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S E C R E T GENEVA 001239 
 
SIPDIS 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA 
(SFO-GVA-VII):  (U) B-1B AND SSGN AGREED STATEMENTS 
MEETING, DECEMBER 13, 2009 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-135. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  December 13, 2009 
                Time:  3:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M. 
               Place:  United States Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The sides met to discuss the U.S. response to the 
Russian counter-proposal of December 10, 2009.  (Begin 
comment:  Russian counter-proposal was delivered separately 
to the U.S. Mission.  End comment.)  Mr. Warner handed over 
the U.S. counter-proposals to each of the Russian responses 
on the SSGN and B-1B agreed statements.  The discussion for 
SSGNs centered on whether the items would still remain 
subject to the broad provisions of the treaty or simply the 
aggregate limits of the treaty.  On B-1Bs, the issue revolved 
around an initial demonstration that included a non-converted 
B-1B.  The Russian side agreed in principle to both agreed 
statements, however they needed to confer with the rest of 
the Russian delegation and Moscow for feedback.  End Summary. 
 
¶4.  (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Another Look at SSGNs; and More on 
B-1Bs. 
 
--------------------- 
ANOTHER LOOK AT SSGNS 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  (s) Warner provided a brief synopsis of the SSGN document. 
 
Begin text of U.S. Non-Paper: 
 
                                    SFO-GVA-VII 
                                    U.S. Non-Paper 
                                    December 12, 2009 
 
PART NINE - AGREED STATEMENTS 
 
Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN) 
 
Agreed Statement.  The Parties agree that, other than the 
provisions contained herein, the guided missile submarines 
shall not be subject to the provisions of this Treaty. 
 
In order to provide assurances that the four SSGNs of the 
United States continue to be incapable of launching SLBMs, 
the following provisions shall apply to such submarines: 
 
¶1.  No later than three years after entry into force of the 
Treaty, the United States shall conduct an initial one-time 
demonstration of each of the four SSGNs to confirm that their 
launchers are incapable of launching an SLBM.  The procedures 
for the demonstration shall be identical to the procedures 
for an SLBM launcher conversion exhibition in accordance with 
Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty. 
 
¶2.  Subsequent to the initial demonstration, the United 
 
 
States shall also provide opportunities for the Russian 
Federation periodically to confirm that the four SSGNs have 
not been reconverted to make them capable of launching SLBMs. 
 In order to provide such assurances that an SSGN has not 
been re-converted during the duration of the Treaty and their 
launchers are incapable of launching an SLBM, the Russian 
Party shall have the right, while conducting Type One quota 
inspections, to inspect guided missile launchers of each 
converted SSGN if they are located at the inspected submarine 
base during the period of the inspection.  The number of such 
inspections for each SSGN shall not exceed ((one))1 ((two))2 
times during the entire duration of the Treaty. 
 
¶3.  The inspection procedures for an SSGN shall be identical 
to the procedures for conducting an inspection of an SLBM 
launcher which does not contain a deployed SLBM in accordance 
with Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty. 
 
¶4.  In lieu of inspecting the SLBM launcher which does not 
contain a deployed SLBM, the inspection team leader shall 
have the right to designate for inspection one guided missile 
launcher located on a SSGN.  If a Dry Dock Shelter is 
installed, tubes obstructed by the shelter are not accessible 
for viewing.  A member of the in-country escort shall 
demonstrate to the inspectors that the guided missile 
launcher is incapable of launching an SLBM. 
 
¶5.  The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded in 
the official inspection report. 
 
((6.  If the United States should acquire other types of SSGN 
guided missile submarines, such SSGNs will also be subject to 
all the aforementioned verification measures.))2 
 
End text. 
 
¶6.  (S) Col Ilin was quick to note that the United States 
specifically stated up front that the SSGNs would not be 
subject to the provisions of the treaty.  Warner and Mr. Dean 
both explained that except for the provisions contained in 
the agreed statement, the four SSGNs would not be subject to 
the broad provisions of the treaty.  Ilin expressed the 
Russian concept that since the SSGNs would be inspected under 
Type One inspections that it was only logical that they fall 
under the broad provisions of the treaty; however, he agreed 
that the SSGNs would not be subject to the limitations of the 
treaty.  (Begin comment:  The Russian interpretation of 
"limitations" of the treaty is the "aggregate limits" only. 
End comment.) 
 
