VZCZCXRO5859
RR RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDJ #1423/01 3611241
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271241Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1170
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 001423 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR AF, AF/E, AND AF/RSA 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER 
AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2024/12/27 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PREF DJ SO ER YM
SUBJECT: DAS WYCOFF DISCUSSES REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES WITH 
DJIBOUTI'S PRESIDENT GUELLEH 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: James C. Swan, Ambassador, U.S. Department of State, 
Executive Office; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On the same day that DAS Wycoff had separate 
meetings with Djibouti's Foreign Minister and Prime Minister 
(septels), President Guelleh engaged in a 90-minute exposition of 
the interlinking security challenges facing Djibouti.  Chief 
security concerns for Djibouti are Eritrea's continued military 
occupation of Djiboutian territory at Ras Doumeira, as well as the 
threat posed by al-Shabaab extremists in Somalia.  In addition to 
discussing developments in the Horn of Africa, Guelleh also 
underscored his concern over deteriorating security conditions in 
Yemen.  He reported that Eritrea's Defense Minister had recently 
traveled to Tehran in search of additional military and financial 
support.  He expressed reservations over Kenya's "Jubaland 
Initiative" to train ethnic Ogadeni in support of TFG political 
objectives in Lower Juba.  Despite the wide array of regional 
security challenges -- or perhaps because of them -- Guelleh 
expressed his deep appreciation for Djibouti's strategic 
partnership with the United States.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
¶2. (U) On December 8, AF DAS Wycoff and Ambassador met with 
President Ismail Omar Guelleh.  Embassy Nairobi Counselor for 
Somalia Affairs, AF/E senior desk officer for Somalia, and DCM 
(note-taker) accompanied DAS Wycoff. 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) President Guelleh expressed appreciation for Djibouti's 
partnership with the United States, a relationship strengthened by 
"optimism" and transparency.  He noted popular support within 
Djibouti for the U.S. military presence at Camp Lemonnier, citing 
civil affairs projects (supporting schools and health clinics) in 
rural areas as an excellent example of bilateral cooperation. 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) President Guelleh noted the impact of regional instability 
on Djibouti.  Individuals fleeing conflict in neighboring Ethiopia, 
Somalia, and Yemen could be found in Djibouti's modest hospitals, 
all receiving treatment with costs covered by the GODJ.  Beginning 
in 1975, with the rise and subsequent fall of the Communist Dergue 
regime in Ethiopia, thousands of refugees fled to Djibouti, with 
many obtaining Djiboutian citizenship upon Djibouti's independence 
in 1977.  In the 1980s, numerous Afars found refuge in Djibouti. 
More recently, for nearly the past two decades, the crisis in 
Somalia had impacted Djibouti. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
AL-SHABAAB REPRESENTS THREAT TO HORN OF AFRICA 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Unlike some European countries, the USG understood the 
gravity of the situation in Somalia and the need for action in 
response, Guelleh said.  Speaking of the TFG's struggle against 
al-Shabaab, Guelleh said that the TFG and Djibouti sought to 
"eliminate a real cancer", which had to be stopped before it 
wrought havoc among the large mixed populations of Muslims and 
Christians in Ethiopia.  Since the mid-1990s, extremist elements in 
Somalia, including al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), had repeatedly 
sought to destabilize Ethiopia, but had been defeated - through 
direct Ethiopian military intervention in 1997, in the case of 
AIAI. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Guelleh also reviewed deteriorating security conditions in 
Yemen, noting Saudi concern over developments with its neighbor, 
and attributing much of Yemen's current instability to the failure 
to demobilize and reintegrate former combatants from south Yemen in 
¶1994.  Somali mercenaries had also fought in Yemen in support of 
 
