VZCZCXRO3723
RR RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHHM #0686/01 3570747
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 230747Z DEC 09
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6186
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 4081
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0053
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 6429

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HO CHI MINH CITY 000686 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
USDOC FOR 4430/MAC/ASIA/OPB/VLC/HPPHO 
USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA RTHAYER 
DAA/ASIA MELLIS 
ASIA/EAA RSCOTT AND DKHY 
BANGKOK FOR OFDA REGIONAL COORDINATOR ALAN DWYER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV KSCA TBIO EAID VN
SUBJECT: VIETNAM'S CENTRAL COAST PROVINCES REBOUND IN THE AFTERMATH 
OF TYPHOON MIRINAE 
 
REF: HANOI 1082 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000686  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Subject: Officials in Khanh Hoa and Binh Dinh gave 
themselves high marks for their preparation and response to 
Typhoon Mirinae, which hit Vietnam's south central coast on 
November 2.  Perhaps rightly so, because ConGen HCMC's December 
9-11 visit to the region found life has effectively returned to 
normal, even in Phu Yen province where officials were too busy 
to meet with foreigners because of the cleanup effort. 
Provincial leaders blamed global warming for a greater number of 
unpredictable storms and are currently implementing GVN's 
national target plan to establish climate change adaptation and 
mitigation measures.  Mirinae underscores another interesting 
provincial dynamic; local leaders said that when a national 
mandate contradicts local reality in an emergency, it's every 
province for itself.  Provincial leaders noted they used U.S. 
Navy website forecasts during the emergency, and appealed to the 
U.S. for further disaster response assistance, particularly 
technical assistance, providing equipment necessary for rapid 
response and training.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶2. (U) Typhoon Mirinae hit nine provinces in the center of 
Vietnam on November 2, with Phu Yen, Binh Dinh, and Khanh Hoa 
enduring the heaviest damage.  The storm claimed the lives of 
around 123 Vietnamese and stranded thousands more. Nearly 50,000 
houses were damaged by flooding, of which more than 2,000 
collapsed.   Through the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the United States provided $250,000 to the 
International Federation of the Red Cross to fund basic 
emergency relief items such as blankets, water containers, 
cooking pots, mosquito nets, soap, and water purification 
tablets to more than 28,000 people who were badly affected by 
the typhoon.  This assistance followed $750,000 in USAID support 
to victims of Typhoon Ketsana (reftel) that slammed into 
Vietnam's central provinces in late September. 
 
 
 
The Anatomy of Storm Preparation 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Steering Committee of each provincial Flood 
Prevention Committee is headed by the Vice Chairman of the 
People's Committee while the DARD Director is managing head and 
oversees the other 22 agencies on the steering committee. 
Within the committee is a Standing Office, which acts as an 
"advisor" to the Steering Committee, looks at various prevention 
activities and technical expertise, and communicates with the 
national flood prevention committee.  This structure is 
replicated at the district and communal levels. 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) Mr. Nguyen Thai Nhu Tri, managing director of Binh 
Dinh's flood management authority said that when a storm is 
300-500 kilometers away, the Steering Committee holds a meeting 
to develop an action plan based on the latest forecast, which 
usually includes calling fishing boats back to shore, evacuating 
residents in high risk areas, removing high cranes or things 
that can fall and installing sandbags.  When the storm is 50 
kilometers offshore, the Steering Committee gives specific 
taskings that include moving elderly and children, mobilizing 
military and volunteer forces and putting four "on-the-spots" in 
place: a commander, rescue forces, transportation, and relief 
logistics. 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) According to the managing director of Khanh Hoa's flood 
management authority, Mr. Dao Cong Thien, one other important 
tasking before a major storm is to have a plan for release of 
water from hydropower plants and irrigation reservoirs.  Khanh 
Hoa has one hydropower plant and before Typhoon Mirinae Mr. 
Thien said he personally went to the reservoir twice to check 
procedures for the water level and held inter-reservoir meetings 
with managers downstream to assure cooperation; he forced them 
to release water to allow a place for it to go if heavy rains 
forced the hydropower plant to release.  Although Mr. Thien 
highlighted his vigilance in this regard, he did not fault the 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000686  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
managers of the Ba Ha power plant in Phu Yen province, who media 
have criticized for an emergency water release that led to 
additional flooding, saying they did the best they could under 
historically heavy rains. 
 
