VZCZCXRO3357
RR RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHPB
DE RUEHHI #0925/01 3450740
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 110739Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0553
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0038
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0239
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000925 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/11 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ECIN ASEAN SENV KFLU BM KN VM
SUBJECT: Vietnam's 2010 ASEAN Chairmanship 
 
REF: A) HANOI 101; B) HANOI 848; C) HANOI 803; D) STATE 103203 
E) HANOI 895; F) HANOI 859; G) HANOI 861; H) HANOI 917 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Virginia Palmer, Deputy Chief of Mission; REASON: 
1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: Vietnam considers its turn as ASEAN chair to be 
the leading foreign policy priority for 2010.  Substantively, 
Vietnam's leadership wants to be seen as a responsible member of 
the international community -- professional and well-briefed, 
acting as an "honest broker" when possible -- but has no 
discernable policy agenda of its own.  MFA officials bluntly tell 
us that Vietnam will focus on implementing ASEAN's new charter. 
Even with limited ambitions, however, Vietnam realizes that Hanoi 
cannot afford to be entirely passive.  Bracketed by Thailand's 
"lost year" and what are anticipated to be weak chairmanships by 
Brunei and Cambodia, Vietnam is feeling the pressure of "high 
expectations" to deliver on Burma, regional security, and economic 
integration.  Vietnam's ASEAN year offers an opportunity for the 
United States to promote its interests at a time when ASEAN's own 
institutions are reforming.  Senior officials and influential track 
II academics have offered to work with us on issues ranging from 
climate change in the Lower Mekong to economic integration to Burma 
and North Korea.  ASEAN as an institution is not at all nimble and 
neither is Vietnam's decision-making; we will miss these 
opportunities if our objectives are not articulated early and 
often.  The GVN continues to press hard to host the U.S.-ASEAN 
summit in Hanoi next year, and would consider a POTUS visit the 
highlight of its chairmanship.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Vietnam is approaching its 2010 Chairmanship with a fair 
amount of confidence, according to contacts in the MFA and think 
tank community.  Most Vietnamese observers express satisfaction 
with Vietnam's 2008-2009 tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, noting that Vietnam's representatives acquitted 
themselves professionally and weathered difficult votes on Iran, 
North Korea, Kosovo, Georgia, and Somalia without alienating any of 
Hanoi's major international partners (ref A).  Vietnam confronts 
its ASEAN chairmanship without the sort of anxiety that preceded 
Vietnam's joining the Security Council or its hosting of APEC in 
2006, according to the MFA's Deputy DG for ASEAN Affairs, Vu Ho. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C) At the same time, with increased confidence comes 
heightened expectations, and Vietnam feels considerable pressure 
within ASEAN to demonstrate that it can succeed.  Ho characterized 
Thailand's term as ASEAN chair as a "disaster."  Others view 
Thailand's tenure as ASEAN chair as a "lost year" (actually a year 
and a half), as the Philippines Embassy's Political Chief Maria 
Arugay put it bluntly, adding that Brunei and Cambodia, which will 
succeed Vietnam as ASEAN chairs in 2011 and 2012, were not expected 
to exercise strong leadership.  Arugay's counterpart from the 
Singapore Embassy, First Secretary Lee Boon Beng, concurred, 
emphasizing that Vietnam would likely be consumed with logistical 
arrangements for two ASEAN leaders' summits; foreign and defense 
ministerials; ARF, "+3," and "+1" meetings and related bilateral 
events; and dozens of other senior official and working-level 
meetings throughout the year. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C) While confident, Vietnam is not approaching its ASEAN 
chairmanship with specific policy goals in mind.  At this stage, 
Vietnam appears content to be seen as a responsible steward -- and 
an honest broker, when appropriate -- with an emphasis on process 
rather than substance.  Lee and Arugay both told us that there was 
little expectation within ASEAN that Vietnam would push its own 
agenda.  DG Ho told us openly that Vietnam would focus on 
implementing ASEAN's new charter.  "Vietnam is not the type of 
country that proposes initiatives," the Deputy Director General of 
the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies at the 
MFA-affiliated Diplomatic Academy, Nguyen Vu Tung, conceded. 
Rather, Vietnam will seek to provide a "safe place" for other 
 
