VZCZCXYZ0084
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #3373/01 3641617
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301617Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5961
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 003373 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I: A/S FELTMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KTER PTER KDEM PINR PINS PHUM PREF
IZ, IR 
SUBJECT: PRT DIYALA:  CENTER OF GRAVITY FOR IRAQ'S PROBLEMS 
 
REF: A. 09BAGHDAD 2937 
     ¶B. 09BAGHDAD 3065 
     ¶C. 09BAGHDAD 2844 
     ¶D. 09BAGHDAD 3120 
     ¶E. 09BAGHDAD 3178 
     ¶F. 09BAGHDAD 3335 
     ¶G. 09BAGHDAD 2367 
     ¶H. 09BAGHDAD 2547 
 
Classified By: OPA Director Greta Holtz for reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is a PRT Diyala message. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT With its long border with Iran, 
Diyala remains a strategically vital focal point for some of 
Iraq's most pressing problems, yet its Provincial Government 
remains ill-equipped to confront the challenges facing it. 
Although Diyala is no longer the haven for Al Qaida and other 
insurgents that it once was, continuing USG assistance is 
vital to stabilize Diyala and to prevent ongoing tensions 
there from spreading to the adjacent disputed internal 
boundary (DIBs) areas. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
VULNERABILITY TO IRAN 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (C) Strategically located between Iran and Baghdad, 
Diyala remains vulnerable to Iranian economic and cultural 
influence, as well as Tehran's apparent support for insurgent 
groups and attempts to manipulate local officials.  Diyala is 
a major transit point, with more than 50 percent of the 
fruits and vegetables in Diyala imported from Iran, along 
with many other goods on their way to Baghdad.  Diyala is 
also a major gateway for Iranians traveling on religious 
pilgrimages to places like Karbala and Najaf.  In meetings 
with PRToffs, provincial officials, including the Governor, 
Dr. Abd-al-Nasr Muntsir al-Mahdawi (Sunni-Tawafuq) and the 
Provincial Council (PC) Chairman Abd-al-Talib Muhammad Hasan 
(Kurd) openly note the importance of cooperating with Iran to 
improve Diyala,s economic future.  Facing the current 
drought conditions, the Governor made a trip to Iran in 
September 2009 to ask for the release of water into the Wand 
River in Khanaqin.  As part of the negotiations for the 
subsequent release of the water, Mahdawi signed a cooperation 
agreement with the neighboring Iranian province of Kermanshah 
on areas including security, trade, water, customs duties, 
and cultural exchanges. (Note: This is notable for the 
numerous subjects covered by the agreement that are clearly 
within the central government,s sphere of authority. End 
note). 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) Governor Mahdawi and other provincial leaders tell 
us that Iranian agents and special groups are supporting 
various insurgent and political groups in Diyala, undermining 
the economy and provoking sectarian tension.  The perception 
of Iran's interference appears to exist on multiple levels, 
for example, PC member Abdullah Jabbouri told PRToffs that 
Iranian agents are manipulating the Muqdadiyah City Council, 
while other PRT interlocutors have reported that Diyala's 
Deputy Governor, Furat Muhammad (ISCI), recently traveled to 
Iran to receive funds for the upcoming national parliamentary 
elections.  Diyala shares a 250 mile-long border with Iran, 
and the Governor, multiple Provincial Council members, and 
other local leaders claim that Iranian agents have many 
members of the Iraqi security forces on their payroll - 
including border forces - thus enabling the smuggling of 
goods, including weapons and explosive devices, into Diyala. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
SIMMERING SECTARIAN TENSION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C) Diyala continues to face the serious potential for 
increased sectarian violence.  While many contacts, including 
the PC Chairman and the district head of Muqdadiyah, estimate 
that more than 90 percent of AQI in Diyala has now been 
Qthat more than 90 percent of AQI in Diyala has now been 
destroyed, the Shi'a-Sunni tensions that developed over the 
past years of struggle have not fully disappeared.   The 
perceived imbalance in the implementation of rule of law in 
favor of Shi'a groups is exacerbating those tensions. Sunni 
groups say they are being targeted for arrest and 
assassination by the Shi'a-dominated Fifth Division of the 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), especially the Iraqi Police (IP) 
(ref A). (NOTE: Among IA divisions, The Fifth has the highest 
percentage of Shi'a troops.  END NOTE.)  This perception is 
strengthened by the fact that approximately 90 percent of the 
prison population in Diyala is Sunni, as stated by Governor 
Mahdawi and prison officials. (NOTE: the population breakdown 
in Diyala is roughly 50 percent Sunni, 35 percent Shi'a, and 
15 percent Kurd. END NOTE).  During a recent Provincial 
Council session, PC member Amir Thamir (Allawi) and others 
openly accused Shi'a tribes of coordinating with the IP on 
the arrest of several Sunni leaders in the Mansouriyah area 
