VZCZCXRO7713
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHCH #1000/01 3640553
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 300553Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8712
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 001000 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UMB 
 
E.O. 12958; DECL: 12/15/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR RS MD
SUBJECT:  DASD WALLANDER DISCUSSES TRANSNISTRIA 
WITH FORMER MINISTER OF REINTEGRATION SOVA 
 
Classified by:  Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Wallander and the Ambassador met with 
former Minister of Reintegration Vitalie Sova on 
December 11 to discuss the current situation in 
Transnistria.  Sova stressed U.S. and Russian 
engagement are the key to a solution to the 
conflict, noting that he and former Transnistrian 
"Foreign Minister" Litskai were prepared to form a 
non-governmental working group to propose a way 
forward.  End Summary. 
 
Transnistria Overview 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) At a December 11 lunch, former Minister of 
Reintegration Sova told DASD Wallander and the 
Ambassador, that Moldova must find "the 
intersection of Moldovan and Russian interests" to 
make progress on Transnistria.  Sova noted that 
although the former Moldovan government proposed 
"demilitarization" of Transnistria as a 
confidence-building measure, the Russians said 
they first wanted Moldovan guarantees of permanent 
neutrality.  The previous government had balked at 
this condition. 
 
¶3. (C) Sova opined that Russian peacekeepers had 
been "useless" since 1995, when animosity over the 
1992 civil war had subsided, and their continued 
presence only served to maintain the status quo. 
With the Ukrainians essentially content with the 
current situation and Romania preoccupied with 
other issues, only the U.S. and Russia could solve 
the Transnistria problem.  Sova lamented the fact 
that this was not a priority for either country, 
and Moldova would have to be content with mere 
dialogue at the current time. 
 
Possible Solutions 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Despite the lack of prospects for progress, 
Sova offered views for a constructive way forward 
on Transnistria.  As there will be no progress 
without a productive discussion of the military 
situation, Moscow must be made to understand that 
the eventual withdrawal of its peacekeepers is 
inevitable.  Unfortunately, the Russia-Georgia 
conflict had complicated the situation and 
negatively influenced Russia's relations with all 
of the former Soviet republics.  Instead of 
promoting resolution of conflicts and stability, 
Russia is interested in "Balkanizing" and 
instilling fear in the former Soviet republics. 
 
¶5. (C) In response to DASD Wallander's query on 
whether Russia would be receptive to U.S. 
engagement with Russia on Transnistria, Sova 
advised that the U.S. should seek to influence 
Russian civilian experts.  The U.S. should appeal 
to Russia for a phased withdrawal, first of the 
Russian Operational Group of Forces, followed by 
RussiaQs peacekeeping troops.  These forces would 
be replaced with a neutral body, such as the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE).  While the Russians wanted 
guarantees of Moldova's neutrality, they must 
understand that Moldova had the right to determine 
its own security.  At the same time, Sova said, 
the Russians needed to be reassured that Moldova's 
economic, historic, and linguistic ties with 
Russia meant that the two countries would always 
be linked. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sova-Litskai Initiative? 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that it was 
important for individual citizens, not just the 
authorities on both sides of the Dniester, to be 
involved in discussions on Transnistria.  Sova 
noted that both he and former Transnistrian 
"Minister of Foreign Affairs" Litskai, whom he had 
 
CHISINAU 00001000  002 OF 002 
 
 
know since 1993, were now free to use their 
experience and connections to develop a solution 
that will reflect both the territorial sovereignty 
of Moldova and the republic status of 
Transnistria.  As both Sova and Litskai are 
working for their respective governments, they are 
both free to conduct Track II diplomacy using 
their knowledge from their years of official 
negotiations.  Sova noted that he had discussed 
this project with Litskai and found a non- 
governmental organization to be their umbrella 
organization, for which they are seeking a grant. 
Sova underscored that Transnistrian leader Smirnov 
would likely not approve of such an independent 
body, but he hoped that Smirnov would be out of 
power "within two years." 
 
¶7. (C) In response to DASD Wallander's urging that 
Sova include Russian, European, and U.S. experts 
in his working group, Sova agree that the 
inclusion of international experts would be 
helpful.  He was less supportive of Russian 
participation, suggesting that the Russians would 
work with Smirnov to "crush" the initiative.  Sova 
was also lukewarm to the idea of including 
Ukrainian and Romanian experts, since the 
proposals he read from those two countries were 
"not useful" for Moldova. 
 
EU Travel Ban 
------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Sova shifted to the EU's travel ban on 
Transnistrian leaders, commenting that with the 
exception of Vice President Alexander Koroliev and 
Deputy Minister of Security Oleg Gudymo, the ban 
should be dropped for all on the list, including 
Smirnov.  According to Sova, the EU would then 
have banned the "worst offenders," while Smirnov 
would be put on the defensive and have to decide 
how to respond.  Sova added that Smirnov's sons 
regularly traveled to Europe. 
 
 
 
Transnistria After Smirnov 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Sova said that "Obnovlenie", Shevchuk's 
political party, was the only real political 
alternative with sufficient funding and cadres to 
replace Smirnov's forces.  According to Sova, 
Smirnov's party had no future without Smirnov. 
Sova discounted the strength of the Left Party, 
Social Democrats, and Communists. 
 
¶10. (C) Sova concluded by stressing that sooner or 
later, Moldova would break through on the 
Transnistria issue, but only with external help. 
There could not be a solution without U.S. and 
Russian engagement. 
 
¶11. U) This message was cleared by Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Wallander.grgr 
 
CHAUDHRY