VZCZCXRO7699
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBC #0066 3640715
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 300715Z DEC 09
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0955
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0533
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0993

C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000066 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/30/2019 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV KCOR PTER PREL IZ
SUBJECT: STABLE SECURITY SITUATION IN BASRAH BOLSTERS CONFIDENCE IN 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: John Naland, PRT Team Leader, PRT Basra, US State 
Department. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C) The security situation in Basrah has remained stable 
since the April/May 2008 Charge of the Knights campaign.  That 
operation largely rid Basrah of the militias that had turned the 
province into a cauldron of violence and instability.  Although 
occasional IED and IDF attacks continue against Iraqi and U.S. 
forces, the absence of any large-scale suicide bombings or other 
major attacks has bolstered the provincial population's 
confidence in the national government to meet its security 
needs.  People we talked to in every echelon of Basrah society 
share favorable impressions of the local security situation, 
generally crediting Prime Minister Maliki for having brought 
stability to the province. 
 
¶2. (C) Basrawis mainly view security as a central government 
responsibility.  They widely hold the Iraqi Army in high esteem 
for having maintained security in the province, and see the 
Iraqi Army as very much in control of security.  Anecdotal 
evidence and limited polling data reveal that the local, popular 
opinion of the Iraqi Police is less favorable than that of the 
Iraqi Army.  Despite that perception, the Iraqi Army and the 
Iraqi Police work very effectively together throughout Basrah 
province on security issues. 
 
¶3. (C) With the province secure and calm, the PRT observed no 
evidence of fears that increasing violence outside of Basrah 
will affect the stability or effectiveness of the provincial 
government.  The concerns that exist about the effectiveness of 
the provincial government arise not from lack of security, but 
rather from perceptions of corruption, political infighting, and 
incompetence.  In short, Basrawis expect the provincial 
government to continue to operate as it has in the past, 
unaffected by outside events. 
 
¶4. (C) As for the national security situation, Basrawis view the 
increased violence in Baghdad and other areas of Iraq through a 
political and/or sectarian lens.  They see the violence 
elsewhere as either a struggle for national political power or 
the result of various ethnic/religious groups living together 
and competing for influence and power locally.  Since Basrawis 
credit Prime Minister Maliki with having brought stability to 
Basrah province, they do not see him diminished in any way by 
the recent spike in violence.  Nor do they see the violence 
undermining the ability of the national government to govern 
effectively.  The concerns that were voiced about the impact of 
the increased violence on Basrah were not political, but 
economic.  Some feared that the high-profile attacks in Baghdad 
could create a perception abroad that Iraq is becoming less 
stable, discouraging foreign investment, especially in Basrah's 
growing oil industry. 
 
NALAND