of Muqdadiyah to retaliate against their Sunni tribal 
neighbors.   Thamir also claimed that the Prime Minister's 
office was behind these arrests. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Moreover, Sunni leaders believe that the IP is also 
working with the support of Iranian groups, and possibly at 
the behest of, or at least with the support of, Iranian 
groups.  For example, in August 2009 the son of PC member 
Najim Harbie (al-Mutluq) was alleged to have been 
assassinated with IP collusion at the direction of Harith 
Sa'dun, a well-known Jayesh Al Mahdi Special Groups (JAM-SG) 
leader with ties to al Quds Force.  (NOTE: U.S. military 
direct intelligence report IIR 6 069 1143 10-DOI 20091116 
from evaluated sources indicates that the vehicle used in the 
kidnapping belonged to the Director of the Major Crimes Unit 
of the IP.  END NOTE).  Despite this background, after his 
arrest by ISF in November 2009, the Deputy Provincial Council 
Chairman, Sadiq Ja'far Abdullah Muhammad (ISCI) approached 
the PRT to press for Harith's release.  In addition, Sunni 
leadership asserts that a Shi'a-biased IP is not only 
supported by Iranian special groups, but also by the central 
government itself.  Diyala's Sunni leaders blame the central 
government for helping to perpetrate sectarian and 
politically biased arrests and assassinations of Sunni 
leaders - both civilians and Sons of Iraq (SOI).  As 
previously reported, a significant number of the Sunni 
(Tawafuq) provincial government leadership either have 
outstanding arrest warrants or are currently in jail (ref B). 
 Diyala's Sunni leadership believes this is a concerted 
effort by central government powers to undermine their 
authority and set the stage for Shi'a dominance in the 
province (ref C). 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
SUNNIS COULD TURN TO VIOLENCE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7. (C) If the arrests, intimidation, and growing 
disenfranchisement of Sunni groups in Diyala continue, some 
PRT contacts in Diyala believe that some Sunnis, particularly 
Sons of Iraq (SOI) or other groups vulnerable to new Ba'ath 
party messaging, may resort to armed conflict as their best 
perceived option to regain power against a Shi'a-led 
government.  Diyala is the second largest source of 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Iraq, second only to 
Baghdad.  Approximately 240,000 people of both Sunni and 
Shi'a ethnicity have been displaced, roughly half of whom 
reside in Diyala, and half in other provinces.  Working with 
Embassy and international partners such as USAID, UNHCR, 
United States Institute of Peace, and International 
Organization for Migration, the GOI's Implementation and 
Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR) has 
developed a special Diyala Initiative to enable and encourage 
IDPs to return home (ref D).  Early results are encouraging; 
UNHCR reports that around 50,000 IDPs returned to Diyala in 
¶2009.  But such progress is not yet consolidated, and 
shortages of jobs, housing, and essential services, as well 
as security concerns still loom as roadblocks.  Local 
citizens in Diyala report that some Sunni families who tried 
to move back into Shi'a dominated areas such as Khalis were 
Qto move back into Shi'a dominated areas such as Khalis were 
threatened with violence that they believe is condoned by 
local Shi'a IP.  For now, these incidents have remained 
isolated, but if they become more widespread and the 
perception of IP support grows--both real possibilities--it 
could spark wider violence from within the Sunni community. 
And in the event that Diyala Sunnis do resort to arms in a 
large numbers, it would heighten the risk of similar actions 
in neighboring provinces due to close tribal connections. 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
ARAB-KURD TENSIONS 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8. (C) Arab-Kurd tensions in the disputed internal boundary 
(DIBs) areas of Diyala could also reverberate in the adjacent 
Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR).  While the majority of the 
Khanaqin area in northern Diyala may be Arab, Kurds claim it 
should be part of the IKR.  (ref E).  In a recent meeting 
with NEA A/S   Feltman (ref F), Governor Mahdawi noted that 
tensions had improved in the DIBs area with the involvement 
of the Iraqi Army, but the situation was far from stable. 
Kurdish leaders in Khanaqin claim increased tensions between 
Arabs and Kurds are a result of intimidation from ISF and 
Ba'athist forces.  On the Sunni side, some tribes in the area 
want to seek revenge for persecution at the hands of 
Peshmerga forces that controlled the area from 2003 to 2008. 
This resentment continues to surface in the form of 
assassinations, bombings, and other violence along ethnic 
lines, especially in areas such as Jalula and Saadiya. 
Moreover, this area continues to be used as a base of 
operations for Sunni insurgent groups such as Naqshbandi 
(JRTN) and, increasingly over the past six months, 
pro-Ba'athist groups such as al-Awda and al-Hadba, which are 
now spreading into other parts of Diyala (ref C).  (NOTE: 
While the extent of the pro-Ba'athist activities is not 
entirely clear, there is a real fear and perception of a 
Ba'athist resurgence.  END NOTE). 
 
