VZCZCXRO2783
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHGI #0273/01 3561238
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 221238Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1107
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0249
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0352
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0365
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0264
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0203
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0553
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0541
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0185
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0529
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1402

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000273 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
USUN FOR DMUERS 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
NAIROBI  FOR AKARAS 
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL 
INR FOR JPEKKINEN 
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR PREF KPKO CT
SUBJECT: CPJP MOTIVATIONS FOR ATTACK ON NDELE 
 
REF: A. A - 09 BANGUI 155 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶B. REF: B - 09 BANGUI 46 
     ¶C. REF: C - 09 BANGUI 45 
 
BANGUI 00000273  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The November 26 attack by the Patriotic 
Convention for Justice and Peace (CPJP) on Ndele in the northern 
Central African Republic (CAR) reignited a conflict largely 
dormant since the start of the rainy season (Ref A). The counter 
attack by the Central African Army (FACA) on December 8 ended 
with the FACA claiming to have pursed the CPJP over the Chadian 
border from their strongholds along the Ndele/Garba road. The 
FACA have since returned to Ndele.  Post suspects that the two 
sides are trying to establish positions from which to negotiate 
from strength -- with the CPJP's leadership looking for greater 
control over the economy of the region and the FACA attempting 
to prove to the CPJP and other rebel groups that it is not an 
impotent force. END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Details of Ndele attack still unclear 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In the early morning of November 26, the CPJP, a rebel 
group based in northeastern CAR and comprised primarily of 
Rounga tribesmen, launched a surprise attack on the provincial 
capital Ndele, targeting government installations like the 
headquarters of the Presidential Guard, the gendarmerie, and the 
Prefet's house.  The CPJP hit targets with rocket propelled 
grenades and light arms, occupied and looted the government 
buildings, and left at noon when the FACA began its counter 
attack.  There are reports of looting in the town - it is 
confirmed that the CPJP absconded with the Prefet's vehicle - 
but it is unclear if the looting was the work of the CPJP or 
that of the local population taking advantage of the chaos. 
Nevertheless, within the day, the FACA - who melted away during 
the attack - regrouped and counter attacked, regaining control 
of the town by the afternoon. Multiple reports from contacts in 
Ndele mention wounded CPJP fighters summarily executed by the 
FACA, with one specific report of a CPJP officer - and allegedly 
a former wildlife park ranger - being shot after brief 
questioning. There have been various exaggerated estimates of 
killed and wounded on both sides, but we have yet to receive a 
casualty estimate from an impartial observer. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ndele is a town made up mostly of mud buildings with 
thatched roofs, and a number of buildings and houses burned as a 
result of the fighting. While neither side seems to have 
purposefully set fire to residences, one very important 
residence did suffer damage - that of the Sultan of Ndele. The 
Sultan is a man of great influence in the region and an informal 
interlocutor between the government and the CPJP (Ref B). 
Contacts at the UN suspect his residence, though close to the 
FACA base and possibly the victim of stray fire, was likely 
targeted by FACA mortar fire. Many in the government question 
the Sultan's allegiances and the mortar blast could be 
interpreted as a message to the local leader. 
 
------------------ 
Who are the CPJP? 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) The CPJP is remarkably well organized, equipped, and 
run relative to other ragtag rebel groups in the CAR. One 
observer who traveled through the CPJP's stronghold of 
Akoursoubak the week before the attack saw a formal ceremony 
where promotions were bestowed upon a select group of officers. 
The observer also noticed recognizable military police manning 
check points, distinctly separate from the regular militiamen. 
The uniforms of the CPJP are reported to be new and originating 
from the Chadian National Army (ANT) - the person saw the black 
 
BANGUI 00000273  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
stitching spelling out ``A.N.T'' bleeding through a white cloth 
that covered up the patch. (We have heard other reports noting 
the quality of CPJP equipment. Another observer said, ``I 
thought at first that they were ANT'').  A different source, who 
frequents the area, remarked that the CPJP does not extort taxes 
from the local population, a practice common among the other 
militia groups in the CAR. 
 
