VZCZCXRO2610
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHHM
DE RUEHDT #0338/01 3560955
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 220955Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4647
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1364
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1183
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0976
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0132
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1152
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 4203

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 DILI 000338 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR STATE - EAP/MTS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PMIL KPKO TT
SUBJECT: THE DOWNSIZING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCES IN 
TIMOR-LESTE 
 
REF: A)  BLOOMQUIST/ HENICK E-MAILS; B) DILI 267 
 
DILI 00000338  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
------------ 
 
Summary 
 
------------- 
 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  The Timorese government seeks a significant reduction 
in the presence of international security forces over the course 
of 2010.  Citing the improved security situation here, 
Australian and New Zealand troops deployed in Timor-Leste plan 
to drop from a combined 800 soldiers today to 450 by May 2010. 
Reducing the United Nations peacekeeping operation may prove 
more challenging, however, as the UN has tied the handover of 
policing responsibilities to Timorese police meeting minimal 
capability standards.  President Ramos-Horta publicly has called 
for the full handover of police responsibilities to occur in 
Dili by June 2010 and nationwide by end-2010.  Mixed UN police 
performance, a Timorese desire to recover sovereignty, a craving 
to reduce the chafing UN presence especially in Dili, and 
renewed confidence in the Timorese police are factors driving 
the new timeline.  The Timorese police remain institutionally 
weak, however, poorly resourced, still deeply scarred by its 
2006 collapse, and inadequately trained.  Nevertheless, we 
recommend that the renewal of the UN mandate for Timor-Leste in 
February 2010 confirm the handover of police responsibilities to 
the Timorese by end-2010, and the beginning soon of a visible, 
deliberate downsizing of peacekeeping operations.  Ideally, the 
UN should sponsor an independent assessment of remaining gaps in 
Timorese policing capabilities that can provide a baseline for 
future bilateral assistance.  As the UN PKO withdraws, the U.S. 
should step up its assistance to the professionalization of the 
Timorese police in conjunction with our allies Australia, 
Portugal and Japan.   End summary. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  In two speeches delivered in Dili in November and 
December 2009, President Ramos-Horta outlined Timorese 
intentions for a deliberate but prompt reduction in the 
international security forces deployed in Timor-Leste. 
Ramos-Horta's timetable - worked out in consultation with the 
Prime Minister and the civilian and uniformed commanders of the 
country's security forces, and ratified in early-December 2009 
by the constitutionally mandated Superior Council on Defense and 
Security (an advisory body comprised of civilian authorities, 
the national parliament, military and police representatives, 
and other stakeholders) - envisions a full transfer of police 
operational responsibilities back to the Timorese by end-2010 
and a concomitant lower presence of Australian and New Zealand 
troops.  The timetable is in rough accordance with the key 
international actors, the UN and the Australian led 
International Stabilization Force (ISF).  Both cite recent 
Timorese stability and the increasing ability of Timorese 
institutions to maintain security as key factors enabling a 
drawdown.  Nonetheless, the potential for friction or 
disagreement regarding the size and mission of future 
international forces in Timor-Leste exists, especially regarding 
the UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) within the UN Mission to 
Timor-Leste (UNMIT).  The UN consistently has tied a handover to 
the Timorese meeting certain qualitative performance criteria, 
and has not begun to discuss downsizing, at least not openly and 
not in 2010. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
International Stabilization Force 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The ISF currently numbers roughly 800 soldiers, 
comprised of 650 Australian troops and 150 from New Zealand. 
Always commanded by an Australian, the ISF arrived in 
Timor-Leste in late-May 2006 at the peak of the violence 
associated with the 2006 crisis with an initial contingent of 
some 3000.   By February 2010, the Australian component will 
shrink to 400 and by May 2010, the New Zealand force will slip 
 
DILI 00000338  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
to 50, leaving total ISF troop strength at 450 by mid-2010.  In 
coordination with the government of Timor-Leste (GoTL), the ISF 
will close a forward operating base in Baucau, focus operations 
in Dili and Gleno, and reduce armed security patrols to a 
minimum, especially in the capital.  The ISF's core mission will 
continue to be to work with the Timorese military (F-FDTL), 
engage with local communities throughout Timor-Leste, and 
monitor the security environment.  Australian diplomatic 
contacts acknowledge that as long as Timor-Leste remains stable, 
the ISF will assess its force strength continuously with an eye 
towards further reductions in manpower. 
 