HANOI 00000925  002 OF 003 
 
 
countries (Tung mentioned Indonesia specifically) to put forward 
ideas. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Vietnam's stated intention to facilitate discussion without 
pushing its own policy agenda extends to ASEAN's "+1" dialogue 
partners, the United States in particular.  Over the past three 
months, senior leaders from President Nguyen Minh Triet (refs B,C) 
to the Foreign and Defense Ministers (refs D,E) have repeatedly 
urged the United States to help make Vietnam's ASEAN chairmanship 
"a success" and have offered to work with us to promote U.S. 
interests within ASEAN and regionally.  We have pushed for 
specifics, but our Vietnamese counterparts appear focused mainly on 
securing visits from Secretaries Clinton and Gates and, they hope, 
the President.  A Presidential-level U.S.-ASEAN summit -- hosted by 
Hanoi in conjunction with the city's 1,000-year celebrations and 
the 15th anniversary of U.S.-Vietnam diplomatic relations -- would 
be, as the MFA's DG for Policy Planning Pham Huu Chi put it, the 
"single greatest success" of 2010.  More darkly, the Vice President 
of the Diplomatic Academy, Dang Dinh Quy, noted that the absence of 
high-level U.S. engagement would leave the field open to the 
Chinese: "a disaster" in Quy's estimation. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) MFA officials and foreign policy academics welcomed the 
U.S. policy review on Burma (ref F).  Recognizing the drag that 
Burma has had on ASEAN, they have offered to facilitate discussion 
with the Burmese regime.  Of particular interest is the Diplomatic 
Academy's proposal for a track II discussion on how Vietnam's 
experience might be applicable to Burma, which we have been invited 
to attend (ref G).  The MFA also claims to have ramped up its 
efforts to pressure the Burmese regime to be more conciliatory to 
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD -- not out of any great love for 
Burmese democracy but with a cold recognition that Rangoon is 
considered the scofflaw of ASEAN, and a bad Burmese election could 
jeopardize what Hanoi dearly hopes will be a successful run as 
ASEAN chair (ref H).  (Comment: This recognition of the importance 
of Burma's election to the success -- or just non-disaster -- of 
Vietnam's ASEAN chairmanship seems primarily to be an MFA 
perspective, not shared by the CPV.  During consultations in Hanoi 
last week, the UK Ambassador to Burma Andrew Heyn had good meetings 
with the MFA but was read the riot act by the CPV External 
Relations Commission, according UK Political/Economic Counselor 
David Edmondson.  End comment.)  Eager to appear helpful, DAV 
scholars have repeated suggestions made in February that the ASEAN 
Regional Forum could serve as a spur to dialogue with North Korea 
(ref I).  Vietnam has responded positively to our suggestions that 
ARF's defense-related meetings be more substantive and has argued 
strongly that the ADMM needs a robust partnership with the United 
States. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Within ASEAN, Vietnam's attention will be primarily be on 
institution building.  The MFA's Deputy DG for Southeast Asia, Ta 
Duy Chinh, offered that Vietnam would be happy to lend its good 
offices, for example, to Thailand and Cambodia if they wished to 
discuss the Preah Vihear dispute, noting that DPM/FM Pham Gia Khiem 
had sent a letter late last to his Thai and Cambodian colleagues 
urging restraint in the spirit of ASEAN friendship and solidarity. 
Mostly, though, Vietnam will be focused on making the new ASEAN 
charter effective and in ensuring that the new institutions 
associated with ASEAN's three "pillars" (political/security, 
economic, and social/cultural) function as efficiently as possible. 
To that end, DDG Ho told us, Vietnam is assigning primary 
interagency coordinating responsibility to DPM/FM Khiem, with the 
MFA taking the lead on political/security matters, the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade responsible for economics, and the Ministry of 
Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs handling social and cultural 
issues. 
 
 
 
Comment: Why We Need to Act Now 
 
------------------------------- 
 
HANOI 00000925  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶8.  (C) ASEAN is not a nimble organization, and its 
consensus-driven decision-making favors the lowest common 
denominator.  Vietnam's own political calendar will only exacerbate 
this, as the Party/state apparatus increasingly focuses inward in 
anticipation of the January 2011 Party Congress.  Essentially, 
there are two vectors in play, operating in opposite directions: On 
one hand Vietnam wants to give life to ASEAN's new institutions and 
is eager to seize 2010 as a chance to be seen as a regional leader. 
On the other hand, Vietnam's capacity to absorb new initiatives, 
limited in the best of circumstances, will degrade steadily through 
2010 as pre-Congress sclerosis sets in.  The departing head of the 
HCMC External Relations Office, Nguyen Vu Tu, recently told the CG 
that the United States has until Tet (October 2010) to accomplish 
what it wants in Vietnam.  Tu may be overstating things, but not by 
much.  We have done an excellent job demonstrating our commitment 
to the region, a point Vietnam's leadership appreciates.  To give 
substance to this commitment, to push U.S. objectives on economic 
integration, public health, climate change, nonproliferation, and 
human rights and democratic governance, we need to articulate our 
goals clearly, early on, and forcefully -- and senior visitors will 
be key to keep the momentum and the pressure on. 
Michalak