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INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 FREETOWN 000471 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL PINS SNAR KCOR SL
SUBJECT: SIERRA LEONE STABILITY, PART III: SECURITY SECTOR 
 
REF: A. FREETOWN 465 
     ¶B. FREETOWN 466 
     ¶C. FREETOWN 34 
     ¶D. FREETOWN 393 
     ¶E. FREETOWN 424 
     ¶F. FREETOWN 462 
     ¶G. FREETOWN 400 
     ¶H. FREETOWN 435 
 
FREETOWN 00000471  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Amy LeMar for reasons 
1.4 (b/ d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: This cable is the third in a four-part series 
(reftels A/B) that highlights risks to Sierra Leone's 
stability. Given recent events in the sub-region and Sierra 
Leone's own blighted history, the ability of the security 
sector to maintain peace is an ongoing, critical concern. 
While capacity and budgeting issues are well-documented 
(reftel C), expected shake-ups in the civilian arm of the 
security apparatus could pose a new threat to their efficacy, 
with leadership changes anticipated in the Office of National 
Security (ONS), Sierra Leone Police (SLP), and the 
Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). Agencies here often succeed 
or fail based on the actions and integrity of their leaders; 
the potential for Sierra Leone to backslide into instability 
is high if the coming period of transition within ONS, SLP, 
and the ACC is not properly managed. This could be 
particularly deleterious as the country sets its sights on 
the 2012 elections. End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
ONS: THE OFFICE WE CAN'T AFFORD TO LOSE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) ONS, the umbrella agency that provides policy and 
intelligence direction and oversight for the security sector, 
is arguably the most important civilian agency in the 
security apparatus. Led by Brigadier (Rtd.) Kellie Conteh, 
who serves as the National Security Coordinator (NSC), ONS is 
responsible for managing the country's most important 
security concerns, including intelligence-gathering, maritime 
security, and international liaising and negotiation on 
relevant issues. ONS benefits from significant UK support, 
which funds operational costs (including salaries). It has a 
robust recruitment progress, relying on recommendations 
generated from current ONS personnel and talent-spotters, 
plus multiple examinations and interviews. As a result, ONS 
has a relatively high-quality, well-educated team, which they 
can afford to compensate accordingly. 
 
¶3. (C) ONS has a reputation for integrity, and many attribute 
this to Conteh's leadership. While ONS has a strong fraternal 
network among its personnel, corrupt officers are not 
protected: one recent example was the conviction of an ONS 
intelligence officer who played a significant role in the 
Perez narco-trafficking organization. While the salary 
supplements from the UK no doubt help, even the lower-ranking 
ONS officers cite Conteh as the reason the office is 
relatively impenetrable to criminal and political pressure. 
Despite his success, or perhaps because of it, Conte has 
begun complaining of burn-out, and expressing his desire to 
leave his position. A UK contact close to Conteh indicated 
that he intends to leave in 2010, to allow a new NSC to 
settle-in before the elections. 
 
¶4. (C) Conteh's departure will undoubtedly impact ONS, 
particularly since there is no one waiting in the wings 
prepared to replace him. The Deputy, Christopher John, is an 
APC political appointment, placed within ONS as the party's 
watch-dog. John does not have the skills or reputation 
required to take over Conteh's position, and will likely 
continue on as Deputy indefinitely (Note: John has reportedly 
angled for the Inspector General of Police position, but is 
unlikely to receive that appointment. End Note.). The UK, who 
intend to continue to heavily invest in ONS until at least 
2012, would like to see an outsider brought in - someone 
known to have a strong backbone, with a willingness to serve 
in the position apolitically. Dr. Christiana Thorpe, the 
National Election Commission Chairperson, was identified as 
an example of someone with the intellect to quickly absorb 
the issues, as well as the demonstrated fortitude to 
withstand political pressure. People like Thorpe, however, 
are hard to find and retain in Sierra Leone, and Conteh's 
shoes will be very difficult to fill. 
 
