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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4028
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004039 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MOPS CAN AF
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: SPIN BOLDAK: A STABILITY AND SECURITY 
BALANCING ACT 
 
REF: KABUL4024 
 
Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Director Hoyt Yee 
for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Spin Boldak District in Kandahar enjoys a 
reputation for stability and security in a region of the 
country otherwise known for insurgent violence.  Encompassing 
the Weesh border crossing with Pakistan and astride strategic 
Highway 4, Spin Boldak occupies valuable turf on the front 
line in the counterinsurgency.  In the East, the district is 
second only to Torkham in the importance of its transit trade 
and its potential to generate customs revenues for the state. 
 Given its location, Spin Boldak also serves as the main 
southern supply route for ISAF, insurgent travel and 
narcotics trafficking.  The licit and illicit opportunities 
of this frontier setting provide an incentive to all actors 
dependent on the district's stability to maintain safe 
passage throughout. End Summary. 
 
Gateway to Quetta 
--------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Sitting along an historic trade route to the Indian 
subcontinent and the Pakistani seaport of Karachi, Spin 
Boldak is a hub of licit and illicit commercial activity.  A 
link in the coalition supply chain, Spin Boldak's stability, 
including access to the border and freedom of movement on 
Highway 4, has become a top ISAF priority in advance of the 
announced troop surge.  The same holds true for the Taliban, 
whose leadership across the border in Quetta is similarly 
dependent on transit through the district for the resupply of 
its forces.  Through a confluence of mutual interests, ISAF 
convoys from Karachi and Taliban convoys from Quetta and 
neighboring sanctuaries, alike, currently enjoy unimpeded 
access across the border and along Spin Boldak's roadways and 
transit routes. 
 
Securing Local Highways and Byways 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Securing Highway 4 and its environs has been the 
task of the 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment (8-1), 5th 
Stryker Brigade, which took control of the area from Canadian 
forces in June 2009.  Initially comprised of three troops 
(companies), 8-1 has aggressively assumed responsibility for 
Spin Boldak and outlying districts.  Since 8-1 entered the 
area, the number of attacks on ISAF in the district have been 
comparatively few (for the south) and limited to IEDs.  While 
IEDs are a continuing threat ) the risk and sophistication 
seeming to increase in parallel with the expansion of ISAF 
patrolling ) there have been no coalition fatalities since 
the transfer of command in June. 
 
¶4. (C) The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) counterpart 
to 8-1 is the 4th Directorate of the Afghan Border Police 
(ABP) under the command of Colonel Abdul Razziq.  With 
approximately 3,400 men under arms and de facto control of 
the local Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Highway 
Police (AHP) contingents, Razziq is the district's main power 
broker. To date, his force has borne the brunt of Spin 
Boldak's insurgent violence.  A recent incident was the 
killing of a commander and four of his men in Luy Karez an 
hour north of Spin Boldak center on November 22; 
responsibility was claimed by the Taliban.  Despite strong 
anti-Taliban credentials, Colonel Razziq poses his own set of 
challenges with influence and interests reportedly extending 
into the district's main economic activity: trafficking. 
 
Ink Spotting 
--------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Sitting along the district's key northern supply 
line, the village of Luy Karez, base of the slain APB 
commander, had been targeted by 8-1 for application of "ink 
spot" counter- insurgency -- the extension of governance, 
security and development to key districts.  At a November 11 
shura in Luy Karez, local elders voiced concerns to the DST 
Spin Boldak CIV-MIL team about the proposed initiative.  The 
concerns, not uncommon throughout the district included: 1) 
that an increased government presence (including ANSF-ISAF) 
would find citizens caught in any resulting crossfire, if not 
directly targeted by insurgents for enabling government and 
ISAF activities; and 2) that ISAF was not committed to the 
long haul, thus eventually and inevitably leaving villages to 
face Taliban vengeance alone.  In similar settings throughout 
the district, elders have raised an additional concern that 
ANSF itself was part of the problem.  For 8-1, Luy Karez was 
 
KABUL 00004039  002 OF 002 
 
 
to be just the starting off point for COIN activities. 
 
Challenging the Status Quo 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) At the November 11 Shura, the ABP commander who was 
subsequently assassinated cast a surprising figure, pressing 
his fellow Noorzai tribesmen, in the presence of outsiders, 
to reject insurgent and criminal activity in their village 
and to cooperate with the government in bringing security and 
development.  Challenging the local narrative of outside 
intimidation, he demanded of the elders, "the Taliban may 
have shut your school down but who took out the window 
frames?"  The implication of local complicity was clear. Ten 
days later, the commander was gunned down.  Serving to 
further highlight the need for increased security in the area 
and the validity of the elders' concerns, an IED disabled one 
Stryker on the CIV-MIL team's return journey from the shura. 
 
Changing Priorities 
--------------- 
 
¶7. (C) With 8-1's loss in November of one troop of soldiers 
to Arghandab, the ability to ink spot the district and extend 
governance and development to at risk communities throughout 
Spin Boldak has already been shelved.  In Luy Karez itself, 
where expectations of improved governance and services have 
actually been raised, providing the persistent security 
presence required is no long feasible.  A new ISAF mission 
directive will now limit 8-1's area of operations to Highway 
4 and the Weesh border crossing; an important mission in 
light of the surge but along a route that sees only a portion 
of all trade transiting through the district - much of the 
illicit trade traveling on ratlines such as the one 
traversing Luy Karez. 
 
Comment 
----- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The killing of the Luy Karez ABP commander reflects 
certain realities underpinning Spin Boldak's perceived 
stability and the local consensus behind it -- limited 
security, governance and development beyond the district 
center and areas immediately adjoining Highway 4.  This 
intentional state of affairs victimizes citizens and damages 
GIRoA legitimacy but ensures freedom of movement for 
insurgents and narcotics traffickers as well as revenue 
making opportunities for local power brokers.  Ironically, it 
also guarantees a level of coalition security, as upsetting 
the status quo would threaten the insurgent supply chain. 
How to confront this set of challenges without risking the 
district's much valued stability is the main question that 
civil and military partners are grappling with. Partnered 
with weak local government institutions, compromised ANSF 
leadership and now a reduced ISAF force and mission, CIV-MIL 
COIN efforts in Spin Boldak are at a crossroads.  PRT will 
continue to monitor developments in Spin Boldak and engage 
local officials on how to strengthen security in this and 
other key border areas. 
 
¶9.  (U) This message was drafted at the DST in Spin Boldak. 
EIKENBERRY