VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLB #1367/01 3650940
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 310940Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6275
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS BEIRUT 001367 
 
SIPDIS 
 
S/CT FOR RHONDA SHORE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS PINS PREL AEMR LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: A. STATE 109980 
     ¶B. STATE 122733 
 
¶1. While the threat of terrorist activity kept Lebanese 
security agencies on high alert throughout the year, 2009 was 
characterized by increased governmental efforts to disrupt 
suspected terror cells before they could act. The Lebanese 
Armed Forces (LAF), in particular, were credited with the 
capture of wanted terrorist fugitives and the containment of 
sectarian violence. 
¶2. Several designated terrorist organizations remain active 
in Lebanon. Hamas, The Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Fatah al-Islam (FAI), 
Al-Qaeda in Lebanon, Jund al-Sham, the Ziyad al-Jarrah 
Battalions, and several other splinter groups all operate 
within Lebanon,s borders. Hizballah, which is a legal entity 
and a major political party, is represented in Lebanon's 
cabinet and parliament. 
¶3. In 2009, terrorist violence and counterterror activity 
included the following incidents: 
-- On five separate occasions -- January 8 and 14, February 
21, September 11, and October 27 -- Katyusha rockets were 
fired from southern Lebanon into Israel. No casualties were 
reported from any of the incidents. The Al-Qaeda-inspired 
Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions claimed responsibility for several 
of the attacks. 
 
-- On March 24, the Internal Security Forces (ISF) defused an 
explosive device near the home of former Lebanese President 
Amin Gemayel and arrested a Syrian, Youssef Mohammad 
al-Mohammed, who is currently imprisoned. 
 
-- On June 17, The Lebanese Army thwarted an attempt to drive 
a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device into the Ain 
Al-Hilweh refugee camp in Sidon. Hasan Merhi, a FAI member 
was arrested in connection with the incident. 
 
-- In July, the Lebanese Army arrested Syrian citizen Mounjed 
al-Fahham, believed to be a high-ranking Al-Qaeda leader in 
Lebanon, at Beirut International Airport. Investigations 
revealed that al-Fahham intended to smuggle FAI spiritual 
leader Oussama Chehabi, known as Abou Zahra; FAI leader Abdel 
Rahman Awad; and Abdel Ghani Jawhar, wanted for 2008 attacks 
against LAF soldiers in Tripoli, out of Lebanon. 
 
-- On August 19, an LAF intelligence unit arrested Lebanese 
citizen Wissam Tahbish, reported to be a key member of Jund 
al-Sham. Tahbish was the primary suspect in the 1999 
assassination of four Lebanese judges in Sidon. 
 
-- On September 17, a Lebanese military court convicted five 
Palestinians of armed attacks, including a January 2008 
bombing aimed at United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) peacekeepers. The one member in custody was 
sentenced to three years of hard labor while four fugitive 
members, convicted in absentia, were given life sentences. 
 