¶5. (C) The ramifications of Conteh's departure are vast: ONS 
officers have anecdotally said that they will leave their 
positions if he goes; Conteh's military background gives him 
legitimacy with the Ministry of Defense, and helps prevent 
military encroachment of civilian authority (Note: This has 
been a burgeoning problem in recent months, per reftel D. End 
 
FREETOWN 00000471  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
Note.); and APC designs to use ONS as a party instrument 
could come to fruition without his push-back. The latter 
point is the most troubling, especially leading into the 
election period. The APC party executive has made numerous 
quiet requests for ONS' intelligence arm, the Central 
Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU), to gather damaging 
information regarding their rivals, as well as bury the 
corrupt practices of APC members. Losing or ceding its 
independence to the ruling party would make ONS ineffective 
and dangerous. 
 
¶6. (C) Though aware of the risks, Conteh can't be convinced 
to stay: besides burn-out, the opportunity cost to him of 
turning down international positions is high. The UK is 
attempting to meet all needs by creating a position for him 
in their new security sector reform program. Conteh will 
become the President's "Special Advisor" on security issues, 
and be paid entirely by the UK. This will at least keep 
Conteh in the country, and will hopefully counter-balance any 
inadequacies in the replacement NSC. It will also provide 
some necessary oversight for CISU, which will likely lose its 
Director General, Abdullai Mustapha, in 2010 as well. As with 
Conteh, Mustapha has been a strong agency head, with numerous 
contacts across the country and sub-region. His Deputy, 
Gabriel Moni, is a political appointment like John, put in 
his position to keep an eye on CISU, rather than 
substantively contribute to its mission. CISU has capable 
junior officers, but none are yet ready to make the leap into 
senior positions. Without Mustapha, who indicated fatigue as 
being a top reason for moving on, it is unclear how CISU will 
continue to operate - he is very much a one-man intelligence 
force, who delegates minimally. Again, there is strong 
potential for political interference, which is particularly 
problematic for an organization responsible for guiding the 
military and police intelligence arms. 
 
¶7. (C) Conteh and Mustapha were both hold-overs from the 
Kabbah administration, and new appointees would no doubt feel 
compelled to repay political favors for their selection. 
President Koroma demonstrates a lot of faith in both men, who 
are the best antidote to the poison spread by the advisors 
who gain from inciting the President's concerns about his 
political rivals. The outlook is bleak for ONS if appropriate 
replacements cannot be found: without effective ONS 
oversight, the varied self-interests within the larger 
security framework will come to the fore, likely bringing 
with them greater levels of corruption, dissent, and 
operational ineptitude. 
 
-------------------------------- 
SLP: A Weak (and Weakening) Link 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Per reftel E, Inspector General of Police, Brima Acha 
Kamara, was on leave in the UK for medical treatment. Many 
feel Kamara has outlived his usefulness, and his departure 
was accompanied by rumors that he may be placed on indefinite 
leave to enable a dignified (but forced) departure from the 
IG position. Assistant Inspector General Francis Munu was 
initially selected to be Acting IG during Kamara's absence, 
but correspondence to that effect was recalled by the 
President, who instead chose AIG Morie Lengor. Kamara's 
return hints that he has a bit more to go in the position, 
and perhaps the rumors were planted as a bit of 
"encouragement."  If Kamara is actually forced out, Lengor is 
by far the best man for the job, but Munu, as an APC 
supporter, is more likely to fill the position in the 
long-term. 
 
¶9. (C) Regardless of who sits in the IG position, they will 
be challenged by endemic corruption, poor management of 
limited resources, and a legacy of impunity. Police at all 
levels are known for taking kick-backs, and must pay into a 
larger system by sharing their "fees" with their supervisors. 
Even Kamara, who is known to demand USD 250.00 in advance of 
meetings with local businessmen, is expected to share his 
take with former IGs, Deputy IGs, and the Police Council. 
Many cite the poor compensation for officers, relative to 
ONS, as the reason (and even justification) for police 
corruption, and few are caught or disciplined. Several recent 
cases of police impropriety, however, put a spotlight on the 
issue: 3 SLP officers stationed at Lungi Airport were 
arrested the week of November 23 for corruption and narcotics 
possession (reftel F), while 4 other SLP officers have been 
arrested for providing weapons to those responsible for the 
recent spate of armed robberies (reftel G). In the former 
instance, the three officers arrested a Nigerian on suspicion 
of cocaine trafficking. After he expelled 26 capsules of 
cocaine, the officers took 16, likely with the intent to sell 
them. They were arrested after the Nigerian's statement did 
not correspond to the officers' report. The latter case 
 
