incomes."  Since the measures were implemented, 
Choquehuanca noted with a smile, he has received numerous 
Ambassadorial requests for salary and expense account increases. 
 
Comment 
 
¶9. (C)   Completing a deal by the end of December will be very 
difficult, but we need to make every effort to do so.  Choquehuanca 
is deeply invested in trying to conclude an accord, and given his 
possible departure from the FM position in the next government, we 
need to act while he remains in place.  Further delays in 
finalizing a deal will also leave the negotiations vulnerable to 
future bilateral shocks, as well as regional events such as the 
recent turmoil in Honduras. 
Creamer