VZCZCXYZ0006
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHCH #0989/01 3580906
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240906Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8701
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS CHISINAU 000989 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UMB AND S/CT FOR RHONDA SHORE AND NCTC 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS PINS PREL AEMR MD
SUBJECT: CHISINAU: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 109980 
 
¶1. Moldova is not a safe haven for terrorists or terrorist groups. 
No acts of international terrorism of major significance have 
occurred in Moldova.  One significant act of possible politically 
motivated domestic terrorism, however, did occur.  Moldova is not 
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.  The Government of 
Moldova (GOM) does not have an active, cohesive counterterrorism 
plan or strategy. 
 
¶2. Moldovan support for counterterrorism was minimal, as compared to 
previous years when Moldova sent demining contingents to Iraq and 
had liaison officers assigned to Centcom Headquarters in Tampa, 
Florida.  Embassy Chisinau and the GOM, specifically the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MIA), did not conduct any joint counterterrorism 
training exercises as in previous years.  One major Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) sponsored counterterrorism exercise had 
been planned for September, but was canceled because of economic 
reasons.  No local inter-agency, inter-mission, or inter-sector 
counterterrorism training took place.  A substantial CIS backed 
counterterrorism training exercise is planned for some time in 2010. 
 
¶3. Moldova continued to work on implementation of 
its obligations under UNSCR 1373, Executive Order 
13224 (the Terrorism Finance Executive Order), and 
provisions related to terrorist financing.  The 
GOM enthusiastically welcomes information 
regarding terrorist financing from the USG and 
other bodies, and actively applies such information 
in its monitoring efforts through its Center for 
Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption (CCECC). 
Moldova's 2008 joining of the Egmont Group of financial intelligence 
units may yield significant results in Moldova's counterterrorism 
efforts, although it is still too soon to judge its impact. 
 
¶4. In 2009, no new action plan/strategy for counterterrorism had 
been developed, accepted, or implemented to replace the expired 
2003-2008 National Action Plan on Combating Terrorism.  There was no 
indication that the GOM would renew the Plan in the near future. 
 
¶5. On December 5, 2008, the Moldovan Parliament ratified a blueprint 
on cooperation with the CIS states in combating terrorism.  This 
document was originally signed in August 2005 and provides for joint 
measures aimed at the prevention and counter-action of terrorism and 
extremism.  The document allows for the exchange of information on 
combating terrorism between CIS states, and provides for the 
extradition of persons suspected of financing or 
committing terrorist actions.  The Moldovan 
Parliament also ratified the specific program on 
CIS member states' cooperation in combating 
terrorism and extremism for 2008-2010.  This 
three-year program reflects the activities which 
were included in the blueprint.  This pact did not have a meaningful 
impact on Moldovan counterterrorism efforts, as it placed no real 
obligations on the GOM. 
 
¶6. The separatist-controlled Transnistria region 
of Moldova remained a potential area of concern. 
Moldovan law enforcement worked hard to track the 
whereabouts and activities of individuals moving 
in and out of Transnistria, an area where central- 
government police and security services are rarely 
able to operate.  However, Post is unable to fully assess the 
ability of Moldovan law enforcement to operate in this region.  Some 
of these individuals moving in and out of Transnistria were foreign 
students who remained in Moldova illegally, as the 
government lacked the resources to deport them 
when their visas expired.  Corruption was endemic, 
and it was easy to obtain false travel documents 
in both Transnistria and Moldova.  No formal cooperation on 
counterterrorism between Moldova 
and the separatist region of Transnistria took 
place. 
 
¶7. The U.S. Embassy does not maintain liaison 
relationships or active, ongoing contacts with Transnistrian law 
enforcement and/or security service personnel.  Embassy Chisinau 
requested meetings in the past with Transnistrian public-security 
personnel, to no avail, but has successfully engaged certain 
Transnistrian authorities on a recent counterfeiting case (although 
it is not yet clear whether this engagement will result in concrete 
cooperation and actions).  The USG has not obtained any information 
about known terrorist organizations or terrorists operating from or 
within this region.  Left-bank (separatist controlled Transnistria) 
and right-bank (GOM controlled) Moldova have no cooperation on 
counterterrorism matters, although right bank Moldova does not 
believe that Transnistria's existence harms right-bank 
counterterrorism efforts. 
 
¶8. In right-bank Moldova, law enforcement and intelligence officials 
had the authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic 
communications, but the investigator was required first to obtain 
prosecutorial concurrence and authorization from a judge.  A 
specific section in the Prosecutor General's Office (PGO) would 
handle any terrorism-related case.  The primary investigative body 
in counterterrorism cases is the Information and Security 
Service(SIS), Moldova's intelligence service.  For cases of 
suspected domestic terrorism, the PGO decides who will complete the 
investigation.  The MIA is usually authorized to take the lead. 
 
¶9. On October 14, 2009, at a downtown Chisinau celebration of City 
Day, a grenade was thrown into the crowd of thousands, injuring over 
30 persons.  Moldovan authorities considered this to be a 
domestically motivated criminal act, and both the PGO and the MIA 
were investigating the attack.  Neither could provide evidence 
regarding the origin of or reason for the attack.  While there may 
have been some political motivation, the attack is most likely 
linked to some domestically-based solitary criminal actor, or 
emotionally disturbed person.  It is improbable that the attack was 
in any way linked to an internationally based group. 
 
¶10. In 2006, SIS was given the governmental lead to establish and 
manage a special Counterterrorism Center.  In 2009, staffing and 
funding were minimal, as were its activities.  The U.S. Embassy's 
law enforcement substantial assistance programs aid Moldovan efforts 
to impede the ability of terrorists and other citizens without 
proper documents to cross national borders.  The programs also 
facilitated automation at ports of entry to ensure greater security 
of passports and travel documents. 
 
¶11. Embassy point of contact for this report is Political/Economic 
Officer Zach Koester.  Email: KoesterRZ@state.gov 
 
MICHELI