 
 
Self-Criticism, Vietnam Style 
 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Binh Dinh's flood prevention director said he would 
rate the province's response to Typhoon Mirinae on a scale of 
one to ten as an eight or nine after taking into consideration 
the resources available and the extremity of the storm.  The 
lessons he learned are to never refuse offers of assistance even 
if they don't have their intended effect, as every effort will 
boost morale; also, he underscored the need to increase the 
capacity of local people, citing former Party Secretary Nguyen 
Van Linh: "We have to save ourselves before God does."  Mr. 
Thien, on the other hand, gave Khanh Hoa a perfect 10 score on 
his province's performance, noting his personal involvement with 
the reservoirs and the rapid decision to send military battalion 
to the north of the province as soon as the storm hit Phu Yen. 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) When faced with the choice between following national 
Steering Committee dictate or making their own choices, 
authorities in both provinces stated that the People's Committee 
Chairman's first responsibility is to the people of his province 
and thus must act in accordance with those needs.  For example, 
after it became clear that Phu Yen would be the worst impacted 
by Mirinae, the national flood prevention steering committee 
directed Khanh Hoa to send eight emergency boats to their 
neighbor for assistance, but the province refused in case they 
were needed for its own relief efforts.  Similarly, because the 
Steering Committee only receives national weather forecasts 
updates every six hours after being vetted through Hanoi, 
authorities depend on outside "unofficial" updates, including 
the U.S. Navy's website, which both groups cited as the "best." 
 
 
 
Provinces Believe Climate Change at Work in Worsening Storms 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Provincial officials were eager to frame recent storms 
in a greater context of global warming.  Mr. Thien said that 
storms in the central region of Vietnam had become more 
frequent, more severe and, most notably, more unpredictable in 
the last ten years.  Whereas storms of the past would typically 
begin in the Pacific, travel over the Philippines into the South 
China Sea and then traverse a steady course into Vietnam, now 
there are more storms that are forming directly in the South 
China Sea and can suddenly shift direction without warning. 
There are also more storms going directly down the coast from 
north to south.  During Typhoon Mirinae, weather updates were 
frequent and accurate, but leaders were taken back by the sheer 
amount of rain dumped on the province in a flash flood.  Binh 
Dinh Flood Prevention expressed similar surprise - the storm 
itself was manageable, but the 70 centimeters that were dumped 
in the aftermath and unprecedented flooding that followed posed 
a greater challenge. 
 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Mr. Thien said that while he is not an expert on 
climate change, he does know about Vietnam's National Target 
Program (NTP) to set overall targets for adaptation and 
mitigation to climate change.  As part of the program, each 
province creates its own detailed plan and Khanh Hoa has already 
submitted its plan to the central government.  As part of the 
NTP, GVN has also selected eight provinces as pilot projects to 
establish "best practices."  Mr. Thien was critical of this 
approach because all eight of the provinces chosen are poor with 
weak preparedness programs, and he would never want to look to 
them as a guide for what should be done in Khanh Hoa.  He gave 
the example of Quang Ngai that had received and used foreign 
funding to build a safe house, and had no money left over to buy 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000686  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
what is most important: equipment.  In his opinion a better 
approach would be to choose as models four provinces with 
inadequate systems and four with strong systems, like Khanh Hoa. 
 
 
 
 
Comment: 
 
-------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Driving through the provinces most affected by 
flooding in the aftermath of Typhoon Mirinae, damage from the 
storm was not readily visible.  This is either testament to 
effective relief efforts -- giving credibility to the provincial 
Steering Committee's high self-evaluation scores -- or due to 
the fact that the worst hit areas are farther inland and off the 
beaten path.  Despite little evidence of flooding damage, Phu 
Yen authorities refused to meet with EconOff, citing that they 
were "too busy dealing with floods."  That same week Phu Yen 
authorities also refused to meet with Canadian Embassy 
officials, who wanted to check up on how $800,000 they'd donated 
for Mirinae disaster relief was being spent.  Other provincial 
leaders, however, appealed for U.S. technical capacity and 
equipment to assist in managing future storms, or at least 
advice on the best equipment to purchase, so that they can 
become even more effective in the face of worsening future 
storms and flooding. 
 
 
 
¶10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Hanoi. 
FAIRFAX