VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDJ #1407/01 3541359
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201359Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1153
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA FWD
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L DJIBOUTI 001407 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/20 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PGOV MARR MOPS PINR DJ ER
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI-ERITREA BORDER CONFLICT UPDATE: DJIBOUTI SETTLING 
INTO MAINTENANCE POSTURE 
 
REF: 09 DJIBOUTI 649; 09 DJIBOUTI 1109 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: J. Swan, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY. During a December 11-12 visit to northern 
Djibouti, Ambassador and visiting DAS Karl Wycoff travelled to the 
Djiboutian military base of Moulhoule, 15km south of the stalemated 
Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute at Ras Doumeira.  While emphasizing 
that the overall border situation remained static, military 
officials outlined some key adjustments in Djibouti's strategy, 
including a reduction in troops from 2,000 to 1,500, and a greater 
focus on intelligence and control of key border points for possible 
infiltrators.  Djiboutian Armed Forces (FAD) officers also noted 
that Eritrean forces appeared to be settling into more permanent 
positions, citing ongoing night-time construction work, and the 
completion of a pipeline supplying water to the front.  The FAD 
commander at Moulhoule estimated that at least 750 Eritrean troops 
were stationed on the Ras Doumeira ridge and in the trenches, with 
an additional 250 opposite the Djiboutian village of Bissidiro 
(20km west of the sea), reinforced by heavy armaments stationed 
further back from the immediate border area.  In response to a 
direct question from the Ambassador, FAD officers stated that the 
original fighting in June 2008 had resulted in 19 Djiboutian 
missing in action (MIA), and about 40 Djiboutian dead.  During a 
presentation of possible Eritrean motives, FAD officers argued that 
possession of Ras Doumeira island and peninsula had important 
implications for allocation of territorial waters, and that 
Djiboutian territory offered better visibility and control over the 
strategic Bab-el-Mandab strait.  FAD officers also underlined that 
the expense of maintaining troops at the border remained a heavy 
financial burden on the GODJ.  Ambassador and DAS Wycoff outlined 
USG support for Djibouti to date during the border conflict, and 
emphasized current high-level U.S. attention to passing a U.N. 
resolution sanctioning Eritrea for its behavior at the border, and 
in Somalia.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
AT MOULHOULE, CONFLICT RECAP 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
 
¶2. (C) On arrival at Moulhoule December 12, Ambassador and DAS 
Wycoff were briefed by Djibouti FAD headquarters staff who had 
travelled to Moulhoule for the day, and by the Moulhoule commanding 
officer, LT COL Dahir Mohamed Ali.  The current commanding officer 
is ranked Lieutenant Colonel; in earlier months following the June 
2008 outbreak of hostilities, a full Colonel had been assigned to 
Moulhoule.  The Moulhoule commanding officer is responsible for 
only the immediate border region, a band of some 30km.  Other 
units, notably the Tadjourah Regiment and the Obock Regiment, are 
responsible for other sectors of northern Djibouti.  The FAD 
presentation included a summary of the events leading up to the 
border conflict of June 2008, a history of international agreements 
regarding the border, an update on Djibouti's current posture, and 
an analysis of possible Eritrean motivations and Eritrea's overall 
regional spoiler role.  In reviewing the chronology of events in 
June 2008, FAD officers told Ambassador that the 24 hours of 
fighting between June 10-11 had resulted in 19 Djiboutian MIA and 
about 40 Djiboutian dead. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
ADJUSTED DJIBOUTIAN FOCUS: INTELLIGENCE, 
 
CONTROLLING KEY POINTS FOR INFILTRATORS 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) Unlike Eritrea, FAD officers pointed out, Djibouti had 
followed international calls for both sides to retreat from the 
immediate border area, and FAD forces remained some 2-4 km from the 
border line.  Eritrean forces continue to work at night on 
construction projects on the Doumeira peninsula ridge line and on 
Doumeira island, FAD officers said, and recently installed a water 
 