¶9. (C) The ongoing struggle between the KRG and central 
government for control over the disputed areas in Khanaqin 
has also undermined the capacity of the local civilian 
leadership, especially with regards to financial resources in 
areas including Jalula and Saadiya (ref C).  For example, 
when the PRT recently sought to provide support for 
developing an education program in a disadvantaged part of 
Khanaqin, Assistant Governor for Technical Affairs Ghadban 
Taha Ismail asked why the provincial government should fund 
the effort, claiming "the KRG takes care of Khanaqin."  In 
the end, the failure of central and provincial authorities to 
provide essential services has left communities vulnerable to 
other groups, including insurgents that could exploit the 
dissatisfaction to ignite ethnic tensions. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT ILL-PREPARED FOR CHALLENGES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10. (C) The provincial government continues to be 
ill-prepared to address these challenges, due to a lack of 
administrative and technical capacity and weak power dynamics 
vis--vis the central government (ref F).  Only within the 
past year has Diyala seen significant improvement in the 
security situation, and as such has not had the chance to 
develop a professional civil service with expertise to 
implement or execute a provincial development plan.  The 
province remains woefully behind many others on essential 
services and governance.  In addition, many members of the 
provincial government believe that the central government is 
systematically undermining their ability to provide essential 
services to their people by delaying the release of budgetary 
funds.  A case of note for members of the Diyala Provincial 
Council is their July 2009 vote to terminate the Diyala 
Director General (DG) for the Administration of Petroleum 
Products for professional malfeasance.  PC members believe 
that the central government's refusal to accept their action 
and remove the DG is a direct cchallenge to the provincial 
council's authority and illustrative of the central 
government's sectarian bias, i.e. protecting the DG of Oil 
because of his close connections to ISCI and Iran (ref G). 
 
¶11. (C) In public statements and private conversations with 
PRToffs, a wide range of provincial officials ranging from 
Governor Mahdawi to PC officials and mayors cite the ongoing 
need for PRT guidance in order to promote stability and 
national unity and prevent the province from slipping back 
into sectarian turmoil.  Hazim Serraj of the Iraqi Red 
Crescent, for example, recently appeared on Iraqi TV praising 
the PRT's work in creating jobs and promoting national unity 
by at the Aruba Market in Muqdadiya.  Once one of the largest 
Qby at the Aruba Market in Muqdadiya.  Once one of the largest 
Iraqi public markets outside of Baghdad, virtually all 
economic activity ceased in 2006-2007 as AQI and Coalition 
Forces battled for the market.  But over the last six months 
the PRT has created a business development program that has 
helped over 500 shops reopen and create 2,000 jobs (septel). 
"The PRT has been instrumental in restoring life to the 
market and the city," Serraj said.  "The program is bringing 
Sunnis and Shi'as back to the market to live and work 
together, and giving people hope for the future.  But we 
cannot do it alone and need the PRT to help us maintain this 
progress."  Diyala may not be the violent haven for AQI and 
like-minded groups that it was two years ago, but the gains 
made by the USG in helping to stabilize the area are not yet 
consolidated. 
 
¶12. (C) COMMENT: Diyala's simmering ethnic and sectarian 
tensions make it fertile ground for various agents of 
instability, including Sunni insurgents, Ba'ath elements, and 
Iranian special groups units.  Together with its 
ethno-sectarian issues, Diyala's location between Baghdad and 
Iran, and along the fault line between the IKR and the rest 
of Iraq, make it strategically important to U.S. interests in 
Iraq.  We will need to work for more equitable treatment of 
all groups in the province to help preclude the possibility 
that disenfranchised Sunnis will increasingly revert to 
violence as a means to redress their grievances, potentially 
sparking broader problems in adjacent provinces. END COMMENT. 
FORD