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OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3865/01 3371127
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O 031127Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3704
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003865

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019
TAGS: PREL PROG AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI LOOKS FORWARD
Classified By: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: On December 2, Ambassador Eikenberry met
twice with President Karzai. At the first meeting, the
Ambassador and General McChrystal discussed President Obama´s
December 2, speech with Karzai and his national security
team. Ambassador Eikenberry advised that at the national
level, the United States will focus on three categories of
essential ministries: Security, Economy, and Human Services.
We will also work through the Independent Directorate for
Local Governance (IDLG) to improve sub-national governance.
In the meeting, Karzai provided criticism and a puzzling
overview of the root causes of corruption in Afghanistan,
largely casting blame on expat-Afghans and foreigners. In
Eikenberry´s second meeting with Karzai and NSA Rassoul, they
discussed the roll-out of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.
Ambassador Eikenberry cited the December 2 signing of a lease
for the Mazar-i-Sharif Consulate as an example of our
long-term commitment to Afghanistan. The Ambassador also
warned Karzai that Afghanistan will receive intense media and
Congressional attention. Karzai, who consulted with
Ambassador Eikenberry on his potential Cabinet picks, shared
his plan to announce his choices in two stages. END SUMMARY.
---------------------------------
Strategy Roll-out Tops Discussion
¶2. (S) The December 2 morning meeting began with Karzai
asking General McChrystal to elaborate on President Obama´s
December 2 speech. General McChrystal briefed on the
deployment schedule of forces over the next 12 months. He
assessed that the number of non-U.S. NATO forces would also
increase. General McChrystal also mentioned his recent trip
to Pakistan where he met with Chief of Army Staff Kiyani.
Ambassador Eikenberry emphasized to Karzai that at the
national level, future U.S. development and aid initiatives
will focus on three categories of essential ministries:
- Security ministries, consisting of the Ministries of
Defense, Interior, and the National Directorate of Security
(NDS);
- Human services ministries, comprising the Ministries of
Education and Health; and,
- Economic ministries, including the Ministries of
Agriculture, Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD),
Energy, Mining, Transportation, Commerce, and Finance.
Also at the national level, the United States will place
additional emphasis on governance and policy, on civil
service training and electoral reform. Ambassador Eikenberry
explained that we will work through the IDLG to improve
delivery of basic services to Afghans. In a clear reference
to President Obama´s statement that we will support
"...Afghan Ministries, Governors, and local leaders that
combat corruption", Karzai said he was concerned about the
establishment of "parallel structures" in the government.
¶3. (S) When the conversation turned to UNAMA, Karzai
responded that he had lost faith in UNAMA. Karzai then said
"why not talk about the Government of Afghanistan to
coordinate donations?" The Ambassador replied that it was a
matter to discuss in the months to come.
¶4. (S) Returning to President Obama´s strategy as laid out
in his speech, Karzai advised that engaging community leaders
was key because they were the "doors" to communities.
"Taliban find space in communities", said Karzai, "You can´t
call for meetings at Camp Bastion (the main British base in
Helmand Province)". Further, if the Afghan/Pakistan border
remained porous, Afghanistan´s security situation would
remain insecure, said Karzai, who added that he would
accompany British PM Brown to Khandahar and Helmand in the
future.
--------------------------------------------- -
Eikenberry to Karzai, "You´re too Thin-Skinned"
--------------------------------------------- --
¶5. (S) President Karzai complained that international
criticism undermined his government. He expressed a desire
for our bilateral relationship to improve and joked that
mutual respect between the two countries might improve to at
least the level that existed in the waning days of the Bush
administration. Karzai requested that both sides pay more
attention to the language employed with each other. The
Ambassador cautioned that the United States will now enter a
period of intense, even caustic, debate over the merits of
the President´s Afghanistan strategy. Warning Karzai that
some American media and some in Congress can be expected to
sharply criticize Afghanistan and its president, the
Ambassador suggested Karzai "develop a thicker skin" in the
weeks to come to prepare for the onslaught. It is essential
to look forward and take concrete steps to build mutual trust
and confidence. In response, Karzai said he would mobilize
sympathetic Parliamentarians to respond to criticism directed
at him.