FREETOWN 00000471  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
involved the Assistant Superintendent responsible for the 
SLP's Mobile Armed Response Unit within the Operations 
Support Division, and three underlings. They provided police 
weapons to those individuals currently being prosecuted for 
armed robbery. The Assistant Superintendent is a known 
associate of wanted drug trafficker Gibrilla Kamara, and was 
likely taking directions from an APC henchman (unnamed), 
whose involvement in the case was reportedly quashed by the 
Attorney General. 
 
¶10. (C) These incidents, as well as others throughout the 
year, have damaged the SLP's image. This makes it easier for 
others, notably the military, to consolidate their own power 
by assuming some civilian policing activities, which 
undermines the police at a time when they need reform and 
support to enable them to take on their security 
responsibilities for the election. Without honest and 
visionary leadership, the SLP will continue to be the weakest 
link in the security sector, with little hope of improvement 
before 2012. 
 
------------------- 
ACC: LOSING GROUND? 
------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) The ACC has made great strides since Abdul Tejan-Cole 
became Commissioner and the 2008 revised legislation passed. 
Recent high-profile cases (reftel H) prove that at least some 
of the "big fish" are up for grabs. Post has learned, 
however, that Tejan-Cole is leaving his position in December 
to take an unknown job in South Africa. His Deputy, an APC 
selection, will assume the helm for an indefinite period. The 
reasons for Tejan-Cole's seemingly sudden departure are 
currently unknown, but rumored to be linked to his refusal to 
investigate his good friend, Foreign Minister Zainab Bangura 
(Note: Bangura has been fingered for possibly using her 
position to profit from a donation of rice from the Indian 
Government. High-level contacts have indicated that there is 
credence to the rumors. End Note.), and frustration at the 
machinations that delayed his indictment of the former 
Ministry of Health. The latter incident appeared to 
demonstrate that the ACC's independence from the Ministry of 
Justice is only accurate in the technical, rather than 
practical, sense. 
 
¶12. (C) Regardless of the reason, Tejan-Cole is a huge loss 
for the ACC, which he completely reformed and re-built after 
his appointment. The UK recently gave an additional two 
million pounds to the Commission to support operational 
costs, and did so in part because of their faith in 
Tejan-Cole: without his leadership, and with no acceptable 
replacement in sight, the UK contribution could be for naught. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
COMMENT: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF A LEADERSHIP VACUUM 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶13. (C) The pending loss of three effective leaders in the 
civilian security sector highlights some of the inherent 
problems plaguing the system: over-reliance on a few 
individuals; a shallow (if not non-existent) pool of possible 
successors; and political interference that places party 
"spies" in deputy positions and prevents the promotion of 
effective leaders. Conteh's, Mustapha's, and Tejan-Cole's 
departures ought not pose such a great threat to the 
legitimacy of their respective officers; the fact that they 
do highlights the immaturity of the security sector in Sierra 
Leone. Further, Kamara's likely firing should be an 
opportunity to increase SLP legitimacy, but probably will 
not, demonstrating the limited independence afforded to 
entities that should be apolitical. With Guinea a continued 
source of anxiety, and political tension already rising in 
advance of the 2012 elections, this is a critical time for 
civilian authorities in terms of preparation and instilling 
confidence. With a void in terms of judicious counsel, 
President Koroma may be forced to seek advice from a group of 
self-interested people with a still undeveloped sense of 
pragmatic responsibility: his own party. End Comment. 
FEDZER