VZCZCXRO1895
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHGI #0272/01 3551343
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 211343Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1104
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0246
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0349
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0362
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0261
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0200
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0550
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0538
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0182
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0526
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1399

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000272 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
USUN FOR DMUERS 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
NAIROBI  FOR AKARAS 
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL 
INR FOR JPEKKINEN 
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR PREF KPKO CT
SUBJECT: MINURCAT SRSG SPELLS OUT CONTINUED SECURITY THREATS IN NE 
CAR 
 
REF: A. A - 09 BANGUI 237 
     ¶B. REF: B - 09 BANGUI 83 
     ¶C. REF: C - 09 NDJAMENA 602 
 
BANGUI 00000272  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On December 16, 2009, Victor Angelo [PROTECT 
SOURCE], the Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG) of the United Nations Mission in Chad and the Central 
African Republic (MINURCAT) met with the Ambassador. At the 
former's request, the Ambassador gave the SRSG an update on the 
current political atmosphere in the Central African Republic 
(CAR) with Angelo, in turn, informing the embassy of three 
significant events in MINURCAT's area of operation (Northeastern 
CAR): the kidnapping of two French NGO workers from Birao; the 
recent violence in Sam Ouandja; and a troubling clash between 
the Chadian Army (ANT) and an anti-Deby Chadian rebel group - 
the Union of Forces for Change and Democracy (UFCD) - that may 
lead to the faction being pushed into the CAR. Each incident 
demonstrates the continued fragility of the broader tri-border 
area of CAR/Chad/Sudan despite a decrease in tension between 
armed factions in Birao (Ref A). Additionally, this continued 
strife will slow down the Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR) process currently under way and complicates 
plans for the Central African elections scheduled for April 
¶2010. END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Kidnapping of French NGO Workers 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In late November 2009, two French NGO workers from the 
organization Triangle were kidnapped in Birao, CAR, it what 
appears to been a well-coordinated operation. They have not been 
seen since. A group named the Freedom Eagles of Africa claimed 
responsibility for the abductions, but it is the SRSG's firm 
conviction that the group is not real and that the kidnapping is 
not tied to those in Chad. Instead, he believes the group is 
local, small, ``of Chadian orientation'', and driven need for 
money to buy weapons and supplies. MINURCAT is in close 
coordination with Triangle and the French Government to try and 
resolve the situation. He said that he would be meeting with the 
CAR government (CARG) thinking they can be helpful as he 
suspects they know who is behind the kidnappings. 
 
----------- 
Sam Ouandja 
----------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Recent violence in Sam Ouandja, location of the largest 
Sudanese refugee camp in the CAR with some 3,500 people, is also 
disturbing as it has potential to become more serious and 
spread. (MINURCAT is directed to protect the refugees in Sam 
Ouandja.) Sam Ouandja has been quiet since its brief occupation 
by Zakaria Damane's Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) 
in 2007. Until recently, the UFDR and the CARG jointly ran the 
town and controlled its comparatively lucrative diamond and game 
trade. During his 2007 visit to Sam Ouandja, the Ambassador was 
told that Sudanese were not allowed to mine diamonds. Over the 
last year, however, the Sudanese refugees began mining for 
diamonds and are increasingly active in game poaching both for 
meat and ivory (NOTE: This may or may not be related to the rise 
of the CPJP as the Rounga who make up the majority of the CPJP 
are the traditional miners of the Sam Ouandja fields. END NOTE) 
This in turn is creating tension with the local inhabitants, who 
are supported by the UFDR and CARG. On December 11, tensions 
boiled over when an ambush of two UFDR members traveling on a 
motorcycle resulted in the deaths of both militia men and one 
ambusher. To make matters worse, one of Damane's close relatives 
was among the two UFDR slain. The UFDR believe the attackers 
came from the refugee camp; however the head of the camp denied 
 
