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PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3823/01 3350156
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 010156Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3496
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003823 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019 
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: CHALLENGES CONFRONTING NATO TRAINING 
MISSION-AFGHANISTAN 
 
Classified By: Assistant Ambassador Joseph Mussomeli. 
Reasons 1.4 (b)&(d). 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary and Comment:  The NATO Training 
Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) was formally declared to 
be at &initial operating capability8 (IOC) on 
November 21, when U.S. LTG William Caldwell assumed 
command of NTM-A and the pre-existing, U.S.-only 
Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan 
(CSTC-A). CSTC-A, which planned and implemented ANA/ 
ANP training prior to the standup of NTM-A, is 
optimistic that the integrated CSTC-A/NTM-A command 
will be able to introduce an accelerated training 
program by the end of December - if NATO allies and 
partner states provide the requisite trainers and 
mentors.  CSTC-A/ NTM-A are also developing plans to 
increase training capacity should NATO Allies approve 
higher ANA and ANP personnel ceilings. We should 
acknowledge and applaud Allies/Partners deploying 
trainers/mentors in the field, even as we continue 
strongly to encourage Allies/Partners to stand in 
the widening gap between the existing number of 
trainers/mentors and the number needed to keep pace 
with intended ANA and ANP growth.  End Summary. 
 
Dual Command 
------------ 
¶2.  (SBU) NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) 
began preliminary operations October 20 and was 
declared to be at &Initial Operational Capability8 
(IOC) on November 21, when U.S. LTG William Caldwell 
formally became the dual-hatted commander of NTMA and 
CSTC-A.  CSTC-A/NTM-A is a single integrated command, 
one of ISAF,s two three-star subordinate commands 
(along with the recently-established ISAF Joint 
Command (IJC) the war-fighting operational 
headquarters. 
 
¶3. (SBU) NATO conceived NTM-A as a mechanism to help 
the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
develop into professional, corruption-free 
organizations able to assume lead responsibility for 
Afghanistan,s security, providing opportunities for 
NATO Allies and Partners to demonstrate their 
commitment to ANSF development.  Under the new scheme, 
NTM-A will focus on force generation and institutional 
training while CSTC-A will focus on ministerial and 
institutional development, as well as resourcing 
trainers and mentors for training teams, equipment, 
etc. for the fielded force.  Although primarily 
focused on operations, IJC will coordinate with NTM-A 
to provide training for ANSF units at the district 
level.  When the dust settles, the NTM-A/CSTC-A 
Headquarters will have a  NTM-A staff of 216 and a 
CSTC-A staff of 587 at Camp Eggers in Kabul and on 
other Force Operating Bases (FOB)/Combat Out Posts 
(COP) around Afghanistan. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) NTM-A training for ANA and ANP will be 
coordinated by two Combined Training Advisory Groups 
(CTAGs): CTAG - Army (CTAG-A) and CTAG-Police (CTAG-P). 
NTM-A officers will be integrated into interagency 
Civil-Military Working Groups co-chaired by the Embassy 
and ISAF in order to ensure ANSF training is informed 
by other U.S. and international efforts to introduce 
reforms and initiatives to address shortcomings in 
governance, rule of law, and development. 
 
ANA ) On its Way 
------------ 
¶5. (SBU) As of October 20 the ANA had 95,523 
personnel on the books and has grown on average by 
2200 per month over past 12 months, with a target 
requirement of 3,000 per month.  Programs designed 
to increase recruiting, decrease attrition and 
increase retention should help GIRoA reach the 
authorized ceiling of 134,000 personnel by the end 
of October 2010, but concerns remain about the ability 
of the ANA to recruit adequate personnel.  MoD 
Training Centers are providing standardized training 
for up to 8,000 soldiers in each 8-week training phase. 
Additional training sites will soon come on line in 
temporary facilities in Kandahar (November 2009), 
Mazar-e Sharif (December 2009) and Herat (January 
2010), pending additional construction of facilities. 
As additional training facilities come on line, the 
 
KABUL 00003823  002 OF 003 
 
 
rate of training should accelerate.  MoD Combat 
Service Support Schools in Kabul and      Mazar-e Sharif 
will train enablers (specialists in, e.g., logistics, 
materiel, and medicine) and come on line in November 
2009 and June 2010, respectively. 
 
ANP ) Greater Challenges 
------------------------ 
¶6. (SBU) Training the ANP poses greater challenges 
than training the ANA.  Recruitment and retention 
of ANP personnel is more difficult, in part because 
the ANP suffers from much higher killed and wounded 
in action rates than the ANA.  Also, in contrast to 
the ANA,s standardized training program for inductees 
which has been in place for more than 5 years, during 
that same period less than 20% of ANP personnel have 
received more than a two-week cursory orientation 
from their local district command.  Persistent 
reports of substantial numbers of &ghost police8 for 
whom salaries are paid without anyone reporting for 
duty have caused concern that MoI manning reports may 
be inaccurate.  For this reason the Ministry of the 
Interior and CSTC-A have launched a Personnel Asset 
Inventory (PAI) which requires ANP personnel to 
personally report for verification of their status; 
this includes providing biometric data.  Pending the 
completion of the PAI in early spring 2010, planners 
are assuming that the ANP had 93,809 personnel as of 
20 October 2009. 
 
