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DE RUEHDT #0325/01 3440859
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100859Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4631
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1147
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1358
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0971
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1178
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 4187

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000325 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN TT
SUBJECT: THE UNITED NATIONS IN TIMOR-LESTE: LOOKING BACK AND FORWARD 
 
DILI 00000325  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a private, valedictory interview, Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Timor-Leste 
Atul Khare provided the following, useful assessment of UNMIT's 
accomplishments over the last few years and the significant 
challenges that lie ahead.  His self-serving comments highlight 
UNMIT's contributions towards maintaining peace and stability, 
but gloss over its failure to rebuild a credible, professional 
police force.  With the United Nations now poorly positioned to 
provide effective support on continued security sector reform, 
Khare correctly highlights the need for UNMIT to place a higher 
priority on supporting democratic governance and socio-economic 
development in the coming years.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
UNMIT Accomplishments 
 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Looking backwards at his three-year tenure as the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Timor 
Leste, Atul Khare listed three primary accomplishments of the 
United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).  First, UNMIT was 
instrumental in helping to restore stability and security to the 
country after the violent clashes in 2006.  Second, UNMIT has 
helped the Timorese leadership earn the faith and confidence of 
its own people and the international community.  Finally, 
UNMIT's efforts have contributed to a fundamental desire on the 
part of the Timorese body politics to be in conformity with 
laws, regulations, and democratic norms. 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) Implicit in SRSG Khare's remarks was the fact that the 
2006 crisis represented a major setback for the development of 
Timor-Leste and that much of the work over the last three years 
has been to address the aftermath and challenges that it 
created.  As a result of the crisis, SRSG Khare notes, the 
international community saw Timor-Leste as a `failing,' if not a 
`failed' state.  The restoration of stability, confidence in the 
Timorese leadership, and a desire to strengthen democratic norms 
has successfully reversed that impression. 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) SRSG Khare points to a few specific examples that 
illustrate the progress.  First, the country's response to the 
February 2008 attacks on the President and Prime Minister 
demonstrated the ability of the various political factions to 
forge a consensus and coordinate an appropriate response on 
issues of national interest.   Second, the parliamentary debate 
in October of a censure motion in response to the GOTL's 
handling of the Martenus Bere case demonstrated that the 
increased importance that Timorese politicians and leaders 
attach to democratic institutions and processes.  SRSG Khare 
noted that there will always be crises, but the challenge is to 
strengthen the mechanisms to manage such crises and to use them, 
when possible, as opportunities to build social cohesion. 
 
 
 
National Challenges Ahead 
 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Despite these accomplishments, however, SRSG Khare 
frankly admitted that Timor-Leste and UNMIT continue to face a 
number of serious challenges in the years ahead.  One set of 
challenges lies in the area of consolidating democracy. 
Elections, institutions, and laws are not enough.  Timorese lack 
a public understanding of the significance of independence, 
democracy, elections, and democratic institutions.  In fact, the 
Timorese state simply does not exist in much of the country. 
There is a continued lack of faith in the rule of law and the 
Timorese authorities have not developed a practical means by 
which to incorporate the long-standing institutions of 
traditional justice into their formal judicial system. 
Establishing civilian control, professionalization, and the 
delineation of roles of the security forces is incomplete. 
Finally, managing the transfer of responsibility from the 
current generation of leaders to the next generation will be 
difficult. 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Another set of challenges, of course, is economic and 
is shared by most lesser-developed countries.  Despite 
Timor-Leste's petroleum fund and modest oil revenues and even 
 
DILI 00000325  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
assuming double-digit annual growth rates, the country will 
remain impoverished for at least the next ten years and more. 
Timorese leaders have not yet come to grips with how the country 
will integrate with the global economy.  Low social capacity can 
only be addressed by significant investments in education, and 
particularly `life skills' or practical vocational training. 
SRSG Khare noted disparagingly that there are 26 universities in 
Dili (there should be perhaps two) and that despite a wide range 
of business management courses, no training is offered to 
develop agricultural skills (despite the fact that 85 percent of 
the population survives on subsistence agriculture). 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) A final set of challenges lies in the area of promoting 
social cohesion and a sense of national identity.  SRSG Khare 
admitted that the inter-regional tensions that flared during the 
2006 crisis have been only `superficially addressed.'  He added 
that the political parties have little incentive to address this 
problem because they actually `gain' from such differences and 
draw political support from specific regions.  SRSG Khare noted 
that although some Timorese leaders have begun to reassess their 
history in an effort to develop a sense of national identity, 
there has not yet been a broad public discourse on the subject. 
SRSG Khare suggested, moreover, that those who led the country 
to independence may not necessarily be the best ones to lead an 
independent country. 
 
 
 
Reinventing UNMIT 
 
----------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Asked how UNMIT's mission would have to change in the 
coming years, SRSG Khare said that while the overall objectives 
would remain the same, the priorities should shift. 
Specifically, he listed the main objectives in the following 
order of importance: 
 
 
 
A) Strengthening the culture of democratic governance 
 
B) Promoting socio-economic development 
 
C) Establishing rule of law, including traditional justice and 
regularizing land claims and property rights 
 
D) Continued security sector reform and development 
 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) SRSG Khare noted that the handover of policing 
responsibilities will continue, although the Timorese police 
(PNTL) would continue to need considerable bilateral assistance 
and professional training for years to come.  The UNPOL presence 
would likely decline to only two formed police units (FPU) by 
the 2012 elections and could leave altogether if those elections 
go smoothly.  As the Mission decreases in size, however, 
staffing dedicated to the top three priorities listed above 
should maintain their current levels. 
 
 
 
Appeal for Continued U.S. Engagement 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) SRSG Khare made a personal appeal for continued USG 
engagement in Timor-Leste, arguing that in addition to the our 
moral responsibility to this country, Timor-Leste's success or 
failure will have significant implications for the United States 
and the international community.  Specifically, if Timor-Leste 
succeeds, it will be an excellent example to the world that 
democracy, human rights, and rule of law are as important to 
lesser-developed countries as they are to developed countries. 
If it fails, however, Timor-Leste's strategic location between a 
stable ASEAN and a prosperous Australia may make it a transit 
point and safe haven for narcotics, human smuggling, organized 
crime, and international terrorists.  SRSG Khare noted that the 
United States is uniquely positioned in Timor-Leste to serve as 
an important bilateral partner and a genuine honest broker 
between Timor-Leste and the various bilateral partners and 
international donors here. 
 
 
 
 
DILI 00000325  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Comment 
 
------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) SRSG Khare departs Timor-Leste on December 11, 2009. 
He is credited by Timorese and international partners alike for 
his tireless effort to improve and institutionalize effective 
communication and consultation among Timorese leaders and key 
state institutions.  His work, and that of his mission, 
contributed critically to the reestablishment of peace and 
security following the 2006 crisis and the successful holding of 
several national elections in 2007 and 2009.  Less successful 
has been UNMIT's reconstitution of the Timorese police, and many 
Timorese fault Khare for failing to effectively lead the large 
UNPOL force viewed locally often as undisciplined and 
insensitive to Timorese customs and aspirations.  Among Timorese 
leaders too often inclined towards impunity, Khare's consistent 
and outspoken support of human rights and the rule of law no 
doubt generated considerable discomfort.  In sum, Khare leaves 
respected, if a bit unloved.  He also leaves behind the major 
task of drawing down the UN PKO in a way that maintains 
stability and begins to repair the organization's bruised 
reputation among the Timorese public. 
KLEMM