¶6. (S) Karzai requested another teleconference in the
short-term with President Obama to discuss the political
context of the President´s announced troop surge. Karzai
suggested three main issues for the next discussion:
--The development of a strategic understanding for our
partnership and a plan for him to hold a jirga with Afghan
leaders to build a consensus for our strategic relationship;
--President Karzai´s plan to increase support for community
leaders. Karzai said some 177 Pashtun tribal leaders have
been killed by insurgents and complained that in 2006 we
refused his request for a USD 25-million fund that he had
planned to use to build up tribal governance. He emphasized
the need to focus on the protection of Afghanistan´s rural
populations and that his government can´t be seen as "stooges
of the United States, Iran, Pakistan, and India"; and,
-- The impact of our Pakistan and India policies on the
U.S.-Afghan relationship. Referencing his November 30
teleconference with President Obama, Karzai said he would
also like to speak to the President about his (Karzai´s)
election. Ambassador Eikenberry informed him that the weeks
ahead will bring a tough, bruising battle played out in the
media before Congress and the American public and that should
be Karzai´s focus -- not Afghanistan´s August 2009
Presidential elections. The elections should be consigned to
the history books. Karzai conceded the point.
¶7. (S) Lamenting the poor state of sub-national governance,
Karzai expressed his desire to improve support to district
governors. He said 200 of Afghanistan´s 364 districts do not
have district governance buildings, nor can his government
provide vehicles to the district governors. Eikenberry told
Karzai that we will support efforts to strengthen
district-level governance.
Kabul Conference Will Require Much Preparation
¶8. (S) In the first meeting, Foreign Minister Spanta said he
was disappointed he would not be included in the London
Conference schedule. He then complained about Pakistan
Foreign Minister Qureshi´s recent comment to the BBC that
social and political factors in Afghanistan contribute to
recent Taliban successes in Afghanistan. Regarding the
timing of the Kabul conference, Ambassador Eikenberry noted
it was useful that Spanta had mentioned to Secretary Clinton
during their recent telephone call a possible time frame of
late March-early April for the conference. The Ambassador
said the lapse of a few months between the London and Kabul
conferences would permit the Afghans to prepare well for the
latter conference. Taking the Ambassador´s point seriously,
Karzai endorsed the need for good preparation.
--------------------------------------------- -------
Karzai Attributes Corruption to Expats and Foreigners
¶9. (S) Addressing the need to deal with corruption, Karzai
intoned that the problem wasn´t caused by "real" Afghans.
Rather, corruption was caused by expatriate Afghans, those
holding U.S. and foreign passports who have returned. Karzai
claimed that the Afghan side of his family lived modestly,
while the American side of his family was getting rich in
Afghanistan. Expanding on the "us vs. them" theme, he said
the country-side dwellers were "at war with the government"
because they were poor and city dwellers were rich. Further,
the luxury of city dwellers was induced by U.S. foreign
policy. "The problem", said Karzai, "is with foreign
relatives". Hearing this, National Security Advisor Rassoul
retorted emotionally, "You are not talking about me." An
equally angry Spanta interjected, "Are you talking about me?
What about the Mujahadeen?". Responding to Spanta´s question,
Karzai said that the Mujahadeen got rich before the United
States arrived, adding that he needed to have a "frank talk"
with America about this issue.
--------------------------------------------- --------------
Karzai Laments Shortcomings in the ANA, Questions the Brits
¶10. (S) Turning his attention to the Afghan National Army
(ANA), Karzai announced that the ANA leadership should lead
simpler, more spartan lives. He criticized widespread
reports of ANA generals driving expensive cars and NDS
reports that only no officers had died in battles with
insurgents, only ANA soldiers died (the latter account was
disputed by Minister of Defense Wardak). Reflecting on ANA
recruitment, Karzai asked why so few Afghans from the
provinces of Zabul, Ghazni, Helmand, Herat, and Farah enlist
in the ANA. He bemoaned the fact that only drug users join
the Afghan National Police (ANP) in Khandahar and Helmand
Provinces. Upon hearing the latter, Minister of Interior
Affairs Atmar interjected that a partially completed
personnel asset inventory conducted in Khandahar and Helmand
turned up the surprisingly good news that only 20 percent of
ANP personnel were drug users.
¶11. (S) Exhibiting displeasure, Karzai said he was concerned
about British "unwillingness" to work with (former Helmand
governor and suspected drug lord) Sher Mohammed from the Ali
Zada clan. Indicating that he felt the Ali Zada clan was key
to the fight against insurgency, Karzai asked rhetorically
whether the British wanted to fight the Taliban, or were they
only willing to work with people who looked pretty and spoke
well, in which case he could provide names. He charged the
British with hypocrisy, saying they preferred dealing with
four drug lords they knew well.
