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RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHFN #0465/01 3351719
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R 011719Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
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INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 FREETOWN 000465 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SL
SUBJECT: SIERRA LEONE STABILITY, PART I: POLITICS 
 
REF: A. FREETOWN 400 
     ¶B. FREETOWN 79 
     ¶C. FREETOWN 425 
     ¶D. FREETOWN 379 
     ¶E. FREETOWN 435 
     ¶F. FREETOWN 449 
     ¶G. FREETOWN 434 
     ¶H. FREETOWN 323 
     ¶I. FREETOWN 255 
     ¶J. FREETOWN 99 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Officer for reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: This cable is the first in a series of four 
that seeks to analyze Sierra Leone's current level of 
stability, and the threats and weaknesses challenging it. In 
the political realm, the country is already gearing up for 
the 2012 national, parliamentary, and local elections. Even 
though the national election appears to be the APC's to lose, 
the SLPP has started readying their troops for political 
battle, perhaps with the intent of reducing the APC majority 
in Parliament and on the local councils. Recent by-elections 
and Paramount Chief elections have received national 
attention because the political parties are expending 
significant resources on them in an effort to gain ground or 
prove their continued dominance in stronghold locations. At 
the same time, power-struggles within parties further expend 
energy and distract politicians from what should be their top 
priority - serving the people. Though politics has always 
been a tough business in Sierra Leone, maintaining some level 
of cooperation between the parties will be critical to help 
ensure a calm, peaceful election period. End Summary. 
 
------------------ 
APC: THE INCUMBENT 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) The APC party has thus far handled its leadership role 
reasonably well, and the majority of citizens seem satisfied 
with what they perceive to be Koroma's achievements: notably, 
the continued provision of electricity in Freetown, the 
progress made on the Bumbuna hydroelectric project, and 
fighting corruption in an effort to re-brand the country. 
Though none of these are true "successes" - the electricity 
in Freetown is provided by expensive generators, Bumbuna is 
not yet operating and may never operate at full capacity or 
meet the demand for power, and corruption is fought on a 
case-by-base basis - Koroma's image remains that of a 
friendly, effective patriarch doing right by his people. Even 
scandals that had the potential to rock his administration, 
from an illegal contract with a Nigerian electricity provider 
to his alleged affairs, have done little to sway, let alone 
destroy, his pedestal. The recent Consultative Group meeting 
in London, which generated increased donor and investment 
interest, will also add luster. Koroma, as the incumbent, 
will be a nearly impossible man to beat in 2012, barring any 
hugely catastrophic and embarrassing incidents. 
 
¶3. (C) While Koroma appears untouchable, his party brethren 
are cognizant of their own political mortality, and are 
angling for positions of greater authority either within the 
administration or the APC structure. It is here that the 
party flounders - internal intrigue, paranoia, and insecurity 
are hallmarks of all political parties in Sierra Leone, and 
the APC is no exception - leading the President's advisors to 
focus on rumor, innuendo, and their own self-interest rather 
than assist with governing the country. The recent incident 
in which the President used his military assistance to the 
civil power authority without consulting the National 
Security Council (reftel A) is a good example of how the 
insecurity of his underlings can undermine his ability to 
make good decisions. Koroma is not surrounded by a bevy of 
trusted people; from the criminal Attorney General who 
conspires to undermine him, to the Majority Leader of 
Parliament who sued him, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
who berates him, there is nearly no one to whom Koroma can 
turn for objective support and guidance. As a result, some of 
his decisions are erratic and impulsive, reflecting the 
atmosphere of tension and anxiety around him, rather than 
carefully-considered analysis. 
 
