VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #1725/01 3581038
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 241038Z DEC 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9852

S E C R E T BRUSSELS 001725 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/NESS: JMENTZ AND DFENSTERMACHER 
DOE/NNSA/NA-243 FOR MELISSA KRUPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 12/09/2019 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP TRGY TPHY EUN BE
SUBJECT: BELGIUM: SECURITY EXERCISE TESTS POLICE RESPONSE 
TO MOCK ATTACK AT BR-2 NUCLEAR RESEARCH REACTOR 
 
REF: A: STATE 65457 
 
Classified By: ACTING DCM Richard EASON, reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (U)  Information in paragraph 4 about the Belgian Design 
Basis Threat for the BR-2 nuclear research reactor is 
classified SECRET by Belgian authorities, and is transmitted 
here to respect that level of classification. 
 
SUMMARY 
 ------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Belgian local and federal police and officials 
from the country,s nuclear research center (SCK-CEN) 
successfully carried out an exercise on December 3 to test 
the local police's ability to respond to an attack on the 
country,s nuclear research reactor BR-2, and 'freeze' the 
situation, thereby preventing the unauthorized removal of the 
nuclear material (highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel rods). 
An Embassy officer was invited to observe, along with 
officials from the nuclear regulatory agency (FANC), federal 
police, and an agent from the Belgian police CGSU--the 
special forces unit which would be called upon to respond to 
an attack.  The exercise, the result of months of planning by 
Belgian officials representing various government and law 
enforcement agencies, was designed as part of an on-going 
Belgian response to recommendation G (reftel) of the U.S. 
physical protection team that visited the BR-2 reactor in 
May, 2009.  In embassy's view, the exercise came off as 
well-organized, with 13 armed police units responding to 
quickly to ring the facility to "freeze" the situation -- 
keeping the attackers within and being on the alert for 
reinforcements from without.  While this exercise was not 
planned to have a CGSU unit respond, the agent said first 
responders could arrive as early as 25 to 40 minutes 
following notification.  A police helicopter was alerted as 
part of the exercise and reported that it could fly to SCK in 
approximately 24 minutes, but did not actually fly to the 
reactor site. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Summary continued:  Following the exercise, a FANC 
security official indicated that the police arrived in 
sufficient time to contain the attackers, according to the 
Path Delay Timeline (i.e., the amount of time it is assumed 
that attackers would take to reach their goal, calculated 
step by step as they work through barriers) that had been 
developed by police, SCK and CGSU leading up to the exercise. 
 FANC, police and SCK believed improvements could be made, 
however, and FANC, the overall coordinator of the exercise, 
has asked all participating agencies to draw up 
recommendations for  lessons learned, and suggested 
improvements.  In Embassy's view, Belgian authorities have 
made substantial progress since the May 2009 visit in taking 
a good plan on paper and testing police response times, as 
well as in creating administrative and communication support 
that will enable the GOB to continue to improve physical 
security at the BR-2 reactor in the months and years to come. 
 The nuclear regulator, FANC, has emerged as an important 
coordinator of the GOB response, something that was not so 
clearly defined in May 2009, and has shown strong commitment 
to continue to strengthen coordination of the various 
entities providing security to BR-2, and clearly sees the 
physical security of the HEU as a continuous ongoing goal and 
not something that can be set aside following the result of a 
particular exercise or exercises.  Thanks to the constructive 
and positive relationship created with Belgian officials by 
the U.S. physical protection team during the U.S. visit in 
May, the Embassy considers the current state of physical 
security at BR-2 to be stronger than it has ever been since 
U.S. teams first began evaluations in 2003.  End summary. 
 