DJIBOUTI 00001423  002 OF 003 
 
 
rebel groups, Guelleh said. 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) DAS Wycoff noted the common interest of the USG in promoting 
stability in the region and in Somalia.  He reviewed regional 
consultations on the margins of the recently concluded IGAD 
ministerial, and highlighted U.S. support for regional actors 
seeking to promote Somali stability, including support for Uganda 
as well as for Djibouti's efforts to train TFG troops.  Wycoff 
highlighted bilateral cooperation with Djibouti, including the 
anticipated arrival in January 2010 of an ACOTA team to discuss 
possible Djibouti military contributions to multilateral 
peacekeeping operations, including AMISOM. 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) In response, President Guelleh noted the necessity of 
establishing a security cordon in Mogadishu; TFG forces needed to 
"clean up" Mogadishu and to rid it of al-Shabaab forces, who 
rallied the bulk of their fighters to specific areas when needed. 
Civilians bore the brunt of their attacks, whether perpetuated by 
al-Shabaab or Hisbul Islam, and medical needs were urgent.  A key 
reason to train TFG forces was that AMISOM could not remain in 
Somalia in perpetuity, Guelleh said, noting that TFG forces needed 
to replace AMISOM forces in the country's interior. 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) After a brief discussion of USG opposition to a reported 
Kenyan plan to work with the TFG to train Somalis in Kenya for an 
intervention in Juba, Guelleh again highlighted the interlinkages 
among countries in the Horn, including Ethiopia, Somalia, and 
Kenya.  Kenya's Minister of Defense, like the terrorist Hassan 
al-Turki, were both ethnic Ogadeni, Guelleh noted.  While the TFG 
and Kenyans wanted to play the Ogadeni card in support of the TFG, 
if mishandled the operation could backfire and lead to further 
unrest in Ogadeni regions of Ethiopian and northern Kenya. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
ERITREA'S ISAIAS MUST BE REMOVED 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶10. (C) Noting Eritrea's continued occupation of Djiboutian 
territory at Ras Doumeira, President Guelleh observed that 
Eritrea's defense minister had led an Eritrean delegation two weeks 
earlier to Tehran in search of weapons and financial support. 
Citing Iranian support for the GSE, Guelleh said the Eritrean 
regime continued to infiltrate Oromos and Afars from Eritrea into 
Djibouti, in an attempt to destabilize Djibouti.  The current 
regime in Asmara needed to be removed, Guelleh said.  DAS Wycoff 
pushed back on this idea, responding that the USG priority was 
regional stability and highlighting our significant efforts to 
exert diplomatic pressure on Eritrea. 
 
 
 
¶11. (C) Guelleh criticized France for opposing international 
efforts to sanction Eritrea, noting that French officials sought 
not to irritate Isaias, due to the presence of a French hostage 
being held in Somalia.  Guelleh noted that the recently concluded 
December 7-8 33rd IGAD Council of Ministers had resulted in a 
communique calling, inter alia, for sanctions against Eritrea, and 
that Isaias only responded to pressure.  Guelleh attributed Isaias' 
intransigence to psychological problems, noting that an uncle of 
Isaias, as governor in Wollo, Ethiopia, had been responsible for 
repeated bloody repression of the population.  Isaias had become 
more and more dangerous; Djiboutian troops had not left the border 
with Eritrea since mid-2008, Guelleh said.  Wycoff noted that the 
USG was working to pass a UNSC resolution that would put sanctions 
 
DJIBOUTI 00001423  003 OF 003 
 
 
on Eritrea both for its role in Somalia and for its conduct vis a 
vis Djibouti. 
 
 
 
¶12. (C) COMMENT.  In this 90-minute meeting with DAS Wycoff, 
President Guelleh offered a strategic tour d'horizon of the 
numerous security challenges affecting Djibouti, and how Djibouti 
therefore views regional cooperation as well as partnership with 
the United States as key to preserving its stability and security. 
Growing worries about instability in Yemen have now been added to 
standard Djiboutian security concerns over Somalia and Eritrea. In 
discussion of the deployment of Djiboutian forces to Somalia under 
AMISOM, Guelleh neither reiterated nor retracted this commitment. 
In a separate meeting, Djiboutian CHOD MG Fathi stated that 
Djiboutian troops had already been identified to serve with AMISOM 
but still lacked equipment (of which he promised to provide a 
list).  END COMMENT. 
 
 
 
¶13. (U) DAS Wycoff cleared this message. 
SWAN