¶4. (C) Koroma is saddled with an under-performing Cabinet, 
some of whom are personal friends and some of whom represent 
campaign promises and political debts made-good. Despite a 
reshuffle earlier this year (reftel B), there has been no 
obvious improvement in governance at the national level. 
Koroma is currently reviewing the ministers' performance 
contracts, perhaps with an eye to a second reshuffle either 
after the national budget is released in December, or in 
early 2010. A second reshuffle may have some positive impact, 
but party insiders say that the "sacred cows," including the 
 
FREETOWN 00000465  002 OF 003 
 
 
Attorney General, are safe until 2012. Party stalwarts like 
the AG are seen as necessary allies for Koroma to win a 
second term, but may be expendable after that. 
 
¶5. (C) This political reality - that Koroma will protect some 
of the criminally-minded cabinet members due to party 
politics - is a disappointment. Vice President Samuel 
Samsumana is known for corruption, and is currently a 
defendant in two civil suits in the United States for abusing 
his position and taking bribes (reftel C), but remains in 
place because Koroma believes he needs Samsumana to win the 
Kono vote. Koroma reportedly hates his VP, who was chosen for 
him by the party, but can only indicate his displeasure by 
firing Samsumana's underlings without consultation or notice. 
He may choose to remove Samsumana from the ticket in 2012, 
and replace him with another Kono ally, but appears willing 
to otherwise protect him from criminal investigations and 
scandals as much as he can. Koroma also protects the Minister 
of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Haja Afsatu Kabba, who 
reportedly received a bribe from the Taiwanese fishing 
company that owned the vessel seized in conjunction with the 
USCG in August (reftel D), and may have been caught on video 
accepting a bribe from another company as well (Note: She was 
also investigated by the Anti-Corruption Commission for 
procurement irregularities when she oversaw the energy 
ministry, but that investigation was allegedly shut-down by 
the President and she was moved to her new position in the 
reshuffle. End Note.). Besides a romantic relationship that 
reportedly existed between Koroma and Kabba, the APC have 
also said that she must be appeased because she was promised 
the VP position and tossed aside for Samsumana. While some 
scapegoats, such as the indicted Minister of Health and 
Sanitation, have lost their positions (reftel E), it appears 
that the money in your pocket and your standing in the APC 
hierarchy ultimately determine whether or not you have carte 
blanche to profit hugely and blatantly from your government 
position. The APC, despite claims of commitment to good 
governance principles, are increasingly showing a deeper 
commitment to the previous status quo of corruption and greed 
at the highest levels. 
 
-------------------- 
SLPP: THE OPPOSITION 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Per reftel F, the SLPP has focused on discrediting the 
ruling party, rather than proposing alternative policies and 
solutions. The recent letter from party Chairman John 
Benjamin to President Koroma is just one in a long line of 
unsophisticated attacks that are too forward-leaning to be 
supported by facts: their history for finger-pointing and 
blame-gaming, which was in evidence following their dramatic 
loss of the presidency in 2007, persists. Their failure to 
advocate particular policy options is likely linked to the 
party's obsession with inter-party power struggles, leaving 
little energy left-over to propose legitimate alternatives to 
APC policies. Some within the SLPP executive are angling for 
a revision to the party constitution (reftel G), and many 
still believe that Benjamin will alter the revised 
constitution, which prevents party executive members from 
standing as candidates, to allow him to choose himself to run 
in the 2012 presidential elections. With this level of 
distrust and animosity within the party, perhaps it is 
unsurprising that the SLPP can be nothing more than a 
cantankerous and disorganized foe for the APC rather than a 
sparring partner bringing relevant issues to the fore. 
 