Exercise 'Archibald':  Basic Elements 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S/REL BELGIUM) The exercise, designed to test SCK,s 
security procedures, communications between SCK and police, 
and the police response, started at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 
December 3.  For purposes of the exercise, it was assumed 
that an attack occurred shortly before midnight on a Saturday 
night was made by a team of assailants equipped according to 
assumptions of the draft design-basis threat (DBT) which 
Belgium expects to make official soon.  Five attackers were 
assumed to arrive in a 4x4 vehicle, armed with rifles and 
carrying a sufficient amount of explosives to allow them to 
enter into the inner area where the fuel rods are stored. 
For purposes of the exercise, no vehicle was used, and two 
role players were attackers, mainly involved in triggered an 
alarm, one by going over the first of two fences on the 
southwest section that ring the facility, the second by 
 
staging a mock explosive device (it emitted smoke) on an 
outer door of the BR-2 building.  It was then assumed that 
the five intruders continued towards the area where the HEU 
fuel rods are stored, through an emergency exit airlock. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  The guard at the BR-2 noticed the initial intrusion 
over the fence, alerting other SCK guard centers (four in 
all) and local police by pushing a 'silent alarm' button that 
also automatically locked all access points into BR-2.  An 
audio alarm alerted the guard, and video cameras on the 
closed circuit system moved in response to the attacker,s 
movements and zoomed in; these systems appeared to work as 
designed (confirmed by authorities during the debrief).  The 
guard spoke loudly and clearly, first indicating simply that 
he saw intruders at the fence wearing backpacks, possibly 
armed.  Shortly after the first attacker went over the fence 
(with the aid of a ladder), a second attacker 'exploded' a 
device to gain entry into the BR-2 building; the guard was 
alerted to the smoke on his video screen and alerted the SCK 
guards and police (note: once the guard hit the silent alarm, 
the local police were able to hear everything said 
subsequently.  End note.)  For safety reasons this 
 attacker, did not scale the second fence with concertina 
wire.   Once the local guard initially triggered the alarm, 
the regional police dispatching service in Antwerp ("CIC") 
was automatically notified and responded within one to two 
minutes and began moving vehicles to the facility. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  After observing the initial alarm and subsequent 
 explosion, and the local guard,s responses, embassy and 
FANC and SCK observers verified that doors and the regular 
entry/exits into the building were locked (at one point, an 
SCK employee not involved in the exercise came to the entry 
system but could not gain entry, and another employee also 
not part of the exercise but inside the building was not 
allowed by the system to leave).  Observers were then taken 
inside BR-2 to one of the airlock entrances to the interior 
of the reactor, and shown that that system also would deny 
entry (by a SCK employee who had access normally but was 
denied). 
 
¶7. (SBU)  Observers then went to the guard station at the 
main entry gate to SCK at approximately 10:20 a.m., where 
local police officers had already gathered and were 
communicating with the CIC dispatcher and with the police 
vehicles that were arriving at the 13 checkpoints that had 
been identified before the exercise took place as being 
critical checkpoints or observation points, based on input 
from SCK, local police, and the CGSU.  About 6 to 8 senior 
police officers were already in place and communicating via 
walkie-talkie with CIC Antwerp and arriving police cars going 
to their 13 pre-planned checkpoints around the several 
kilometers of road that ring SCK; the CGSU commando was also 
there and observing.  There were a great number of well-armed 
police officers posted outside the main entrance (which was 
shut down).  In addition, the police had a mobile 
command/communication vehicle (a very large van with 
telecommunications equipment and extra seating space) ready 
to be used as needed, although it was not used during the 
exercise itself except to give a briefing to the exercise 
observers.  Some police officers had arrived in 8 to 10 
minutes.  Police were using maps and speaking on 
walkie-talkies.  Communication seemed organized.  The local 
police chief had alerted the mayor,s office very early on 
after hearing an incident was taking place at BR-2. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  A SCK security official involved in the exercise 
arrived in about 20 minutes (the amount of time it had been 
previously determined it would have taken him to arrive from 
his home) and began his role of passing information provided 
by SCK guards to the police officials at the main entrance. 
An additional SCK employee knowledgeable of the layout and 
the possible radiation risks of the nuclear research facility 
arrived in just over 20 minutes, called in to escort police 
and/or CGSU special forces inside the facility in the event 
needed.  FANC informed the embassy observer that a police 
helicopter was alerted shortly after the initial alarm by the 
regional police center at CIC Antwerp and would have arrived 
at the site in approximately 24 minutes of being notified. 
The helicopter,s mission would be reconnaissance -- tracking 
movements of the attackers should they have exited SCK, or of 
any suspicious vehicles moving towards SCK, and the like. 
 