 
pipeline to supply their trenches at the front.  The FAD commander 
at Moulhoule estimated that at least 750 Eritrean troops were 
stationed on the Ras Doumeira ridge and in the trenches, with an 
additional 250 opposite the Djiboutian village of Bissidiro (20km 
west).  Heavy Eritrean armaments, he told DAS Wycoff and 
Ambassador, were stationed further back from the immediate border 
area, in the vicinity of the Eritrean town of Rehayto. 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) While emphasizing that the front has "not changed since 
2008," FAD officers outlined several adjustments in Djibouti's 
force posture.  Overall FAD forces had been reduced from 2,000 to 
1,500, partly because of other pressing commitments such as the 
recent East African Standby Force (EASBRIG) Field Training Exercise 
(FTX) and the training of Somali Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) recruits.  The maintenance of this somewhat reduced force 
still took a heavy toll on the GODJ's budget, FAD officers said, 
with high costs for communications, electricity, and both air and 
overland supply deliveries twice a week.  FAD forces consume 200 
sheep a week, delivered via boat to Obock and then overland to 
Moulhoule.  With somewhat reduced forces, FAD officers said that 
Djibouti's strategy had shifted toward intelligence collection, 
mobility, and maintaining selected key positions along the border. 
FAD forces were also focusing on monitoring important border entry 
points and nearby water sources for possible movement of 
Eritrean-backed infiltrators.  FAD officers noted that the local 
population suffered from displacement and reduced freedom of 
nomadic movement as a result of the border conflict, and said that 
the FAD worked with nomads to gather intelligence. 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) FAD officers said that Eritrea continued to support 
infiltrators and "malfaiteurs" (criminals) in Djibouti.  A 
particular menace, they said, was mine-laying (ref A).  Mine 
layers, FAD officers emphasized, were believed to be Eritreans who 
"exfiltrated" back over the border into Eritrea after setting 
mines.  Some Djiboutian nationals, FAD officers admitted, had 
received training in Eritrea and had then been infiltrated back 
into Djibouti to help destabilize the north.  These Djiboutians 
were under the command of Eritrean officers, were often used as 
porters, and had little "freedom of action."  Echoing reports from 
other GODJ interlocutors (ref B), FAD officers said that recent 
"infiltrators" captured by FAD forces had been Djiboutian, and had 
voluntarily turned themselves over to Djiboutian forces after 
souring on the Eritrean-backed destabilization mission.  The FAD is 
also still apprehending three to four Eritrean military 
deserters/defectors every month.  The deserters/defectors are 
interviewed in northern Djibouti before being transported to 
Djibouti City's Nagad detention center. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Asked about recent security incidents in the area under his 
command, LT COL Dahir said the last in his sector was a mine 
incident in June that damaged a Djiboutian military truck carrying 
census enumerators.  Subsequent incidents in the Mablas and near 
Assagayla were in zones overseen by other Djiboutian commanders 
(ref A). 
 
 
 
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DJIBOUTI ON ERITREAN MOTIVATIONS 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) According to the FAD briefing, Eritrea had four reasons for 
invading Djibouti and maintaining its current position: 1) to 
control the strategic Bab-el-Mandab strait and shipping through the 
Red Sea; 2) to disturb trade, and especially Ethiopian, Djiboutian, 
and American trade; 3) to hamper Djibouti's development; and 4) to 
sabotage the Djibouti Peace Process for Somalia.  FAD officers 
stressed that under the current assignment of territorial waters, 
Eritrea has no direct control or visibility over the Bab-el-Mandab 
strait; Yemen and Djibouti control access to the Bab-el-Mandab 
waters.  Occupying the island of Ras Doumeira and the peninsula of 
Ras Doumeira, FAD officers explained, would give Eritrea direct 
 
 
presence at the Bab-el-Mandab. 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Ambassador and DAS Wycoff thanked FAD officers for their 
presentation, and outlined USG support to date for Djibouti in the 
border conflict.  In addition to early diplomatic and material 
support, Ambassador said, the U.S. was now firmly backing a 
"muscular" African-drafted UNSC resolution (UNSCR) to sanction 
Eritrea, both for its interference in Somalia, and its 
noncompliance with UNCSR 1862 on the Djibouti-Eritrea border 
dispute.  DAS Wycoff added that the U.S. understood the "heavy" 
burden of the border conflict on Djibouti and GODJ resources, and 
said that the USG continued to look for ways to achieve Eritrean 
withdrawal. 
 
 
 
-------------- 
 
COMMENT 
 
-------------- 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) While emphasizing the lack of either diplomatic or military 
movement in the stalemated Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute, FAD 
officers nevertheless described a slightly adjusted Djiboutian 
tactical approach to the conflict, with a greater emphasis on 
reconnaissance and intelligence, and a slightly leaner, more mobile 
posture.  This adjustment in approach-along with Djiboutian 
observations of Eritrea's continued construction projects-suggest 
that both sides continue to settle into what they believe will be a 
longer-term standoff.  As the border dispute continues to weigh 
heavily on Djiboutian financial, human, and diplomatic resources, 
FAD officers appreciated the high-level USG visit to Moulhoule, and 
the reiterated assurance of USG diplomatic support at the UNSC. 
END COMMENT. 
 
 
 
¶10. (U) DAS Wycoff departed post before having an opportunity to 
clear this cable. 
SWAN