VZCZCXRO3859
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1343/01 3351048
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 011048Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4809
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001343 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAGR ECON EIND ENRG SENV EWWT SU
SUBJECT: World Bank Economist: Water Security an Issue for Sudan 
Peace Talks 
 
REF: A) Cairo 2195, B) 08 Cairo 1963 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: World Bank Economist Mosllem Alamir predicted that 
water resources in post-2011 Sudan could lead to conflict and 
economic crisis if the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) do not make decisions now about allocation or cooperation on 
the use of Nile waters.  Increased development and agricultural 
projects in Southern Sudan could rankle Egypt, which currently 
claims control of the majority of the water that flows through the 
Nile.  Alamir believes Sudan should continue its cooperation in the 
Nile Basin Initiative, and - should Southern Sudanese choose 
independence in 2011 - that Juba join the organization as well.  End 
Summary. 
 
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Background: Nile Water is Egypt's Domain 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In 1929, British colonial authorities consolidated an 
agreement giving Egypt primary rights over the Nile's 85 billion 
cubic meters of water, permitting Egypt to veto projects by other 
countries that would affect its water rights.  In a subsequent 
agreement with Sudan in 1959, Egypt agreed to accept 55.5 billion cm 
and Sudan 18.5 billion cm, leaving the other eight countries in the 
region (Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Burundi, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Tanzania) a minimal share of 
Nile water.  Rains in Uganda and Ethiopia contribute approximately 
85 percent of the Nile's flow, but these countries have little input 
on the administration of the river, and could not divert any 
significant share of their contribution to the Nile without 
political backlash from Egypt. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In an effort to avoid conflict over Nile waters, regional 
countries launched the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999.  The NBI 
has sought to use the derivatives from Nile development and 
extraction projects to benefit the millions who depend on the river. 
 The NBI's mechanism of cooperative project management and 
gains-sharing was also considered a way to reduce Egypt's domination 
of the Nile.  Sustainable development allows other countries to use 
the Nile for energy production and to provide a consistent source of 
other revenues.  The partnership approach, has to some degree, 
negate the countries' need to depend on percentage shares of the 
water use.  The NBI instead establishes policies for the projects 
and seeks to address environmental and other threats to the river 
waters. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Making the Nile a More Productive Waterway 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) According to Alamir, upstream NBI member countries have 
long disputed the 1929 and 1959 agreements, and for years have been 
campaigning for a more equitable share of the water resources.  He 
described the NBI symposia held in July in which upstream countries 
hoped to pressure Egypt into agreeing to new allocations, but 
neither Egypt nor Sudan would consent to relinquish their historic 
rights to the waters.  Alamir said that Egypt views its position on 
water-sharing from a security standpoint, as its demand for water 
will outpace supply within the next 10 years due to an increase in 
population.  (Note: Sudan's needs for water are also expected to 
grow, although planned large-scale agricultural projects along the 
White Nile south of Khartoum are proceeding slowly.  End note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Given existing tensions, Alamir said that the Government of 
National Unity (GNU) and the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) 
need to decide on how the water from the Nile River will be used by 
both sides in various future scenarios.  He pointed out that they 
must look at the model of regional cooperation used by the NBI 
countries, pending the result of the 2011 referendum on Southern 
Sudanese independence.  (Note: Most observers and Southern Sudanese 
politicians assume the south will opt for secession from Sudan.  End 
note.)  Alamir pointed out that the NBI mechanism has succeeded in 
preventing international conflict over water rights by agreeing to 
cooperatively generate and manage sustainable development projects 
based on the resources extracted from the Nile, such as fish and 
hydroelectric energy.  Should the south secede in 2011, Alamir said 
the two countries should agree to appropriately share the revenues 
derived from extraction, power generation, agricultural and 
transportation projects.  Alamir advised that the ultimate aim 
should be to join ranks with other upstream countries to address 
more equitably Egyptian primacy over water resources. 
 
----------------------- 
Avoiding War over Water 
----------------------- 
 
KHARTOUM 00001343  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) During both bilateral north-south discussions and formal 
negotiations with Egypt, water security issues should be high on the 
agenda, Alamir advised.  Increased competition for water resources 
could exacerbate diplomatic relations with Sudan's northern 
neighbor, and if Southern Sudan secedes, this would create yet 
another country competing for a share of the Nile's waters. 
Southern Sudan, which is severely underdeveloped, could potentially 
pursue large-scale mechanized agricultural projects.  In such a 
case, Alamir expected that Egypt would view Southern Sudan as a 
competitor for water and consider its development as a potential 
threat to Egypt's quota. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: To date, most discussions of post-referendum 
issues have focused on the contentious issues of land and petroleum 
resources.  Cairo is certainly aware of the possibility that 
Southern Sudan could become a wild card in the NBI games, a 
competitor for the water of the White Nile, or even an ally should 
the Egyptians manage to convince the GOSS to complete the Jonglei 
Canal, long coveted by Egypt, that would increase the flow of the 
White Nile at Kosti by ten percent, probably to the detriment of the 
Sudd, Africa's largest interior wetlands.  It is no accident that 
the first diplomatic facility to open shop in Juba as the GOSS stood 
up was Egyptian. 
 
WHITEHEAD