VZCZCXRO2548
RR RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDJ #1391/01 3441331
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101331Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1117
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA FWD
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 001391 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/10 
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV PTER KE SO ET DJ
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: KENYAN FOREIGN MINISTER PUSHES LOWER JUBA 
INITIATIVE 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: James C. Swan, Ambassador, U.S. Department of State, 
Executive Office; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  During a December 8 meeting on the margins of the 
Djibouti IGAD ministerial visiting AF Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Wycoff  and Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs Wetangula agreed to 
continue to work together to promote stability and political 
reconciliation in Somalia. DAS Wycoff told Wetangula that the USG 
continued to strongly oppose the Kenyan "Jubaland" initiative as a 
bad idea that would more likely add to Somalia's instability than 
to help stabilize the country.   Wetangula defended GOK plans to 
pursue its Jubaland (southern Somalia) initiative, implied that it 
was in evolving concept, and offered to facilitate better USG 
understanding of Kenya's plans. He also urged, as he had in 
interventions at the ministerial, international community support 
for the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG).  Wycoff 
agreed and highlighted the importance of supporting the Djibouti 
Peace Process (DPP) and efforts to promote political 
reconciliation.  When the subject was raised, Wetangula excluded 
further expansion of the teeming Dadaab refugee camp in 
northeastern Kenya, which he said had received 12,000 refugees in 
November.  The Foreign Minister took a hard line on Eritrea.  He 
told DAS Wycoff that he had rebuffed efforts by the visiting 
Eritrean Foreign Minister to solicit support for a new Somalia 
reconciliation process.  The Kenyan government had expelled 
Eritrean diplomats that Wetangula thought had played a role in the 
mid-September suicide bombing attack on AMISOM in Mogadishu. 
Wycoff reviewed USG efforts to engage, both positively and 
negatively, with Eritrea, and effect a change in its behavior.  End 
summary. 
 
 
 
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Jubaland Initiative:  FM Urges USG Participation 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2. (C) Visiting AF Deputy Assistant Secretary Karl Wycoff opened a 
December 8 meeting with Kenyan Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula on 
the margins of the Djibouti IGAD ministerial by recounting USG 
support for the DPP and the TFG. He also forcibly underscored USG 
concerns about reports that the GOK was recruiting and training an 
ethnic Somali force as part of a "Jubaland" initiative.  DAS Wycoff 
told Wetangula that concerns which Assistant Secretary Carson had 
expressed to Wetangula and other members of the Kenyan leadership 
remained, and he urged Wetangula to re-consider the Kenyan 
initiative. 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) Wetangula defended the initiative by noting that it was an 
evolving concept and that Kenya had carefully coordinated every 
aspect of it with the TFG.  He acknowledged that "some excited 
Kenyan military officers" had "bungled the earlier phases" of the 
planned operation, but that planning was back on track.  The GOK 
hoped that the "strong Jubaland," which would result from a 
successful, Kenyan-backed effort to defeat al-Shabaab in southern 
Somalia, would "cage in the Hawiye."  The plan, he said, "seemed 
feasible to the TFG."  The plan had been difficult to implement, 
Wetangula said.  Prominent, ethnically Somali Kenyan politicians, 
including Kenya's Deputy Speaker, were strong al-Shabaab supporters 
who saw any effort to weaken al-Shabaab as an "Ethiopian plot." 
Wetangula alleged that the ethnically-Somali politicians had worked 
behind the scenes to recruit al-Shabaab sympathizers from the 
Dadaab refugee camp in order both to spy on and undermine the 
planned Kenyan initiative.  When Wycoff reemphasized USG 
opposition, Wetangula offered to facilitate contact in Nairobi that 
would give the USG an understanding of Kenyan planning and that 
might reassure the U.S. side that the plan made sense. Wycoff 
accepted the offer of further information but noted that USG 
concerns remained. 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) Wetangula predicted success for the initiative.  Al-Shabaab 
was weak, he insisted, recalling that Ethiopian troops had marched 
into Mogadishu in December 2006 "like a hot knife through butter." 
USG criticism should be accompanied by other ideas, he said, noting 
that "I sincerely believe that good ideas should give way to better 
ideas."  In any event, Wetangula thought that the GOK could "no 
longer afford to sit on the sidelines."  The prospect of a serious 
terrorist attack in Nairobi was increasing every day.  Wycoff noted 
 
