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DE RUEHBUL #4024/01 3500531
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INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004024 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY (CLASSIFICATION) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MOPS ELTN CAN PK AF
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: BUILDING A STRATEGY ON AFGHANISTAN'S 
SOUTHERN BORDER AT SPIN BOLDAK 
 
REF: A. REF: (A) KABUL 3161 
     ¶B. (B) KABUL 3480 
     ¶C. (C) KABUL 3814 
 
KABUL 00004024  001.5 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Director Hoyt Yee 
for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary. Cross-border issues have a fundamental impact 
on U.S. objectives in southern Afghanistan, and improved 
control of the southern border -- at the Spin Boldak crossing 
in particular -- is a critical path to international 
coalition and GIRoA success.  This message assesses the key 
challenges and outlines local action proposals for 
civil-military consideration by Embassy Kabul's Border Issues 
Working Group (BIWG) in four issue areas: border crossing by 
the Taliban, cross-border consultation, military control of 
the border, and reform of the border regime.  Ultimately, 
however, a determined strategic approach that unifies 
diplomatic, military, and commercial dimensions requires 
national level attention. End Summary. 
 
Visit of Embassy-ISAF Border Issues Working Group 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) On November 27, members of the Embassy-ISAF Border 
Issues Working Group (BIWG) visited Kandahar Air Field for an 
extended briefing and discussion with Regional Command ) 
South (RC-S) and Regional Platform ) South (RP-S), including 
the RC-S Commander and the RC-S Senior Civilian 
Representative (SCR).  This report reflects issues raised 
during that session.  The group focused on the cross-border 
issues and the fundamental impact on U.S. objectives in 
southern Afghanistan.  Improved control of the southern 
border -- at the Spin Boldak crossing in particular -- is a 
critical path to international coalition and GIRoA success. 
While it will be possible to attack some of the border 
challenges through local and regional programs, ultimate 
success in dealing with this highly complex issue will 
require national level attention.  The central challenge is 
broader than both the near-term objective of achieving 
population-focused COIN effects in RC-South and the long-term 
objective of increasing central government revenues as part 
of an ISAF exit strategy.  As long as conflicted 
Afghan-Pakistani interests and a host of sub-national actors, 
including narco-traffickers and insurgents, preempt 
sovereignty, the southern border will remain an enduring 
source of instability. 
 
TRADE AND MAJOR PLAYERS IN SPIN 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S) The quasi-legitimate trade regime and relative 
stability prevailing today at Spin Boldak (the actual 
crossing is Weesh-Chaman) provides short-term benefits to all 
involved in cross-border interchange.  Obstructing freedom of 
movement is not in the interest of any of these parties.  The 
participants include a complex array of interrelated 
political clans that extend to commercial trucking mafias, 
businessmen, local power brokers, members of the Karzai 
regime, narcotics traffickers, traditional Noorzai racketeers 
and Achekzai smugglers, private security protection rackets, 
and the Afghan Border Police (ABP).  All have Pakistani 
counterparts, the majority of whom are fellow Pashtuns, among 
whom common ethnicity is more important than nationality. 
Other beneficiaries include ISAF, through safe passage of 
NATO supplies, and the Taliban, who likewise use Weesh-Chaman 
as a virtually unimpeded transit route.  The incentives for 
maintaining the status quo are powerful and to a large degree 
countervail COIN objectives, assertion of central government 
authority, and the broader project of modern state-building. 
 
¶5.  (S) Low-grade hostility and lack of trust characterize 
relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, even though 
objectively their mutual interests in stability and trade 
should outweigh zero sum calculation.  For example, 
Afghanistan requires Pakistan for access to the sea, and 
Pakistan requires Afghanistan for access to Central Asia; 
Spin Boldak is the most geographically logical crossing point 
for both, even though the volume of traffic at Torkham Gate 
in the East is currently greater.  Instead, insecurity in 
Afghanistan keeps Pakistan's trade with Central Asia 
negligible, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
estimates that illicit and semi-licit trade is four times 
greater than legitimate commerce on the southern border. 
 