 
 
---------- 
 
UNPOL 
 
----------- 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The UN PKO is made up of some 1500 personnel, 
predominantly police representing more than forty nations, and 
known locally as UNPOL.  Its largest contingents hail from 
Portugal, Malaysia, the Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh and 
Australia.  UNPOL is headquartered in Dili, concentrated in 
formed police units in several parts of the country and is 
permanently stationed in each of the country's thirteen district 
capitals (an early goal to have UNPOL stationed in all 65 
sub-districts was never realized).  Since its inception, the 
peacekeeping mandate has had two primary goals: A) establish 
peace and stability through operational command of all police 
forces in Timor-Leste and B), reconstitute the Timorese national 
police (PNTL) through training, mentoring and a process of 
certification.  The size of UNPOL has remained constant since 
the beginning of the UN mandate in 2006, although its role has 
shifted over time in response to changing conditions in 
Timor-Leste, fluctuations in the relationship with the Timorese 
authorities, and realization of its own limitations. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  UNPOL's task of ending the widespread violence and 
property destruction that wracked Timor-Leste through much of 
the latter half of 2006 was accomplished by end-2007.  Today, 
the country is peaceful and crime rates are low.  The consensus 
view on UNPOL's second objective - training, mentoring and 
recertifying the PNTL - is largely one of failure.  Mentoring 
and training programs had little positive effect due to the 
absence of a unified UN training/mentoring doctrine, a lack of 
qualified trainers/mentors within UNPOL and, after the initial 
bad experience of working with weak UNPOL instructors, Timorese 
disengagement.  On the certification process, whereby individual 
PNTL officers would be reviewed for past criminal behavior and 
performance during the 2006 crisis, the GOTL and UNMIT never 
came to agreement on a unified process and have effectively 
operated parallel systems.  A program of co-location to 
encourage joint UNPOL/PNTL operations was not uniformly 
implemented.   Visiting police stations around the country, one 
can easily find PNTL officers working out of dilapidated 
structures without power, desks or latrines, in eyesight of 
their UNPOL colleagues working in clean, well-lit and fully 
resourced offices.  Several internal UN reviews of the 
UNPOL-PNTL relationship, including a major assessment conducted 
in March 2008 by the head of the UN's police operations, have 
suggested reforms.  Implementation has been spotty, however. 
UNPOL leadership at times has been weak, effective joint 
operations remain irregular, and the Timorese in frustration 
have turned to bilateral partners for their training needs. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
How long the UN PKO Mission? 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  In September 2007, the GoTL asked the UN for an 
extension of its PKO mandate through 2012 when the next round of 
 
