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DE RUEHGI #0275/01 3641601
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P R 301601Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1112
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0254
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0357
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RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0269
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0208
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0192
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0558
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0546
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0190
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0534
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1407

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGUI 000275 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
USUN FOR DMUERS 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
NAIROBI  FOR AKARAS 
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL 
INR FOR JPEKKINEN 
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: DDR PROCESS INCREASINGLY LINKED TO ELECTIONS - A DANGEROUS 
CORRELATION 
 
REF: A. A 09 BANGUI 272 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶B. REF: B 09 BANGUI 181 
 
SUBJECT: DDR PROCESS INCREASINGLY LINKED TO ELECTIONS - A 
DANGEROUS CORRELATION 
REF A: 09 Bangui 272 and previous 
REF B: 09 Bangui 181 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Two critical and linked realities threaten to 
derail the progress of the scheduled preparations for the 2010 
Central African (CAR) elections: setbacks in implementing the 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program (DDR) and 
the existence of armed groups outside of the peace process. 
Although most observers agree that a successful DDR process is 
vital to create a stable environment for peaceful elections in 
April 2010, the DDR process continues to experience delays. 
Pushing back the elections, however, has its own hazards as the 
constitutional mandates of the President and National Assembly 
expire in June.  A constitutional crisis, while convenient for 
some individuals with limited public support, would derail the 
CARs democratic progress and fuel the rebel movements. 
Therefore, while some flexibility in the first round's date may 
be advisable, international and national actors involved should 
avoid conditioning the elections on implementation of a strict 
DDR timetable, lest it give parties who do not want to see 
elections an easy excuse to avoid the democratic process.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Current State of the DDR 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) The DDR process is estimated to require a total of USD27 
million.  So far financial support has come from the UN Peace 
Building Fund, sub-regional organizations such as the Economic 
and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and the 
Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC), and 
neighboring countries, but a funding gap still remains. 
Recently the local press announced that Chad, Gabon, and 
Equatorial Guinea pledged an additional USD 6.6 million.  In 
addition, the Peacebuilding Commission at the United Nations 
(PBC) has proposed a pledging conference - to be held in early 
2010 - in order to increase financing for Security Sector Reform 
(SSR), a wider program within which the DDR process exists. 
 
¶3. (U) SSR cannot fully succeed without resolving the issue of 
the numerous rebel groups, either through DDR or military action 
by the Central African army.  There are currently two major 
groups outside of the DDR peace process -- the Patriotic 
Convention for Justice and Peace (CPJP), Democratic Front of the 
Central African People (FDPC) -- along with a number of smaller 
armed bands. The opposition has called for the government (CARG) 
to initiate political dialogue with the remaining militia 
groups, but so far President Bozize has declined to negotiate 
directly with the CPJP, preferring confrontation.  The FDPC 
pulled out of the process citing delays in implementation and 
the murder of two of their members in a Central African jail. 
The Army for the Restitution of Democracy (APRD), while still 
adhering to the process, has reestablished check points in its 
areas of operation and recently turned away a UN convoy headed 
by Chairman of the PBC in protest against the slow roll out of 
the DDR program. Additionally, the instability in the northeast 
has forced the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) to 
repeat demands that all the other regional groups disarm 
simultaneously (Ref A). 
 
¶4. (SBU) UNDP officials in charge of the DDR do not expect the 
entire process to be completed before the elections, but do 
believe that the first two phases - disarmament and 
demobilization - can be completed by mid-April.  This, they 
 
BANGUI 00000275  002 OF 002 
 
 
hope, will ensure a sufficiently secure environment to allow 
free passage throughout the country for election staff, voters, 
and the possible return of the estimated 162,000 Central African 
internally displaced people and 130,000 refugees.  Progress has 
been made by the DDR Steering Committee - earlier this month, 
the long awaited deployment of 31 military observers from CEEAC 
funded by the EU to oversee the demobilization process finally 
arrived in Bangui.  Yet, even though the UNDP forecasts that the 
DDR team will complete the first two phases by February 2010, a 
recent press interview with one of the CEEAC military experts 
declared that the disarmament process alone will likely take 
more than three months, allowing implementation of only the 
first phase of DDR before the first round of elections currently 
scheduled for April 18. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Delays in the DDR Causing Nervousness 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Although the government and the Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC) consistently reaffirm their commitment to 
holding the elections within the timeframe prescribed by the 
country's constitution, major international partners - France, 
the European Commission (EC), the UNDP and the UN's Office for 
Central Africa (BONUCA) - all agree that peaceful and 
transparent elections will be compromised without further 
improvement in the security situation in the CAR.  The 
opposition often stresses the need for flexibility within the 
proposed election timeline and that the dates of the scheduled 
activities are less important than the conditions on the ground. 
 Some observers speculate that the opposition would prefer a 
constitutional crisis that would potentially result in a 
``government of national unity,'' but until now, their efforts 
have been brushed aside by the international community and the 
government (Ref B). 
 
¶6. (U) The Constitutional calls for the IEC to conduct the first 
round of elections before the end of the current Presidential 
mandate on June 11, 2009.  During a recent meeting of the 
Electoral Steering Committee, IEC representatives from the 
ruling party did not object to the opposition statements calling 
for flexibility in the electoral timeline, but they were quick 
to stress that the constitutional mandate must be respected. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The CARG is not always clear about its intentions 
either.  During a meeting with the Secretary General (SG) of 
Government, the SG stated that it was imperative that the 
disarmament and demobilization phases be completed before the 
national elections are held.  Nevertheless, the SG was also 
assured that the IEC had already taken into consideration the 
DDR process for the elections timetable, because the militia 
groups who are members of the DDR process are represented by 
five members on the IEC.  It is possible that President Bozize 
is seeking to maintain some flexibility of action by demanding 
the timeline be respected, but also acknowledging the necessity 
of DDR implementation. 
 
¶8. (SBU) COMMENT: BONUCA has stressed the need for the DDR 
process to move forward, but correctly warned of making the 
elections strictly conditional on DDR, which could risk 
compromising the peace-building effort by causing a 
constitutional crisis.  Post agrees with this assessment and 
cautions against a hasty decision to accept significant delays 
in the electoral timeline.  Any postponement past the 
constitutional mandate will create a constitutional vacuum and 
distract the CARG and opposition from the real issue at hand: 
the elections and effective governance of the Central African 
Republic. END COMMENT. 
COOK