¶7. (C) Despite their internal dramas, the party is still 
claiming some victories, albeit in their own stronghold: 
their candidate won a local council position in Bo in a 
November by-election by a landslide margin. The party is also 
trying to regain support from the international community, 
and recently created an external contact group to liaise with 
diplomatic partners. This group, though unlikely to be 
rebuffed, is also unlikely to be welcomed with open arms 
given their deliberate, regular, and targeted media attacks 
of post, UNIPSIL, and IMATT. The SLPP can not afford to 
further alienate such groups, but it will remain to be seen 
if they can re-direct their energies towards a more positive 
level of engagement. As a party, the SLPP has been unfocused 
and vengeful since the 2007 elections, and could only pose a 
real threat to the APC in 2012 if new leadership emerges and 
adopts different strategies. Still, the SLPP contributes 
negatively to the level of political discourse in Sierra 
Leone, which encourages similar bad behavior from their 
opponents. Like a cornered fighter, the SLPP approach to 2012 
will probably be to swing wildly, often, and with as much 
force as possible - guaranteeing damage, but not necessarily 
to its opponents. 
 
--------------------- 
 
FREETOWN 00000465  003 OF 003 
 
 
PMDC: THE OPPORTUNIST 
--------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The PMDC party continues to hold on by a thread, 
despite losing members to the APC and SLPP parties on a 
regular basis. Party Chairman Charles Margai seems to have 
enough hubris to make up for the losses (reftel H), but 
hubris alone won't propel the PDMC into a credible threat for 
the 2012 elections at any level; this is likely why he has 
begun encouraging his opponents to court him for his future 
support, even though he pledged at the PMDC party conference 
this year to support the APC again in a run-off situation. A 
November 25 article in a local paper highlighted a speech 
Margai gave in Pujehun district in which he said that voters 
should avoid both major parties because they "have failed the 
people of Sierra Leone in terms of good governance, 
transparency, and accountability." Though he criticizes both 
parties, his remarks are clearly designed to demonstrate to 
both the APC and SLPP that his support for the APC is fickle, 
and that he is essentially for sale. 
 
¶9. (C) Margai is seemingly risking a great deal by 
tap-dancing between the APC and SLPP parties, especially when 
the APC reportedly bankrolled their conference and 
by-election campaigns. He is likely aware, however, that 
ultimately the APC needs his party to split the SLPP vote 
more than he needs their cash - the PMDC candidates are not 
strong in any district, but will continue to win at least 
some votes as long as they are on the ballot. If Margai's 
intent is not to win, but to profit, his strategy may work. 
However, his intent could also be to remind Koroma and the 
APC that they owe their success, in part, to the PMDC, and 
that political debts remain to be paid. This hypothesis may 
be proven if more PMDC members are selected for Cabinet 
positions in the expected reshuffle. 
 
¶10. (C) The PMDC party is inherently the "Margai Party," and 
his self-interest will override the party's larger ambitions. 
Margai was angry earlier this year by the APC's reaction to 
the Dennis Sandy-Eddie Turay land scandal (reftel I), and his 
criticisms could be retribution for that. However, he could 
also be angling for a bigger piece of the political pie, 
including a prestigious appointment for himself in 2012. 
Margai is most likely to throw his support behind the party 
that appears poised to win, which means that he can flirt 
with the SLPP as much as he likes, but he's going home with 
the APC. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) Party politics in Sierra Leone is an ugly business, 
with rivalries seemingly more important than governance. 
Though in recent years these rivalries have played out more 
rhetorically than physically, situations can quickly derail 
into acts of violence: the March riots (reftel J) show that 
inciting tension here is an easy process. While there is no 
immediate reason to expect such an incident to occur again in 
the near future, there is also no guarantee that it will not, 
despite the parties' mutual promise to behave themselves. 
What is perhaps the greatest ongoing concern in the political 
realm is that the two significant parties both behave 
erratically, irrationally, and personally, responding first 
and asking questions later whether they are addressing inter- 
or intra-party conflict. The ability to remain objective is 
exhibited by neither the insecure APC or the rudderless SLPP. 
It is easy, therefore, to understand why party followers - 
many of whom are illiterate and blindly support either the 
APC or SLPP along regional or ethnic lines - exhibit poor 
judgment as well. In a country where mobs are plenty and cool 
heads are few, it would take a very small spark to ignite the 
pervasive political tension into an uncontrollable fire. End 
Comment. 
FEDZER