¶7.  (S) In response to Ilin's query about the SSGN conversion 
procedures, Elliott explained that for the initial 
demonstrations, since the SSGNs had already been converted 
under START, the demonstration would only be to show how the 
conversions were done.  Furthermore, Elliott maintained that 
should any more submarines be converted, the United States 
would follow procedures covered in Part Three of the START 
Follow-on Protocol.  Warner clarified that the last sentence 
in the U.S. proposal on SSGNs was not supposed to be 
bracketed and that it elaborated Elliott's point precisely. 
 
¶8.  (S) Ilin expressed a positive reaction to a SSGN 
demonstration although he said a review was required by 
 
 
Moscow.  Additionally, Ilin agreed with the concept that 
SSGNs should be demonstratedin order to show that they had 
not been reconverted.  Ilin questioned, during a Type One 
inspection, whether it would be possible to conduct an 
inspection of an SSGN.  Warner replied that it would be 
possible if the Russian inspectors elected to use their 
"empty launcher" allocation to lookQt a launcher on an SSGN. 
 Ilin then moved the discussion to a question as to how many 
launchers a dry dock shelter (DDS) covered when installed. 
He mentioned that the agreed statement should state clearly 
that the DDS will cover no more than the number that it 
covers whether it is three, four or six.  Warner said he 
would get the answer as to how many launchers the DDS covered 
and would ensure the text clearly stated the concept. 
 
¶9.  (S) Ilin stated he would take this back to the Russian 
delegation and also try to get feedback from Moscow. 
 
------------- 
MORE ON B-1BS 
------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Begin text of U.S. delegation paper: 
 
                                    SFO-GVA-VII 
                                    U.S. Delegation Paper 
                                    December 12, 2009 
 
PART NINE - AGREED STATEMENTS 
 
Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers 
 
Agreed Statement.  The Parties agree that, other than the 
provisions contained herein, after the completion of the 
conversion of the final B-1B heavy bomber, and for such time 
as no B-1B heavy bomber is equipped for nuclear armaments, 
B-1B heavy bombers shall not be subject to the provisions of 
this Treaty.  The Parties also agree that the conversion 
procedures employed previously under the START Treaty for 
conversion of B-1B heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped 
for non-nuclear armaments shall continue to be used under 
this Treaty. 
 
In order to provide assurances that the B-1B heavy bombers 
equipped for non-nuclear armaments continue to satisfy the 
requirements for conversion in accordance with Part Three of 
the Protocol to this Treaty, the following provisions shall 
apply to such heavy bombers: 
 
¶1.  The United States will notify the Russian Federation that 
the facilities where solely B-1B heavy bombers equipped for 
non-nuclear armaments are based, Ellsworth Air Force Base, 
South Dakota and Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, have been 
eliminated.  Such eliminated facilities where converted B-1B 
heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments are based 
may be inspected as eliminated facilities under a Type Two 
inspection to confirm that they are not being used for 
purposes inconsistent with the Treaty.  The inspection will 
fall within Qe quota for Type Two inspections established in 
accordance within Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol to 
this Treaty. Moreover, no more than one such inspection at 
one of the two B-1B bases may be conducted each year. 
 
 
¶2.  The procedures for the conduct of a Type Two eliminated 
facility inspection will be in accordance with Section VIII 
to Part Five of the Protocol and Part Three of the Protocol, 
with the following modified procedures: 
 
      (a)  At the point of entry for such an inspection, 
Travis Air FoQe Base, California, the inspection team that 
has designated either Ellsworth Air Force Base or Dyess Air 
Force for an eliminated facility inspection will be informed 
if more than 50 percent of the B-1B bombers based at that 
base are currently located at the base.  If less than 50 
percent are present, then the inspection team leader shall 
have the right to: 
 
            (i)  inform the member of the in-country escort 
that the inspection of the designated base shall take place; 
or 
 
            (ii)  designate another inspection site 
associated with the same point of entry; or 
 
            (iii)  decline to conduct the inspection and 
leave the territory of the inspected Party.  In this case the 
number of such inspections to which the inspecting Party is 
entitled shall not be reduced. 
 
