VZCZCXRO8738 
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL 
DE RUEHBUL #3888/01 3400617 
ZNY CCCCC ZZH 
P 060617Z DEC 09 
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL 
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3738 
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003888 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2019 
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PREL PROP AF
SUBJECT: REGIONAL COMMAND EAST CIVILIAN UPLIFT: THE NEW, INTEGRATED 
CIVILIAN-MILITARY PLATFORM 
 
Classified by: CDDEA Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne; reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: This is the first of a series of messages that will 
outline important innovations in our operational paradigm in Regional 
Command East (RC/E), one of the more volatile areas along 
Afghanistan's Pakistan border, to improve stability and demonstrate 
near and medium term progress. A key component of this new platform 
for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations is the deployment now 
underway in RC(E) of significant numbers of civilian subject matter 
specialists from a range of USG agencies to work closely with 
military colleagues. We are seeking to build a population-centric 
COIN effort that conducts all operations by, with, and through Afghan 
institutions, both formal and informal. End Summary. 
 
Unity of Effort 
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¶2. (C) The first element of this effort deeply integrates military 
and interagency civilian personnel with senior leaders to execute a 
joint campaign plan -- on a division scale -- throughout the 14 
provinces of RC(E). Authority and responsibility for executing this 
civilian-military plan, for "operationalizing" it, begins at the 
headquarters of Combined Joint Task Force-82 (CJTF-82) and is shared 
equally by the Commanding General and Senior Civilian Representative 
(SCR). This co-equal leadership structure focused on the defeat of 
the insurgency is replicated at the brigade and all lower unit levels 
wherever an interagency civilian team operates alongside its military 
counterparts. 
 
¶3. (C) Jointly signed by the SCR and Commander of RC(E), the 
operational order for this campaign plan also focuses civ-mil 
operations into the district level. Interagency District Support 
Teams (DST) will operate from remote Combat Operating Posts (COP) 
throughout each province, extending the reach of established 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) focused more on population 
centers. Manning these new interagency positions will be 
approximately 175 subject matter specialists as part of the civilian 
uplift supported by the extraordinary efforts of Washington and 
Embassy staffs. 
 
Visitors welcome Innovations 
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¶4. (C) During a recent visit to CJTF-82, CENTCOM Commander General 
Petraeus observed this paradigm at Baraki Barak, one of the focus 
districts selected under the joint campaign plan, commenting that 
this approach to counterinsurgency was particularly innovative. We 
have also described it recently to CODEL Burr (who also visited 
Torkham Gate and Jalalabad), the NATO Military Committee and NATO 
General Ramms (both of whom visited Panjshir), CODEL Bordallo (Task 
Force Cyclone), and State's Office of the Inspector General 
(travelling to Task Force Cyclone and Bagram-based PRTs). We are 
also familiarizing the 101st Division with this new counterinsurgency 
approach as it prepares to assume command of the regional battlespace 
from the 82nd Airborne Division. 
 
Protect and Support the Populace and build Afghan Capacity 
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¶5. (C) The intent of this integrated civ-mil command, shared equally 
by the Commanding General CJTF-82 and the SCR, is to protect and 
support the populace by building the competence, capacity, and 
credibility of Afghan government (GIRoA) and the Afghan National 
Security Forces through integrated operations at every level. The 
plan seeks to address the root causes of instability, enhance 
security and governance, and help set conditions for long term 
economic development. Nangarhar Province and the Kunar River Valley, 
including Laghman Province, known collectively as "NKL," are 
conflicted areas of concentrated insurgent activity, yet have the 
greatest potential for enduring stability and economic development. 
Thus, they are the focus for the main effort of the joint campaign 
plan being implemented by five regional interagency task forces, 14 
PRTs, and nine DSTs. The principal USG agencies charged with this 
mandate include State, USAID, Agriculture, and DEA. Other agencies 
and their civilian personnel are playing important roles as well, 
including Defense, Justice, Treasury, and agricultural specialists 
from the National Guard Bureaus of several states. 
 
Four Critical Operational Foci 
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¶6. (C) In addition to an agreed focus on NKL, the GIRoA has also 
agreed to combined civ-mil operations across all lines of 
counterinsurgency operations -- information, governance, security, 
and development -- focused on the following three concepts: 
 
-- District Delivery Pilot Districts. Four have been selected by the 
GIRoA-led District Delivery Working Group in RC(E): Sarkani, 
Khogyani, Baraki Barak, and Sayadabad. (The two others are in RC(S). 
 
-- Stabilization Areas. In those unstable areas of RC(E), the 
immediate goal remains to clear them of the enemy and malign 
influence, and to hold the areas. Setting the conditions to build 
going forward will require the combined effort of our interagency 
teams and GIRoA. 
 
-- Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility (TLSR). RC(E) is 
considering Bamyan, Panjshir, and Parwan Provinces, due to their 
relative stability, for the next phase of development effort whereby 
lead responsibility for each would transfer to GIROA. 
 
An Abbreviated Case Study: Laghman Province 
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¶7. (C) Laghman Province is illustrative because the interagency PRT 
and National Guard agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) are fully 
integrated today. The challenges, as throughout the east and 
differing only by degree in many instances, remain: ineffective 
government, corruption, low literacy, high unemployment, no land 
dispute resolution mechanisms, and a virulent, complex insurgency. 
Over time, a "welfare state" mentality has evolved and now citizens 
and local officials rely on Coalition Forces, not the Afghan 
Government, for basic services and security. A nascent Provincial 
Development Council and proactive Governor in Laghman, however, are 
responding positively to a number of programs addressing these 
issues. Key is to engage the local populace by, with, and through 
GIRoA civil and security officials; to empower community-based 
decision-making processes; and to link emerging Afghan leadership to 
relevant GIRoA institutions in Kabul. 
 
¶8. (U) An important albeit largely informal role in Afghan society, 
shuras are a means to draw in tribal elders, mullahs, maleks, key 
stakeholders, and even insurgent fence-sitters to mediate communal 
disputes, discuss and generate support for elections, address the 
concerns of the poor and women, and petition government. PRTs and 
DSTs have been using these gatherings to offer incentives for 
communities to join with sub-national authorities in security, 
governance and development compacts running the gamut of the many 
programs offered by the Afghan Government, international community, 
and the USG. Together with district-wide information campaigns, our 
immediate objective is to provide time and space -- stability -- to 
allow these relationships and programs to take hold and to set the 
conditions for more effective governance and economic development. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment: Over the next several weeks, reporting from RC(E) 
will describe the rationale for selecting NKL and the operational 
foci described above in greater detail, as they will influence 
governmental legitimacy at the sub-national level where the 
insurgency is most active and the presence of effective civil service 
and Afghan institutions are so important. End Comment. 
 
¶10. (U) This message was drafted by Regional Command - East. 
 
MUSSOMELI