¶6.  (S) In addition to narcotics flowing south, smuggling 
travels in both directions, and Afghanistan is the source of 
substantial "unauthorized-trade" in vehicles, consumer 
 
KABUL 00004024  002.4 OF 002 
 
 
electronics, and other goods that enter Afghanistan duty-free 
under the 1965 Trade and Transit Agreement, and then return 
for resale in Pakistan.  The losses to tariff revenues from 
this gray market trade as well as smuggling of licit goods 
are enormous.  Most financial and political benefits accrue 
to political clans in Kandahar and in Baluchistan Province, 
Pakistan, which is semi-autonomous and often at odds with 
Islamabad. 
 
Three Areas for a Strategic Approach 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Border Crossing by the Taliban: There is broad 
recognition that no matter how effective population-centered 
COIN is in southern Afghanistan and how many troops are 
present there, it will be possible for the conflict to 
continue at a slow burn as long as the Quetta Shura Taliban 
enjoy undisrupted sanctuary along with access to recruits and 
material support in Pakistan.  Short of decisive measures 
against the Afghan Taliban leadership, securing Pakistani 
cooperation to halt cross-border movement of Taliban 
insurgents will be far more effective than interdiction from 
the Afghan side alone across the hundreds of kilometers of 
open country on the southern border.  Recognizing that these 
talks would need to be initiated at the national level 
between the neighboring countries but could be ultimately 
coordinated at the local levels, one starting point would be 
getting Pakistan and Afghanistan to cooperate, with RC-South 
assistance, in halting positively identified Taliban from 
crossing at Weesh-Chaman. 
 
¶8.  (S) Border Coordination and Control: The Border 
Coordination Center (BCC) will benefit from clarification of 
its mission and repositioning.  Posting a U.S. civilian 
agency border enforcement liaison with the current military 
Liaison Officers (LNOs) at the BCC would be a useful 
addition, as would the near-term stationing of mentors at the 
border crossing.  The BCC's current location on Forward 
Operating Base Spin Boldak eight kilometers from the actual 
border reduces its potential even for low level 
military-military communications.  One solution would be to 
move it on an interim basis to the site of the proposed 
border crossing facility once the project, led by the 
Embassy's Border Management Task Force, gets underway. 
 
¶9.  (S) Military Control of the Border: Positioning U.S. 
military forces with the mission of establishing control at 
the Weesh-Chaman border crossing, as directed by the guidance 
issued by RC-S Commander, is sensitive and requires explicit 
definition.  An existing presence in Regional Command ) East 
(RC-East) helps channel traffic to Torkham Gate, but there 
are differences in conditions, and it is not clear, for 
example, exactly how the military presence may help ensure 
uninterrupted flow of NATO supplies or legitimate collection 
of revenues.  This deployment would best be carried out in 
close coordination with the BIWG or the civilian entities at 
the BCC.  An informal local agreement with the ABP that keeps 
U.S. forces out of Spin Boldak proper and allows direct 
access to the border only by exception will need to be 
modified, possibly by referring to Kabul for confirmation. 
 
COMMENT 
---- 
 
¶10. (S) A variety of issues should be addressed and steps 
taken to better control the porous southern border.  However, 
it is important to view Spin Boldak and the southern border 
as a whole in order to grasp the degree to which the 
situation there has multiple and critical implications for 
RC-South operations, as well as for broader international 
coalition objectives in southern Afghanistan.  There are 
incremental and programmatic measures that can be taken on 
the ground, such as stationing mentors with customs agents 
and border police to reduce corruption as a result of their 
day-to-day presence with the law enforcement officials. 
Ultimately, however, a determined strategic approach, formed 
at the national level with regional buy-ins and applications 
and unified diplomatic, military, and commercial dimensions 
is essential.  U.S. civilians in RC-South will continue to 
support GIRoA efforts to develop and implement such an 
approach. 
 
¶11.  (U) This message was drafted by the State Department 
Representative at the Stryker Brigade headquarters in 
Kandahar. 
EIKENBERRY