DILI 00000338  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
presidential and national parliament elections are expected. 
Even then, the Timorese embrace of UNPOL was less then 
wholehearted.  In October 2007, the president of the national 
parliament told the Ambassador that it was time for UNPOL to 
scale down and give policing back to the PNTL.  UNPOL's heavy 
presence in Dili has chafed, as has the loss of sovereignty, the 
occasional poor caliber of UNPOL officers, its indifferent 
integration with PNTL forces, its lavish stock of equipment and 
vehicles, and the occasional well-publicized maltreatment of 
Timorese.  In recognition of Timor-Leste's increasing stability, 
in May 2009 UNPOL finally initiated a process whereby 
operational policing responsibilities were returned to PNTL 
commanders on a district or unit basis.  Command in four 
districts and several units (such as the maritime police) have 
been turned over to the PNTL so far. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  The focus now is on when the handover will be 
completed, and the future role and scale of UNPOL.  President 
Ramos-Horta asked that the ongoing handover process be completed 
by the end of 2010, with the PNTL reassuming policing 
responsibilities in the critical Dili capital district by June 
¶2010.  He urged that the four formed police units (FPUs) be 
reduced to two and deployed outside of Dili, but later acceded 
to the UN's request that the FPUs be reduced only to three, with 
one having responsibility for the security of UN staff 
concentrated in Dili.  While Ramos-Horta deferred to the UN 
decisions regarding the future, post-handover size of UNPOL, he 
made clear the Timorese expectation that UNPOL will downsize. 
Regarding the post-handover role of UNPOL, Ramos-Horta insisted 
that it be subordinate and supportive; i.e., to provide guidance 
and support in administration and management and to continue 
monitoring and training.  Throughout the country, UNPOL would 
cease carrying out mobile patrols "or intervene except when 
necessary." 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
The Handover Process So Far 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  In the four districts in which the PNTL have resumed 
command, the process of transferring authority and having UNPOL 
assume a "monitoring" role has not been friction-free.  In 
Lautem, which in May 2009 became the first handover district, 
there was considerable confusion among both the remaining UNPOL 
officers and the PNTL regarding their respective roles.  UNPOL 
commanders provided little doctrinal or procedural clarity and 
UNPOL behavior suggested to the Timorese that the former 
believed themselves to be still in charge.  The Lautem PNTL 
Chief told the Ambassador that the situation was resolved 
satisfactorily only in October 2009, following a visit by the 
PNTL commander. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Decisions on which districts or units to hand over 
have been jointly reached by UNMIT and Timorese commanders based 
on assessments of local PNTL operational capabilities, including 
the completion rates of the certification process for district 
or unit officers.  The process at times has required very 
senior-level negotiations.  In one instance, UNMIT threatened to 
block a handover unless the prime minister acted to remove 
uncertified district commanders.  Although the Timorese at times 
asked that the process be time-bound, UNMIT maintained that the 
process be solely criteria-based.  The significance of 
Ramos-Horta's December 9 declaration was UNMIT's apparent 
acceptance that the handover process would now also be driven by 
a timetable and completed no later than end-2010. 
 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Timorese Police Far From Ideal 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
DILI 00000338  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  The PNTL remains a weak institution, poorly 
resourced, inadequately trained, badly administered, with many 
of its officers without access to basic transportation, 
investigations, enforcement and communications equipment.  Since 
2006, however, when its command collapsed in the face of that 
year's crisis, there have been some improvements.  In a 
late-2008 national poll, 80% of respondents stated the PNTL was 
doing a good or very good job.  By means of a series of legal 
and regulatory changes the government is reforming the PNTL's 
command and personnel structure, tightening its disciplinary 
codes, and clarifying its training and operational doctrines. 
The prime minster recently dismissed seven officers, a 
commission reviewing 259 still uncertified officers (8% of the 
total force) will complete its work in mid-2010 (and is expected 
to require more dismissals), and a long awaited 
performance-based promotion system will be enacted in January 
¶2010.  That said, while the new PNTL chief introduced a needed 
strengthening of the chain of command, he also faces criticism 
for rewarding loyalists and prioritizing the development of 
glitzy tactical units at the expense of community policing.  A 
visit to any sub-district PNTL station remains an astonishingly 
discouraging event.  It routinely ends with a beleaguered 
commander noting the absence, and requesting help with the 
provision, of basic skills training, communications equipment, 
generators, transportation, weapons lockers and even handcuffs. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (SBU)   Nevertheless, Ramos-Horta's logic in calling for a 
completion of the handover process in 2010 is compelling.  To 
begin, the PNTL relationship with UNPOL is significantly one of 
dependence, for logistics, infrastructure, equipment, 
maintenance and transportation.  An effective downsizing of 
UNPOL will help break this dependency, and Ramos-Horta urged the 
GOTL to meet by end-2011 all basic PNTL infrastructure and 
logistic requirements.  He further told the ambassador that the 
PNTL must develop the confidence that it can police Timor-Leste 
on its own well before the next round of national elections in 
2012, and can only do so by building up a record of success 
through experience.  Mindful of the history of PNTL failure when 
the international presence has been relaxed, most notably in 
2006 but also in 2002, Ramos-Horta said the presence of UNPOL as 
monitors through 2012 will provide adequate insurance in the 
case of another PNTL relapse. 
 
 
 
-------------- 
 
Next Steps 
 
-------------- 
 
 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Two milestones loom.  The first will be a UN 
technical assessment mission, to be led by Ian Martin (a UN 
veteran in Timor-Leste), that will survey all UN operations but 
especially those of UNPOL in mid-January 2010.  The second will 
be the upcoming UN Security Council review of the UN's mandate 
in Timor-Leste, currently due for renewal in February 2010.  We 
see some danger that either UNMIT or UN headquarters will take 
an overly restrictive approach to the handover process and UNPOL 
downsizing, and unnecessarily maintain the UNPOL presence at 
current levels.  We recommend UN support of completing the 
process of returning full policing responsibility to the PNTL by 
end-2010, the development of a well-defined, narrow, supportive 
monitoring program for UNPOL, and the beginning in 2010 of a 
visible, deliberate downsizing of UNPOL. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  The role of Timor-Leste's bilateral partners, 
including the U.S., in the professionalization of its police 
force and military is viewed by Timorese actors as becoming ever 
more important.  For the PNTL, both Portugal and Australia have 
significant training programs in basic skills, and the U.S. has 
contributed in alignment with Australia investigative skills 
training (implemented by NCIS) and the installation of a 
computer-based training facility at PNTL's training center.  The 
 
DILI 00000338  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
FBI/JTIAF-W is developing an extended criminal intelligence 
training program.  Timorese leaders do not expect or want 
bilateral partners to replace the full array of assistance 
provided by UNPOL since 2006, but correctly see key PNTL 
capability gaps and believe they can only be remedied with 
support from skilled, reliable bilateral partners.  An area 
where the UN may still play a useful role would be to sponsor an 
independent assessment of PNTL needs.  The Timorese requested 
such an analysis in 2008, but UNMIT dodged it.  A comprehensive 
assessment and prioritization of PNTL needs would provide a 
critical reference for both the GOTL and bilateral partners. 
 