DJIBOUTI 00001391  002 OF 003 
 
 
the importance of implementing the DPP and making progress on the 
political reconciliation front at the same time that we worked to 
improve the TFG's security forces. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
TFG Needs More External Support 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) At various points in the conversation, Wetangula strongly 
supported the TFG but argued, as he had publicly at the December 7 
session of the IGAD ministerial, that it was handicapped by 
insufficient international community support.  He urged that the 
USG provide the TFG with "two or three armored vehicles" so that 
its leadership can safely engage with Somalis around Mogadishu.  He 
also thought that helicopters would be useful in intimidating 
al-Shabaab.  Picking up on an assertion which had been frequently 
made at the IGAD ministerial, Wetangula alleged that only a tiny 
fraction of the Brussels pledges to the TFG had been realized.  The 
GOK had given the TFG money from time-to-time, but it "was not 
rich."  Only the West could provide the support needed by the 
Somali government. He urged that the USG take the lead in 
galvanizing the international community. Wycoff recounted USG 
efforts both to provide direct support to the TFG, but also to 
encourage its friends and allies to provide material and budget 
support.  HE also highlighted USG efforts to promote political 
reconciliation and negotiations in support of the DPP.  Wycoff also 
pointed out that the U.S. was the primary provider of support to 
AMISOM. 
 
 
 
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----------------------------- 
 
Dadaab:  No Possibility That Additional Refugee Camp Could be 
Opened 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) In response to a question from DAS Wycoff, Wetangula 
emphatically rejected the possibility of opening a fourth refugee 
camp at Dadaab, in northeastern Kenya.  He asserted that continuing 
instability in Somalia had further increased refugee flows:  Twelve 
thousand refugees had crossed the border in November alone.  He 
urged that some of the refugees in Dadaab be transferred to the 
Kakuma refugee camp, farther from the Somali border.  About 12,000 
refugees had been moved a few months ago, he said, and the Kenyan 
military could be used to facilitate further such transfers.  It 
would be easier to control and monitor Somali activities at Kakuma, 
which was further from the border and "away from the action." 
Wetangula told DAS Wycoff that he also believed at one time that 
the Dadaab camp could be expanded, but extended discussions at 
Kenyan Security Council meetings had since convinced him otherwise. 
 
 
 
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Wetangula Alleges Continuing Eritrean Involvement in Somalia 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
--------------- 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Wetangula recalled for DAS Wycoff recent Kenyan difficulties 
with Eritrea.  The Eritrean Foreign Minister had just treated him 
to "the usual assertions" that Eritrea was misunderstood by the 
international community.  On September 17, three Eritrean diplomats 
had transited Kenya en route to Mogadishu, then back to Kenya.  The 
visits had taken place "with the full complicity and knowledge" of 
the Eritrean Embassy in Nairobi.  The Kenyan authorities had 
deported two of the three diplomats, Wetangula said.  He was 
 
DJIBOUTI 00001391  003 OF 003 
 
 
convinced that their travel was linked to the mid-September suicide 
bombing attacks on AMISOM in Mogadishu. 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Wetangula sidestepped DAS Wycoff's suggestion that the 
Eritrean diplomats' activities be publicized by the GOK.  He would 
continue to talk with EU countries so that they understood the 
full, negative role Eritrea plays in the region. 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Wetangula also asserted that Eritrea continued to lobby 
Tanzania and others for the launch of a reconciliation conference 
to which Hisbul Islam's Hassan Dahir Aweys and others would be 
invited.  He planned to pressure his Tanzanian counterpart to 
reject the idea.  DAS Wycoff told Wetangula that the USG had 
already urged Dar es Salaam to distance itself from the idea and to 
focus its support on the DPP and the TFG. 
 
 
 
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---------- 
 
Kenya Willing to Expel or Freeze Assets of Somali Spoilers 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
---------- 
 
 
 
¶10. (C) In addition to Eritrea, Nairobi was home to Somalis and 
others who were backing al-Shabaab.  Wetangula repeated GOK 
willingness to expel "troublemakers" from Kenya and/or to freeze 
their assets if evidence about their activities were brought to his 
attention.  When pressed on the importance of the TFG operating in 
a transparent and accountable manner, Wetangula agreed that 
previous TFGs had been perceived as corrupt and noted that former 
TFG Prime Minister Gedi had invested much of his ill-gotten gains 
in Nairobi. 
 
 
 
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Comment 
 
-------------- 
 
 
 
¶11. (C) During the December 7 - 8 IGAD ministerial, Wetangula 
joined his IGAD counterparts in repeatedly backing the TFG and in 
alleging that it was lack of international community support, not 
TFG inertia, which was responsible for the lack of progress to 
date.  Wetangula endorsed the TFG's 2010 budget, which was 
presented by TFG Deputy Prime Minister Sharif Hassan during the 
ministerial.  He and the other ministers present termed it a great 
improvement over the complete lack of financial transparency, or 
worse, which had been characteristic of the TFGs of Prime Ministers 
Nur "Adde" and Gedi.  The IGAD ministers' unanimous, strong support 
for the TFG seemed to visibly boost the TFG Foreign Minister and 
Deputy Prime Minister, who were present, and contrasted 
significantly with the criticism of Somalia's government that had 
been the norm at preceding ministerials. 
 
 
 
¶12. (U) DAS Wycoff cleared this message. 
SWAN