¶9. (SBU)  According to the CGSU representative, the first 
CGSU agent/s could arrive at the facility in approximately 25 
to 40 minutes, via road from Antwerp, with others to follow 
via helicopter from either Antwerp, Ghent, or Brussels.  CGSU 
units train for crisis situations, including hostage-taking, 
the CGSU agent said, and are trained and prepared to react 
 
quickly to events and could respond to one at BR-2.  (Note: 
CGSU was involved in the planning of the Path Delay Timeline, 
the December 3 exercise, and in the preparation of the 
table-top exercise that preceded the December 3 event.  End 
note.) 
 
¶10. (SBU)  The police and observers then left the Main 
Entrance to see the police units at the 13 pre-determined 
strategic points around SCK that CGSU and police had 
determined before the exercise as best for either observation 
of the facility by police or deterring any unauthorized 
incoming or outgoing vehicles.  Each police car had at least 
two agents, armed (with what appeared to be automatic or 
semi-automatic weapons), and each also had devices to throw 
across the road to puncture tires in the event an 
unauthorized car attempted to enter or exit SCK grounds. 
Vehicles were at locations where they could easily block 
traffic in either direction.  Police also monitored the BR-2 
facility, as well as a bridge and a canal in the event the 
attackers tried to get away via boat; a locked gate barred 
passage under the bridge, and a police car was located just 
outside the bridge, in the event a boat nonetheless somehow 
made it through or a boat attempted to arrive from the 
outside trying to go in.  Once the observers saw all 13 
units, the exercise was ended and participants and observers 
returned to a room at SCK that was the designated operations 
center for a debriefing. 
 
DEBRIEFING 
---------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) In the debriefing, the local police chief indicated 
that although he was overall basically satisfied with the 
response of police vehicles/forces, he believed it possible 
through improved communication to gain some more time in 
bringing police assets to the SCK site.  One policeman 
reiterated that the police understood full well the critical 
importance of responding/arriving quickly to SCK, under the 
assumption that intruders would move fast to get inside BR-2. 
(Note: in creating their projected Path Delay Time, officials 
told embassy observer that they have added certain 
unspecified features to increase the delay times, but are 
continuing to evaluate additional actions to take to create 
additional delays.  End note).  The federal police crisis 
planner (a briefer to the U.S. team in May) said he thought 
that local police did a good job in taking positions in an 
organized and timely manner to 'freeze' the situation until 
CGSU agents would arrive.  FANC pointed out that based on how 
the situation might develop, the CIC dispatcher in Antwerp 
would be able to send more police units to SCK as needed, 
having specialized software and information available to 
track police resources and movements throughout the immediate 
area and the region (including bringing reinforcements to 
maintain public order to places where existing police had 
been summoned to SCK).  Embassy observer was told that police 
vehicles coming to the BR-2 as part of the exercise for 
public safety reasons observed regular traffic safety 
precautions (i.e., did not drive at high-speed with sirens), 
and that therefore some of the units would have been able to 
get to the area even faster. 
 
¶12. (SBU)  A SCK security official indicated that the 
facility's technical alarm, cameras and guards also appeared 
to function well during the exercise.  SCK will nonetheless 
be studying possibilities of improvements based on a more 
in-depth analysis of the equipment and guard responses to 
take place following the exercise.  (Note: FANC indicated 
that all entities involved in the exercise will be preparing 
reports and analysis of their participation to share and/or 
submit to FANC.  End note.)  The SCK secuity official 
involved in the exercise said once he was notified that an 
incident was occurring, he had immediately called the SCK 
Director General and FANC security (this was verified by both 
FANC and the DG).  FANC in turn verified that as part of the 
exercise its safety and security departments were also 
notified of an incident and put on alert (to deal with 
possible of public health issues/response in the event of a 
radiation-causing incident).   The CSGU representative added 
that he thought police did a good job of sharing 
intelligence, specifically in informing that a dirty bomb 
could be created if rods put in contact with water.  While 
this exercise was not designed to have hostages or sabotage, 
he said CGSU was equipped to deal with those issues; SCK has 
a system to identify the location of employees inside BR-2. 
He said CGSU participation in designing the Path Delay Time, 
in a table top exercise that preceded exercise Archibald, and 
in the December 3 exercise itself would improve the ability 
of the CGSU to respond to a threat to the facility, and 
improve the response of the police (for example, in 
 