--------------------------------------------- ------
Consulate Lease-Signing Sign of American Commitment
¶12. (S) Ambassador Eikenberry raised the December 2, signing
of a lease for the Mazar-i-Sharif Consulate as an example of
our long-term commitment to Afghanistan. Further, this act
served as a clear rebuttal to political pundits asserting
that President Obama´s statement that U.S. troops will begin
to come home in 18 months signaled our intent to abandon
Afghanistan. Building on the theme of our long-term
commitment, the Ambassador pointed to the White House press
release stating support for economic development in the areas
of water, energy, and mining.
--------------------------
Two Stage Cabinet Roll-out
¶13. (S) Karzai informed Ambassador Eikenberry of his plan
to appoint Cabinet members in two stages. He expected to
send some of his names to Parliament within a week
(Parliament´s Lower House must confirm the President´s
nominees and then send the remainder of the names to
Parliament for confirmation once Parliament returns from its
December 6 - January 21 recess). Karzai said he his first
tranche of nominees will include the following:
-- Defense: Abdul Rahim Wardak will remain at Defense,
-- Foreign Affairs: Karzai may ask current NSA Rassoul to
assume this position,
-- Finance: Omer Zakhiwal will remain in place,
-- National Security Advisor: Ali Ahmad Jalali (former
Minister of Interior),
-- Agriculture: Asif Rahimi will return as Minister of
Agriculture,
-- Mining: Amirzai Sangin (currently Minister of
Telecommunications)
-- Interior Affairs: Karzai said that Atmar has lost the
confidence of the Northern Alliance, who say he is bringing
the former Communist Khad (Afghan secret police during the
Soviet occupation) into MoI. Responding to the Ambassador´s
question if it was essential for Atmar to leave MoI, Karzai
said it was not, but he was under considerable political
pressure to remove Atmar from his current position. Karzai
said if he decides to remove Atmar, he might appoint Atmar as
Minister of Energy. A possible replacement for Atmar was
current ANA Chief of Staff Muhammadi Bismullah. Karzai asked
Eikenberry´s opinion on Bismullah Khan, who responded that he
would consult with General McChrystal.
--Energy: Karzai said he will remove Ismail Khan as Minister
of Energy, but was struggling to find the right person to
replace him (though Atmar was mentioned).
¶14. (S) Karzai also shared his plan to name three women to
as-yet-undetermined posts in his Cabinet. Candidates
included Sima Samar (Chair of the Afghan Independent Human
Rights Commission), another unnamed woman to perhaps the
Ministry of Public Health (Karzai mentioned that current
Minister of Public Health Fatimie may remain in that
position, but it would depend on his health), and a third,
unnamed woman to a third position. (NOTE: The Ambassador has
heard separately that Bamiyan Governor Habiba Sarabi is
under consideration for the Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs and that NDS Director Saleh will also remain in
place. END NOTE)
¶15. (S) COMMENT: In the two meetings Karzai manifested both
encouraging and discouraging tendencies. General McChrystal
and Ambassador Eikenberry agreed that Karzai in some ways
appeared to excude the spirit of a wartime commander, an
important quality he has heretofore not demonstrated. As
Commander in Chief, Karzai appears to be focused on the right
issues, in particular how to make the ANA a more effective
fighting organization. The Ambassador gave Karzai credit for
his genuine willingness to consult on Cabinet picks.
However, Karzai´s dismaying qualities include his seeming
unwillingness to take any responsibility for corruption and
poor governance, and his continuing obsession that foreign
influences are to blame for these problems. Karzai
acknowledges the corruption, but blames it on outsiders.
Another related negative was the revelation that Karzai still
contemplates returning the corrupt, narco-trafficking former
governor of Helmand Province, Sher Mohhammed to power.
Karzai remains extremely thin-skinned, consumed by foreign
criticism, always reacting to perceived slights. Karzai´s
plan to seek confirmation for Cabinet nominees in two stages
suggests that he may first announce palatable choices and
then reserve more questionable choices to meet the
expectations of his jihadi political campaign allies for the
second tranche. However, those possible nominations
mentioned up to this point are of high caliber. END COMMENT
Mussomeli