IJC ) Taking the Baton 
---------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) With the activation of the IJC on October 12, 
responsibility for programs to develop the fielded force 
transferred from NTM-A/CSTC-A to the IJC.  Most notably, 
this includes the Focused District Police Development 
(FDPD) through which U.S. Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs) 
and NATO/Partner POMLTs (Police Operational Mentoring 
and Liaison Teams) train ANP recruits for eight weeks at 
school, then deploy with them to the field where they 
continue to mentor their ANP partners in basic policing 
and survivability skills.  CSTC-A recruits the PMTs and 
POMLTs (each POMLT consists of 7 to 16 mentors), which 
remain under NTM-A command during the initial 8-week 
training, but transfer to IJC command when they deploy 
to the field with the trainees.  A new reform program, 
Directed District Police Development (DDPD), will 
provide additional reform capacity by delivering the 
FDPD program of instruction in districts rather than at 
a regional training center.  IJC field commanders will 
administer DDPD in their areas, supported by NTM-A/ 
CSTC-A. 
 
¶8. (SBU) CSTC-A estimates that over 60,000 police on the 
ANP payroll have yet to receive professional police 
training.  Further, although CSTC-A/NTM-A have succeeded 
in recruiting an adequate number of trainers, Embedded 
Training Teams (ETTS) and Operational Mentoring and 
Liaison Teams (OMLTs) to train the ANA to the currently 
approved staffing ceiling, CSTC-A/NTM-A is concerned that 
the ANP will continue to suffer from a serious shortfall 
in Allied/Partner trainers, PMTs and POMLTs.  Of 196 
POMLTs ISAF is seeking to fill, with 7 to 16 mentors in 
each, NATO/partner states have only deployed staff for 
14 POMLTs to date. 
 
Accelerating Training/ANSF Growth Exacerbates 
Mentor Shortfalls 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶9. (SBU) As CSTC-A and NTM-A complete growth of the 
ANA and ANP to currently established ceilings (ANA ) 
134,000 and ANP 96,800) and accelerate ANP reform, they 
are also developing plans to increase training output 
should higher ANA and ANP personnel ceilings (e.g., 
COMISAF,s recommended 240,000 for ANA and 160,000 for 
ANP) be approved by NATO Allies and the Afghanistan 
Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board when it next 
convenes, probably in mid-January.  Such acceleration 
will exacerbate already serious shortfalls in trainers 
and mentors and stretch existing training facilities. 
Over 60 percent of ANP personnel still need to complete 
initial training. 
 
¶10. (SBU) In Kabul, the problem is manageable.  Of 
216 NTM-A Crisis Establishment (CE) positions NATO 
Allies/Partners to date have pledged to fill 183. 
 
KABUL 00003823  003 OF 003 
 
 
A significant portion of the NTM-A posts filled 
represent lateral transfers from within CSTC-A with a 
few additional transfers from ISAF; however, staff 
pledged by NATO and non-NATO contributing states are 
arriving to take up their responsibilities.  The 
thirty-three positions not yet pledged by Allies 
include a critical staffing gap in the area of Police 
Training, CTAG-P, which has 11 of 33 positions not 
pledged by any nation.  The NTM-A positions are 
included in the current ISAF Statement of Requirements 
(CJSOR).  COMISAF expects that Allies will pledge 
additional staffing for billets at the December 7 ISAF 
Force Generation Conference.  However, if the ceilings 
for ANA and ANP increase to the COMISAF-proposed 
ceiling of 240,000 and 160,000, to cover each of the 
475 Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) districts, 39 Border 
police battalions within 5 zones, and 4 brigades with 
25 battalions of Afghan National Civil Order Police 
(ANCOP).  The number of personnel needed on a POMLT 
will be dependent on the threat level of the area 
the team will be operating. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶11. (C) It hardly needs repeating that the development 
of the ANA and ANP into effective and professional 
organizations able to provide security to vulnerable 
populations throughout the country is critical to 
GIRoA,s ability to win back the loyalty of populations 
alienated by police and governmental corruption and/or 
the absence of governance.  As more trainers become 
available, the pace of training should accelerate. 
However, to optimize the quality of ANP training, many 
more POMLTs are needed to accompany trainees when they 
deploy to their home districts.  Thus, training existing 
ANP personnel to a minimal competent level will remain a 
major multi-year police development undertaking even if 
all NTM-A requirements identified by NATO are met. 
 
¶12. (C)  The establishment of NTM-A has put a 
multilateral face on training and may provide an impetus 
for NATO Allies and non-NATO contributing states to 
be more forthcoming in contributions of OMLTs and 
POMLTs. Conversely, we should remain alert to any 
indication that some Allies/Partners will see the 
establishment of NTM-A as providing them an &out8 
to send officers to Kabul at the expense of 
committing mentors down in the battlespace.  The 
risks of insurgent attack assumed by OMLTs and 
especially POMLTs when they deploy with their units 
can be substantial.  In the case of the POMLTs, 
mentor participation down at the district level ) 
where ANP suffer casualties at a rate more than four 
times the rate incurred by the ANA - should enhance 
ANP contributions to security and accelerate the pace 
of anti-corruption efforts within the force.  We 
should acknowledge and applaud Allies/Partners 
deploying OMLTs and POMLTs in the field, even as we 
continue strongly to encourage Allies and Partners to 
stand in the widening gap between the existing number 
of mentors and the number needed to keep pace with 
intended ANA and ANP growth.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
 
Eikenberry