determining where police units should go to secure the 
perimeter of SCK). 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) In a meeting with the embassy observer in the days 
following the exercise, a FANC official indicated that the 
agency has tasked SCK with drafting a follow-up report with 
details on the various parts of the exercise.  Each 
participating agency, including the police force, is being 
asked to provide recommendations for improvement.  FANC has 
also asked SCK to address the status of any open 
recommendations from the U.S. recommendations following the 
May 2009 visit, as well as from the table-top exercise from 
Fall 2009. 
 
¶14. (SBU)  FANC will continue to focus on implementation of 
further actions to increase delay times.  FANC will also plan 
additional exercises with SCK, and will work with CGSU 
regarding involvement by the police special forces unit in an 
exercise at BR-2 in 2010 or 2011. 
 
¶15.  SCK Director General Eric Van Walle indicated that in 
2010 SCK plans to hold a high-level security seminar in which 
the Prime Minister would be expected to take part, SCK having 
already briefed him on the matter.  Van Walle also said SCK 
wishes to organize a high-level event with the USG to discuss 
HEU-related issues. 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  Participating agencies included: 
 
SCK-CEN:  BR-2 officials, Safety and Security Department, and 
Public Relations 
 
FANC:     Observers (from Security and Safety offices), 
Public Relations 
 
Police:   Local (from tri-town of Balen-Dessel-Mol); Federal 
(based in Turnhout), CIC Antwerp (dispatcher), CGSU (Special 
Forces--observer) 
 
¶17. (U)  The Director General of Belgium,s nuclear 
regulatory agency, FANC, Mr Willy de Rooveere, attended a 
luncheon/informal debriefing involving participants and 
observers, in a signal of the importance FANC placed on the 
exercise. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶18. (SBU)  Since the visit in May 2009 of the USG physical 
protection assessment team, Belgian authorities have taken a 
number of important steps, including the December 3 exercise 
testing police response times, that are improving the 
Government of Belgium,s ability to protect the highly 
enriched uranium at the BR-2 facility.  For one, the nuclear 
regulator, FANC, has taken the initiative in coordinating the 
overall GOB response to physical security at BR-2, improving 
communication within the GOB and with the USG via the 
Embassy.  Besides coordinating the GOB interim response to 
the May 2009 recommendations of the USG physical protection 
team, FANC organized a multi-agency table-top exercise that 
preceded Exercise Archibald and highlighted improvements to 
be made as a result; it also coordinated input on the Path 
Delay Timeline.  FANC also participated in study and 
elaboration of the Path Delay Timeline at BR-2.  It is 
overseeing the SCK,s evaluation of the December 3 exercise 
and the multi-agency recommendations for improvements 
( lessons learned,) and envisions additional exercises at 
BR-2 on a regular basis.   Senior SCK and FANC officials are 
aware and fully supportive of the need for the increased 
attention to security at BR-2. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Given the importance of BR-2 in the supply chain of 
global production of medical radio-isotopes, Embassy Brussels 
is encouraged that the GOB has diligently taken steps to 
strengthen the physical security of Belgium,s sole nuclear 
research facility since the May 2009 USG physical protection 
team visit by improving communication, planning and most 
recently testing police response.  FANC plans to build on the 
December 3 event in future exercises, including at some point 
the involvement of a CGSU unit.  DOE may wish to consider 
reminding Belgian officials of the open-ended invitation made 
in May 2009 by the visiting DOE force-on-force expert to 
observe a force-on-force exercise at a U.S. nuclear facility. 
 Embassy observer verbally reiterated that invitation at the 
debrief of Exercise Archibald, but a more formal invitation, 
to include a calendar of possible exercises in the United 
 
States during 2010 and 2011, might be useful.  Post believes 
in particular that FANC, CGSU and SCK representatives would 
most benefit from observing an exercise. 
GUTMAN 
.