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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KARACHI 000398 
 
SIPDIS 
 
REF: KARACHI 330 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PTER KCRM KCRS PK
 
SUBJECT: BALOCHISTAN - CONFLICT BETWEEN BALOCH SEPARTISTS AND 
GOVERNMENT FORCES CONTINUES TO THREATEN STABILITY OF PROVINCE 
 
Classified by: Acting Consul General Mary Elizabeth Madden, Reasons 
1.4 b and d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The 25 October assassination of Balochistan 
Education Minister Shafiq Ahmed Khan and the 18 October grenade 
attack upon Provincial Information Minister Yonous Mullahzai 
represent the continuation of an ongoing Baloch separatist campaign 
of intimidation and targeted killings.  These separatists hope to 
reduce the writ of the Government of Pakistan in Balochistan and to 
exploit a widening rift between the Government and the people.  Far 
from satisfied with government reconciliation efforts, these groups 
have been systematically broadening their list of targets, and 
sources warn that violence will continue to escalate for the 
foreseeable future.  The ongoing conflict has had a noticeable effect 
on the quality of life for the people of Balochistan and has created 
an opportunity for third parties, especially the Pashtun, to exploit 
the situation for property and business gains.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The 25 October assassination of Balochistan Education Minister 
Shafiq Ahmed Khan is another example of Baloch Separatist's ongoing 
campaign of targeted killings against government officials and 
Punjabi "settlers."  Khan was known throughout Balochistan as a vocal 
supporter of the Government of Pakistan and was responsible for 
several educational initiatives that were perceived as anti-Baloch. 
Individuals associated with the separatist groups openly cited his 
"anti-Baloch" policies, including the closure of colleges throughout 
Balochistan and the relocation of all Punjabi teachers to Quetta, as 
the rationale for his assassination. 
 
¶3. (C) Although tensions have historically been high in Balochistan, 
the current wave of violence can be differentiated from previous 
insurgencies by the participation and leadership of the Bugti tribe, 
a numerically significant and politically influential tribe that has 
historically avoided armed conflict with the Pakistani Government. 
The Bugtis were drawn into the current conflict when widespread 
unrest over the exploitation of the Sui Gas fields in Dera Bugti was 
met by a staunch crack down at the hands of security forces. 
Initially targeted killings were mainly directed against security, 
police, and intelligence forces.  After the killing of Akbar Bugti in 
2006, the separatists began targeting settlers or non-Baloch who were 
believed to be directly associated with the Government, such as 
teachers, as well as groups believed to support the Intelligence 
Services, notably barbers who are believed to be the eyes and ears of 
the GoP in Balochistan. (Note: Post's FSNI media analysis indicates 
that there have been at least six people killed in attacks against 
professors and school administers since September.) 
 
¶4. (C) Sadiq Raisani, Spokesman for the separatist Baloch Nationalist 
Front, said that these attacks are part of an ongoing strategy of 
Baloch separatist groups to retaliate against increased Government 
operations in Balochistan and continued dissatisfaction with the GoP. 
 This strategy is intended to bring international attention to the 
Baloch separatist movement and to isolate individuals who support or 
otherwise sympathize with the Government of Pakistan.  He claimed 
that these groups have been gradually escalating their use of 
violence in Balochistan and that the Baloch separatist groups are 
positioning themselves to enter a third, more deadly phase of this 
operation.  This phase will expand the pool of targets to include 
anyone associated with the government establishment.  There have been 
some indications that this new phase of the operation is underway and 
that separatist groups are beginning to target Pashtun and even 
Baloch citizens who are either pro-government or unwilling to support 
separatist causes.  A recent example is the October 15 grenade attack 
against Younous Mullahzai, the Provincial Information Minister and a 
Baloch.  However, Mullahzai told PolStaff that the police were still 
investigating the incident and that it was too early to determine who 
was ultimately responsible for the attack. 
 
¶5. (C) University campuses have become ground zero in the conflict 
between the GoP and Baloch separatists groups.  Student groups are 
widely believed to support militant organizations and the current 
insurgency has its roots in social unrest at educational 
institutions.  In response to this ongoing unrest, security forces 
have begun routinely shutting down educational institutions and have 
been arbitrarily singling out groups of students for arrest and 
interrogation.  Unrest has resulted in most colleges and universities 
 
KARACHI 00000398  002 OF 002 
 
 
being shut down over the past seven months, effectively crippling the 
higher education system in Balochistan. 
 
¶6. (C) Meanwhile, this conflict has had a significant effect on the 
day to day life of the citizens of Balochistan.  Native Baloch 
residents have begun to disassociate themselves from non-Baloch 
groups and from being affiliated with government forces for fear of 
being targeted.  At the same time, Punjabi and other "settler" groups 
have begun to migrate away from Balochistan while Pashtun groups have 
been purchasing the property and businesses they leave behind.  There 
have also been reports that certain Pashtun elements have started to 
exacerbate the situation by threatening settlers themselves and 
attributing these threats to Baloch nationalist groups (Reftel). 
 
¶7. (C) The Government of Pakistan has focused its efforts on 
addressing Baloch complaints of socio-economic inequality, while 
ignoring demands for greater political autonomy or independence.  The 
recently announced Balochistan package and increased National Finance 
Commission (NFC) award for the province are seen by the federal 
government as attempts to address socio-economic inequalities. 
Baloch, particularly those with separatist leanings or those involved 
in the insurgency, see the government's financial incentives as "too 
little, too late," and fear that much of the increased assistance 
will benefit a handful of individuals in the provincial government - 
and the leaders of the tribes allied with it - rather than the 
citizenry at large.  In the past, the government has generally 
resolved issues in Balochistan through increasing payments to tribal 
leaders in exchange for cooperation with the government.  The current 
insurgency and separatist sympathies, however, appear to have spread 
to urban areas and middle-class students and professionals that are 
only tangentially affiliated with tribal leaders, making the 
government's traditional approach largely futile. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: Post continues to monitor the deteriorating security 
situation in Balochistan with concern.  While outside support to the 
Baloch insurgency from Indian intelligence and its agents in southern 
Afghanistan is plausible, the escalation of violence in Balochistan 
can be chiefly attributed to indigenous separatist elements.  If the 
federal government is unsuccessful in addressing the economic and 
political concerns of the Baloch middle class, the insurgency 
threatens to further alienate the GoP from the people of Balochistan, 
eroding the GoP's writ in the province.  Of additional concern is 
that this conflict has created ungoverned space that outside 
elements, such as militant forces fleeing ongoing operations in 
Afghanistan and Waziristan, are capable of exploiting.  To date, the 
Baloch insurgency remains a secular movement vigorously opposed to 
the religious ideology of Taliban/al-Qaeda elements and has not found 
common cause with that movement.  However, as the conflict with the 
government goes forward, it is possible that approaches by 
Taliban/al-Qaeda for safehaven may become more attractive to Baloch 
insurgents. 
 
MADDEN