      (b)  Upon arrival at the eliminated facility, the 
in-country escort team lead shall provide an annotated site 
diagram to show the location of each of the B-1B heavy 
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments that are currently 
present at the base; 
 
      (c)  After pre-inspection procedures have been 
completed, the leader oQhe team attending the inspection 
will designate no more than three B-1B heavy bombers equipped 
for non-nuclear armaments for inspection; 
 
      (d)  A member of the in-country escort shall permit the 
members of the team attending the inspection to view the 
designated B-1B heavy bombers that were converted in 
accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty to 
confirm that the bombers inspected continue to satisfy the 
requirements for conversion and therefore are incapable of 
employing nuclear armaments; and 
 
      (e)  The conduct of such an inspection shall be 
recorded in the official inspection report. 
 
¶3.  If during a Type One Inspection being conducted at an air 
base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, heavy 
bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments are present when 
pre-inspection movement restrictions are implemented, those 
heavy bombers shall not be subject to the Type One inspection. 
 
¶4.  If the United States should convert any other type of 
heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments into a heavy 
bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, those converted 
heavy bombers shall also be subject to the aforementioned 
verification measures. 
 
End text. 
 
¶11.  (S) Col Ryzhkov began the discussion by addressing the 
 
 
fact that under START the conversion process for B-1Bs was 
not completely fulfilled.  He asserted that the U.S. proposal 
to continue using procedures under START to complete the B-1B 
conversion process would be difficult for the Russian side to 
accept.  The Russian side had disagreed with the United 
States that the procedures had rendered the B-1B incapable of 
employing nuclear armaments.  Elliott replied that the United 
States had been doing the conversion for many years and if 
there was no agreement between the sides then the 
disagreement would continue for the next 10 years.  Elliott 
made it clear the United States did not intend to devise a 
new procedure to complete the conversion of the B-1B fleet 
and that given that the modification process of the fleet was 
nearly complete, boQ sides needed to find a way to resolve 
this issue.  Elliott commented further that the Russian side 
clearly knew that the United States did not store nuclear 
armaments at B-1B bases and that it did not train their B-1B 
crews in the nuclear mission.  Elliott stated that the U.S. 
concession was to offer periodic exhibitions that would go no 
further in confirming the conversion procedure than had been 
done previously.  Ryzhkov reasserted that the initial B-1B 
conversion demonstration was done improperly and it was the 
responsibility of the Party performing the conversion to 
convince the other Party that the conversion was sound. 
 
¶12.  (S) Ilin proposed that the United States should provide 
a demonstration for the B-1Bs much like the United States 
proposed to do for the SSGNs.  For the B-1Bs the 
demonstration should provide a comparison of a non-converted 
B-1B with a converted B-1B.  Warner said he would take the 
proposal for consideration but queried Ilin about the U.S. 
proposal for assurances against reconversion.  Warner stated 
the Russian side must choose between the Type Two inspection 
for an eliminated facility Q the U.S.-proposed annual 
exhibition but could not have both.  Warner also mentioned 
the reason the United States elected to expound upon the Type 
Two proposal from the Russian side was because we thought the 
Russian side preferred a regime that provided for a surprise 
verification rather than one which was predetermined by the 
United States. 
 
¶13.  (S) Documents provided:  See paragraphs 5 and 10 above. 
 
¶14.  (U) Participants: 
 
UNITED STATES: 
 
Mr. Warner 
Mr. Elliott 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. Dean 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
RUSSIA: 
 
Gen Orlov 
Col Ilin 
Gen Poznikhir 
Col Ryzhkov 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
¶15.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS