VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHK #2262/01 3451006
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111006Z DEC 09
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9153
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0725

C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 002262 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/CM; ALSO FOR DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MC CH
SUBJECT: MACAU SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION AT 10: DESPITE 
CRACKS, ESTABLISHMENT REMAINS SOLID 
 
REF: (A) HONG KONG 2171 (B) HONG KONG 1807 (C) HONG 
     KONG 354 (D) 08 HONG KONG 2094 
 
Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher Marut for reasons 1.4( 
b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and comment: Ten years after reversion, Macau 
remains politically conservative and largely under the sway 
of the same entrenched, "patriotic" business and political 
elite that has essentially run Macau since the late 1960s. 
While Beijing has shown a low tolerance for public 
corruption, it appears to prefer an imperfect political 
status quo to dynamic change.  Macau people remain generally 
content and largely politically apathetic.  While interest in 
politics has increased, there is no clear movement towards 
political reform.  End summary and comment. 
 
¶2. (C) This is the first of two analytical cables examining 
Macau's development on the occasion of the tenth anniversary 
of its December 20, 1999 return to Chinese rule; the other 
will examine economic issues. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Change Flags, Change Names, Change Nothing 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) The Macau that Beijing took back in name on December 
20, 1999 was much the same as the one it had ruled in fact 
since the late 1960s.  At that time, a tottering Portuguese 
regime under siege by Cultural Revolution-inspired protests 
turned to three senior Macau "patriotic" business clans -- 
the Ho's (whence came future Chief Executive Edmund Ho 
Hau-wah), the Ma's, and the Chui's (whence came CE-designate 
Fernando Chui Sai-on) -- to mediate.  The three families 
restored the peace, but the capitulation of the Portuguese to 
protester demands, followed by the rapid decolonization 
effort after the fall of Salazar in Portugal, meant that the 
Portuguese were marking time until a mutually acceptable exit 
could be negotiated with Beijing. 
 
¶4. (C) It was during this twilight period that traditional 
associations -- "patriotic" organizations representing key 
business and social sectors -- came to dominate civil 
society, running patriotic schools, trade unions, and social 
welfare organizations.  In the SAR era, these associations 
have dominated elections for both directly- and 
indirectly-elected legislative seats, ensuring comfortable 
majorities for the government to pass its legislative 
program.  The Catholic Church, the only institution that can 
rival the traditional associations in providing education and 
social services, has no real political profile (although it 
remains a key constituency).  While the government does not 
actively restrict the media, it also doesn't have to -- most 
outlets would fold without government subsidies.  Most civil 
society organizations similarly subsist on the dole. 
 
¶5. (C) On the positive side, Macau followed post-Salazar 
Portugal in taking the first steps towards social reform, 
including directly-elected legislators starting from the 
mid-1980s.  The Portuguese administration actively recruited 
Macau-born students to return from overseas to help develop 
the territory.  Results lagged behind aspirations, however, 
leaving institutional capacity in most areas extremely low at 
the time of the handover.  Macau since 1999 has remained 
critically short of trained local civil servants and legal 
professionals.  Many policy bureaux still include Portuguese 
nationals, and Portuguese lawyers still dominate the legal 
field. 
 
¶6. (C) Edmund Ho Hau-wah seems to have been almost the only 
choice for Macau's first Chief Executive (CE), and he still 
possesses a stature none of his would-be successors can 
match.  Born into one of Macau's leading political clans, Ho 
managed to keep the establishment and the casino magnates 
(the other Ho clan, the Foks and the Chows) on board when 
Macau opened the gaming market to competition in 2002.  If 
not for the 2007 fall of Secretary for Transportation and 
Public Works Ao Man-long on corruption charges in a scandal 
that threatened to engulf Ho himself, Ho would have left 
office as the fair-haired CE whom Beijing held up to Hong 
Kong as a model.  As it turned out, many observers regarded 
Ho as on life-support through his last months, with 
successful passage of Article 23 national security 
legislation among the penance Beijing set for him. 
 
¶7. (C) Beijing's concerns about public corruption in Macau 
fed rumors that Macau Prosecutor General Ho Chio-meng might 
be tapped to succeed Edmund Ho as a warning to wrong-doers. 
In the end, a flawed but familiar status quo apparently 
 
looked better than change by fiat.  Macau people assumed any 
contender for the CE-ship would only declare himself with 
Beijing's approval, which in turn meant that Beijing 
consciously chose to allow Fernando Chui Sai-on to run 
unopposed.  The decision to retain Edmund Ho's cabinet 
largely intact under the Chui administration supports the 
idea that Beijing wants more of the same. 
 
---------------------- 
Guarding a Dying Flame 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Portuguese language and culture never achieved the 
penetration into Macau society that English did in Hong Kong, 
and the Portuguese and Chinese communities lived almost 
separate existences.  The bridge between the two was provided 
by the Macanese -- people either of mixed heritage or whom 
consciously chose to acculturate with the Portuguese.  While 
many Macanese are still active in public life (Secretary for 
Administration and Justice Florinda Chan being a prominent 
example), Macau's commitment to preserving its Portuguese 
heritage seems largely pro forma.  Many senior officials 
speak Portuguese poorly if at all, and educated Macau people 
are more likely to speak English.  While Portuguese dominates 
the legal field (for now), and the Portuguese press is 
largely held to be the most probing and critical in Macau, 
the community tending the Portuguese flame is small, and its 
influence is marginal at best. 
 
---------------- 
Majority Silence 
---------------- 
 
¶9. (C) One essential ingredient in a political system which 
perpetuates an established elite is a population that is 
sufficiently content to remain disinterested.  Macau's 
economy is healthy enough to maintain almost full (if not 
always high-quality) employment and to generate revenue 
surpluses sufficient to fund repeated cash handouts.  Macau 
people may not all be rich, but they can get by, and the 
booming economy means that many are doing better than ever. 
Demographically, political-age Macau residents are largely 
Mainland-born or of the first generation born in Macau, 
leaving them far more "patriotic" and favorably disposed 
toward Beijing.  They are also less immediately interested in 
politics, although they turn out in respectable numbers for 
elections. 
 
¶10. (C) With the last days of Portuguese rule marred by 
corruption and triad-related violence, many saw the coming of 
the PRC as heralding a return to law and order, and it 
generally has been.  Macau's weak governing capacity has 
meant Beijing can be more open about its role in Macau, which 
is commonly held to extend to day-to-day guidance of the SAR 
Administration.  We doubt Beijing actually gets down that far 
into the weeds, but we expect the process of consultation is 
more direct than may occur in Hong Kong, where there are more 
"one country, two systems" hawks keeping tabs on the 
government. 
 
¶11. (C) Perhaps the best illustration of this trend was the 
public's reaction to Article 23 national security legislation 
passed in February 2009.  One poll, conducted in late 2008 by 
influential "traditional association" the Macau General Union 
of Neighborhood Associations, showed support for the law 
running at 92 percent.  Sixty-five percent, however, admitted 
to not knowing the details of the text. 
 
--------------------- 
First Buds of Spring? 
--------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Macau society's contented apathy showed the first 
signs of change in the runup to the September Legislative 
Assembly (LA) elections.  With only twelve of the LA's 
twenty-nine seats up for direct election, and the ten 
indirectly-elected seats decided before the election, nothing 
that happened September 20 was ever likely to bring 
substantive change to Macau politics. That said, there was a 
palpable buzz that many took as the first sign that the Macau 
people might stand up. 
 
¶13. (C) Political debate increased in the months leading up 
to both the CE and LA elections, but much of it took place in 
the comfortable anonymity of cyberspace or talk radio.  A new 
organization, Civic Power, tried to position itself as the 
voice of a modern middle class, independent of both the 
government-business collusion of the establishment and the 
"confrontational" tactics of Macau's established 
 
pro-democracy movement, the New Macau Association (NMA). 
Three of the political movements able to contest seriously 
the direct elections for the LA made a transition to 
universal suffrage a core element of their platform. 
 
¶14. (C) In the end, however, only NMA gained an additional 
seat.  Its principal pan-democratic competitor, representing 
Macau civil servants, managed only to return its single 
incumbent, while Civic Power failed to take a seat.  Analysts 
judge that, while there are more individuals interested in 
politics than in past, they represent no single group or 
political tendency.  Moreover, democracy trails behind anger 
over corruption and concern that increasing numbers of 
foreign workers are taking jobs from Macau people as a spur 
to political participation.  That said, turnout for the 2009 
LA elections approached 60 percent, a Macau record and 
perhaps the most hopeful sign Macau people are becoming more 
interested in how they are governed. 
MARUT