¶4. The June 7, 2009, parliamentary elections, an event widely 
considered vulnerable to politically motivated violence, 
passed peacefully under the watch of international observers 
and a fully deployed LAF. Aside from some polling place 
scuffles, the elections were considered peaceful. Saad 
Hariri, leader of the Western-oriented March 14 alliance 
defeated the March 8 opposition allied with Syria and Iran. 
Hariri, who was named prime minister-designate, formed a 
national unity government that included Hizballah after 
nearly six months of negotiations. The new government 
obtained a vote of confidence on December 10. 
¶5. Incoming PM Hariri pronounced that strengthening the LAF 
and internal security would be a hallmark of his 
administration. General Jean Kahwagi, LAF commander since 
2008, has publicly listed counterterrorism, internal 
security, and suppression of sectarian violence as his top 
priorities. The U.S. government has an active security 
assistance program with the LAF as well as with the other 
security agencies that includes both training and equipment. 
¶6. LAF commanders stressed that the LAF has strengthened its 
surveillance capabilities over the 12 Palestinian camps and 
four Syrian-backed Palestinian military bases within its 
borders.  Nevertheless, a porous border with Syria, weak 
internal camp security, and LAF reticence to enter the 
Palestinian refugee camps all contribute to fears of another 
confrontation with an armed group, similar to the 2007 Nahr 
al-Barid conflict. The most widely predicted venue for such a 
clash is in Lebanon,s most populous refugee camp, Ain 
al-Hilweh, near the southern city of Sidon. The camp is well 
known for Hamas-Fatah intra-Palestinian violence and as a 
suspected safe haven for fugitive FAI terrorists. 
¶7. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559 called for 
respecting the sovereignty and political independence of 
Lebanon, the end of foreign interference in Lebanon, and the 
disarming and disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese 
militias. While the Lebanese government was committed to 
fulfilling the provisions of UNSCR 1559, it maintained that 
Hizballah,s disarmament should be accomplished through a 
National Dialogue rather than by force. The last round of 
talks, headed by President Sleiman, occurred in December 2008 
and failed to achieve progress on developing a "National 
Defense Strategy" to address the disposition of Hizballah,s 
weapons.  The electoral campaign and lengthy government 
formation process prohibited the convocation of the National 
Dialogue in 2009, but the new government's ministerial 
statement acknowledges the right of the Lebanese "resistance" 
(interpreted by many as referring to Hizballah's militia), 
along with the army, to recover occupied territory and 
confront external aggression. 
¶8. The dismantling of four Palestinian military bases 
controlled by Syrian-backed groups remained a concern for the 
LAF. The Qousaya Base, which straddles the border with Syria 
and allows easy access for fugitives and smugglers, is of 
particular concern. Activity in these bases reportedly 
remained quiet in 2009, although the LAF can do little more 
than monitor their activity without political support to 
dismantle them. The new ministerial statement calls for the 
elimination of Palestinian weapons outside the refugee camps 
and obliges the government to provide security for 
Palestinian refugees. 
¶9. Lebanon's border security remained problematic. The 
Government of Lebanon still does not exercise control over 
parts of the border in the Hizballah-dominated Bekaa Valley, 
in addition to the wider problem of Hizballah,s military 
presence in the southern suburbs of Beirut and southern 
Lebanon. Over the course of the year, conflicting reports 
surfaced of weapons smuggling from Syria and Iran to 
Hizballah and other militant groups in Lebanon. Reports from 
UNIFIL and the LAF said there was no conclusive evidence of 
arms smuggling to Hizballah in the UNIFIL area of operations 
south of the Litani River. UNIFIL and the LAF described a 
suspected Hizballah arms cache that exploded in July in the 
southern village of Khirbet Selim as containing weapons 
pre-dating the 2006 war and UNSCR 1701.  Nevertheless, 
Hizballah officials publically stated that the organization 
is now more heavily armed than it was before the 2006 war 
with Israel. 
¶10. UNSCR 1701 called upon Lebanon to secure its borders at 
all entry points to prevent entry of arms, weapons of mass 
destruction, or related material without its consent. In May 
2007, the UN Secretary General dispatched a border security 
team to Lebanon (the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment 
Team or LIBAT) to assess the monitoring of Lebanon,s border 
with Syria. In July 2008, a second assessment team (LIBAT 
II), responsible for assessing the implementation of the 
recommendations of LIBAT I, was sent to Lebanon. The overall 
assessment of LIBAT II was that the borders were as 
penetrable and insecure as they were in 2007 and that the 
rate of implementation of LIBAT I,s recommendations was 
insufficient. Due to the acknowledged lack of progress since 
2008, no follow-up assessment was made in 2009. 
¶11. In June 2009, then-Prime Minister Fouad Siniora announced 
the government's intention to improve border security. In 
July, an LAF-headed team produced a comprehensive border 
security management plan, for which the UN Special 
Coordinator on Lebanon (UNSCOL) is coordinating further 
technical evaluation with donor assistance. The Lebanese 
security agencies lack strong interagency cooperation, so 
progress on implementing the integrated border management 
plan moved slowly. Some gains were achieved on port security 
through better radiological screening of incoming shipping 
containers, and upgraded customs inspection stations on the 
eastern border improved border inspections. 
¶12. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, based in The Hague, on 
March 1 replaced the UN International Independent 
Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) as the body charged with 
the prosecution of persons responsible for the assassination 
of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and other Lebanese public 
figures, many critical of Syrian interference in Lebanon. 
All of these attacks remained unsolved at year's end. 
¶13. Two international conventions supported by the USG 
remained pending approval. The International Convention on 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing was sent back to the 
parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee for further study, 
and the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism was not submitted by the Foreign 
Ministry for cabinet approval due to reservations by the 
Finance Ministry. 
¶14. Lebanon hosted the 2009 Middle East and North Africa 
Financial Action Task Force (MENA-FATF) and played a 
leadership role in the US-MENA Private Sector Dialogue. 
Lebanon's financial intelligence unit is the Special 
Investigation Commission (SIC), an independent legal entity 
empowered to investigate suspicious financial transactions, 
lift banking secrecy, and freeze assets. It investigated 116 
cases involving allegations of money laundering, terrorism, 
and terrorist financing activities. The SIC referred requests 
for designation or asset freezes regarding Hizballah and 
groups affiliated with Hizballah to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, but the Lebanese government does not require banks 
to freeze these assets because it does not consider Hizballah 
a terrorist organization. 
¶15. Lebanese authorities maintained that the amnesty for 
Lebanese individuals involved in acts of violence during the 
1975-90 civil wars prevented the government from prosecuting 
terrorist cases of concern to the United States. These cases 
included individuals involved in the 1985 hijacking of TWA 
Flight 847, during which a U.S. Navy diver was murdered; the 
bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983 and 1984; and 
the abduction, torture, and murder of U.S. hostages in 
Lebanon from 1984 to 1991. Mohammad Ali Hamadi, convicted in 
a West German court in 1987 of air piracy, murder, and 
possession of explosives for his part in the TWA hijacking 
spent 18 years in a German prison before he was paroled in 
December 2005 and was believed to be in Lebanon. The United 
States continued its efforts to bring him to trial before a 
U.S. court and has formally requested his extradition. The 
United States does not have an extradition treaty with 
Lebanon. 
¶16. Michael Brennan is the Embassy point of contact for this 
report. E-mail: BrennanMF@state.gov, tel.:  961-542600. 
SISON