 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Pending the completion of such an assessment by the 
UN or by the USG, Mission Dili has identified the following key 
areas for potential U.S. programs. 
 
 
 
Development of Timor-Leste's Legal Framework for the Security 
Sector: The clash between members of the Timorese armed forces 
(F-FDTL) and between the F-FDTL and the PNTL during the 2006 
crisis demonstrated the urgent need to clearly articulate a 
national security policy and to delineate the roles and 
responsibilities of the Timorese security forces.  The U.S. has 
been playing a major supportive role in the ongoing effort to 
finalize a national security policy through facilitation and 
coordination conducted by the Asia Pacific Center for Security 
Studies.  Although the draft national security policy is 
expected to be approved sometime early next year, continued 
support may be required to help bring this process to a 
successful conclusion.  In addition, the U.S. Pacific Command 
has explored the provision of legal advisors, which would be 
warmly welcomed by Timorese Commanders. 
 
 
 
Professionalization of the F-FDTL: The F-FDTL is in the process 
of tripling its size over the course of just a few years and has 
declared its intention to focus future activities on disaster 
management, engineering projects, and international peacekeeping 
- all areas in which it has little expertise.  Mission Dili's 
Office of Defense Cooperation has been using IMET funds and U.S. 
Pacific Command programs to support the professionalization of 
the F-FDTL through training programs and bilateral engagement. 
A recent major U.S. Marines exercise in Timor-Leste that 
included extended joint training with the F-FDTL was highly 
praised by Timorese commanders for providing their soldiers an 
opportunity to engage with and learn from U.S. troops.  Making 
such exercises a regular feature of U.S. engagement would have a 
strongly positive effect on F-FDTL development.  In addition, 
the U.S. Pacific Command supported the permanent deployment of a 
detachment of U.S. Navy Seabees to conduct humanitarian 
engineering projects and to work with the F-FDTL engineers to 
build their capacity.  Continued support in these areas will be 
critical for the next several years. 
 
 
 
Maritime security: The GOTL has yet to develop an integrated 
policy and institutional arrangements to manage its maritime 
security and the failure to do so is a major obstacle to 
addressing the country's vulnerabilities to terrorism, narcotics 
and human smuggling, and illegal fishing.  Additional 
vulnerabilities in this area include port security and the low 
capacity of the maritime police and military units.  The 
Secretary of State for Security has asked for U.S. navigational 
skills training, from the most basic thorough intermediate 
search and rescue and maritime police tactics, for the Timorese 
maritime police.  The U.S. Pacific Command, the U.S. Coast 
Guard, and the National Criminal Investigative Service have all 
begun to offer assistance programs to address these problems, 
including training on port security and basic navigational 
skills, and the possible assignment of a legal advisor to assist 
with the development of a national maritime security policy. 
Additional support will be required in these and related areas 
in the coming few years. 
 
 
 
Logistical support for the PNTL:  As noted above, the PNTL lacks 
basic logistical capabilities, particularly in the districts 
 
DILI 00000338  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
outside of Dili.  At the same time, the GOTL is committed to 
investing some of its own funds towards redressing these 
deficiencies.  What is lacking, however, is technical expertise 
on procurement, storage, and, particularly, maintenance of 
equipment and supplies.  All too often, we have observed that 
Timorese purchase unneeded equipment or fail to maintain such 
equipment in working order.  Per ref A, we have already 
requested INL support in providing limited technical assistance 
in this area.  Depending on future assessments and needs, 
however, additional support may be necessary. 
 
 
 
Professionalization of the PNTL:  As described above, the PNTL 
remains an unprofessional force lacking in capacity in a range 
of critical areas.  A comprehensive assessment of the 
deficiencies and the ongoing bilateral training programs is 
needed to determine where and how the U.S. can contribute to its 
professionalization.  Pending such an assessment, however, 
immediate needs include basic training in the areas of border 
management and close protection.  Deficiencies in both of these 
areas have left Timor-Leste vulnerable to external terrorism 
threats, as well as international crime and drug and human 
trafficking.  Per ref B, we have requested assistance from S/CT 
and Diplomatic Security's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program to 
conduct an assessment and offer in-country border management and 
close protection training. 
 
 
 
As we continue to develop a better understanding of the needs 
and deficiencies of the PNTL, we anticipate the need for 
additional U.S. training and support.  We hope to apply for 1207 
funds during the coming year to address the immediate needs 
presented by the anticipated drawdown of the ISF and UNPOL over 
the next few years. 
KLEMM