BANGUI 00000272  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
that the dead ambusher originated from his community. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Damane has repeatedly threatened the refugees since the 
incident, spurring the deployment of a MINURCAT contingent. They 
plan to maintain presence in Sam Ouandja for the near future. On 
December 17, the UFDR and the Sudanese struck a deal in which 
the Sudanese agreed to pay a blood price of 1.1 million CFA (USD 
2,500). On the December 18, the Sudanese paid the blood price, 
but tensions still remain high. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Prior to the deal being struck on the payment of 
restitution, Damane had demanded in writing that the Sudanese 
refugees in Sam Ouandja be moved out of their camp and that food 
aid to the Sudanese be cut. The UNHCR in the CAR, along with the 
Nation Council for Refugees have signaled a willingness to 
negotiate a proposed move of the refugees to Bambari (250 km 
from Bangui). The CARG has not yet weighed in. This move has 
good points and bad points: 
 
-- Logistical costs will significantly drop for the UN as 
Bambari is much closer to Bangui. 
 
-- Security would be easier as relocation away from the border 
may cause the troublemakers - who live among the refugees by 
night and poach game and highjack motorized vehicles by day - to 
leave the camp and return to the border area. 
 
-- Conflict with the UFDR will be reduced. 
 
--The Sudanese want to get away from the border to find better 
agricultural land and fewer threats from the area's ubiquitous 
bandits and the UFDR. 
 
But there are other considerations to keep in mind: 
 
-- The CAR government may not be happy about resettling 3,500 
Sudanese deep within their national territory in what would 
likely be a permanent move. 
 
-- The departure would remove one of the primary reasons for 
MINURCAT to be in the CAR. It is impossible to judge the 
reaction of the CARG and the French (NOTE: The British are on 
record as opposing an MINURCAT presence in the CAR. END NOTE.). 
The departure of MINURCAT would unquestionably lead to a 
deterioration of the security situation in the Vakaga, and thus 
despite all of the criticism of MINURCAT, we would be reluctant 
to see it leave the area. 
 
-- UNHCR is currently out of funds. 
 
The deal struck between the UFDR and the refugees may make this 
potential move unnecessary. Still, this is an idea that may have 
some traction because the underlying suspicion between the 
groups will not be bought away so easily. Yet, for the reasons 
mentioned above, it is likely the CARG will be unwilling to 
allow this move. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Chadian Rebels Threaten to Change the Equation 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Angelo lastly discussed a possible major shift in the 
balance of power in the northeastern CAR. On December 13, the 
Chadian rebel group UFCD clashed with the Chadian national army, 
the ANT. The SRSG described how the group has worn out its 
welcome in Sudan and a combination of combat losses and 
defections (Ref C) have weakened the UFCD. As a result, he 
believes the UFCD may seek to relocate to the lawless and open 
 
BANGUI 00000272  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
area north of Birao. If so, this would put the group into 
contact with the Goula dominated UFDR, the Kara dominated UMDR, 
and the other minor armed groups in the region. If Angelo is 
correct, the UFCD has some 70 vehicles and is heavily armed, 
making it, in reality, more capable of projecting force than the 
Central African Army or any of the other various armed groups in 
the region. If indeed the group ends up in the CAR and comes 
into conflict with any of the armed non-state or state actors, 
the region will be at risk of a significant and perilous flare 
up. Angelo described this possible move as a serious ``game 
changer''. 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: It is clear that Northeastern CAR is still 
rife with instability just four months before the scheduled 
national elections. Despite the attestations of the Independent 
Electoral Commission that they recognize the threat to the 
process posed by instability all along the north of the CAR, the 
northeast's particularly hot conflicts seem unlikely to cool 
before April 2010 without major intercession by the CARG. The 
armed response of the CARG to recent violence in Ndele (reported 
septel) suggests they are far from coming to a grand bargain 
with the various warring factions. Additionally, the possible 
arrival of a group like the UFCD would make DDR impossible in 
the region. Even if the Chadian group does not descend into the 
CAR, the previously reported tensions in and around Birao - and 
now Sam Ouandja - diminish the prospects of any possible DDR 
effort, especially by February 2010, as is the plan.  END 
COMMENT. 
COOK