¶5. Days after the attack, the CPJP announced an accord with 
Abdulaye Miskine's Democratic Front of the Central African 
People (FDPC) (Ref C). The FDPC is a signatory to the 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program (DDR), but 
recently pulled out claiming anger over the slow roll out of the 
process. The FDPC is small, but very well armed (NOTE: There is 
unconfirmed speculation that the Libyan government finances the 
FDPC. They are also the only Central African militia with a 
website:  HYPERLINK "http://www.centrafriquefdpc.com" 
www.centrafriquefdpc.com . END NOTE). The practical implications 
of this alliance are unclear as the FDPC's area of operation is 
some 220 km from the CPJP's, and their aims vis-`-vis the 
government are very different. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The day after the attack on Ndele, the CPJP released an 
updated organizational chart (NOTE: These names are possibly 
pseudonyms as combatants from this area often take on symbolic 
names. END NOTE) : 
 
-- Dhafane Mohamed Moussa - Secretary General and Official 
Negotiator, in charge External Relationships. 
-- Colonel Richard Deye - Chief of Staff 
-- Colonel Issa Adam - Troop Commander 
 
The shadowy Karama Souleymane Nestor remains President of the 
Supreme Council of the Movement, but rumors suggest that Nestor, 
who may not be a Rounga, is only a figurehead for the real power 
figures of the CPJP  Interestingly, Charles Massi --  the four 
time former Central African Minister, former member of the 
Central African National Assembly and proclaimed President of 
the CPJP earlier in the year - was conspicuously left off the 
announcement.  This is likely as a result of the failure of 
Massi to bring the CARG to the negotiating table. More 
importantly, this release likely signifies that the CPJP, with 
the announcement of an ``Official Negotiator'' days after the 
attack, are gesturing to the government that they seek a 
settlement. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Many in the Rounga community, both in Ndele and in 
Bangui, purport to be perplexed by the CPJP. While they admit 
that some of their youth have joined the CPJP, they hold fast 
that the leadership is ``foreign'' - a term of ambiguous 
definition. 
 
------------------ 
COMMENT: Diamonds Motivate the CPJP 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) The CARG does not have the strength to effectively 
quash the CPJP. The CPJP has made no public calls to join the 
DDR process, and when asked claim their goal is ``justice and 
peace for all Central Africans''. The true motivation behind the 
CPJP's rebellion likely lies with the diamond mines near Ndele: 
 
-- After violence in 2007 in the Vakaga, Post believes that the 
CARG subcontracted responsibility for the region to the 
increasingly Goula dominated UFDR led by Zakaria Damane in 
return for payments back to Bangui. 
 
-- The UFDR was previously multiethnic, but started to fragment 
once the conflict with the CARG subsided. Damane, a Goula, 
 
BANGUI 00000273  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
maintained his support within the UFDR by increasingly relying 
on his ethnicity against all others. The Rounga in particular 
suffered and were pushed off their traditional diamond fields in 
eastern CAR and specifically those at Sam Ouandja and Bria. 
 
-- It was this event that sparked the creation of the CPJP. It 
is thought that the CPJP is a combination of former Rounga UFDR 
fighters and potentially former Presidential Guard members who 
helped President Bozize to power in 2003 but who then found 
themselves alienated from Bangui. They coalesced around the 
Rounga who now run the diamond mines around Ndele and may be 
seeking to obtain a deal similar to the one that Damane attained 
from Bozize: control over the diamonds and trade in the region 
in return for payments back to Bozize. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The area north of Ndele is geographically and 
politically remote from Bangui, making confirmation of facts and 
figures difficult, but the attack on Ndele was clearly bruising 
to the CARG's ego with various ministers emotionally blaming 
international NGOs in the area with aiding and abetting the 
militia and threatening to revoke their right to work in the 
region. The question thus remains: was the embarrassment felt by 
the government ameliorated enough by the counterattack that they 
can begin a dialogue? Bangui has yet to show it has an interest 
in a deal, but the CPJP may have exhibited just enough muscle in 
this important time before national elections in April 2010 to 
get the government's attention. END COMMENT. 
COOK