VZCZCXRO7083
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAN #0887/01 3631211
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291211Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3179
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0084
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1081
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0224
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000887 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/E MARIA BEYZEROV 
PARIS FOR WALLACE BAIN 
LONDON FOR PETER LORD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA FR ET
SUBJECT: ICG-M IN ADDIS ABABA: BACKGROUND AND TALKING POINTS 
 
REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 868 
     ¶B. ANTANANARIVO 870 
     ¶C. ANTANANARIVO 874 
     ¶D. PARIS 1754 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 6, members of the International 
Contact Group on Madagascar (ICG-M) will meet in Addis Ababa 
to discuss the international community's response to recent 
developments in Antananarivo.  This cable contains suggested 
talking points for use by the U.S. delegation to the ICG-M; 
see paragraph 4.  With Andry "TGV" Rajoelina having 
unilaterally abandoned a negotiated four-party transition 
government in favor of a quick push for legislative elections 
in March 2010, the political divide is as wide as ever 
between the de facto government and the three principle 
opposition factions.  The international community, however, 
is in disagreement over the remedy: France has come forward 
with conditional support for March elections, while most 
other western missions doubt the feasibility, and 
credibility, of a rush to the polls.  Post recommends that we 
seek to promote the resumption of talks between the four main 
political factions, and dissuade the de facto government from 
pursuing unilaterally-organized elections, despite the French 
position.  At the same time, we should push other ICG members 
to finally cut assistance to the de facto government 
(particularly French military cooperation), and give serious 
consideration to targeted sanctions against the regime 
leaders.  The current unilateral election plan will only 
serve to lengthen the political, social, and economic crisis, 
and postpone a real solution.  With our "carrots" now 
exhausted (AGOA, MCC, and assistance to/through the 
government have all now been terminated or suspended), it is 
time to push ICG members towards "sticks" they have been 
avoiding for almost a year now. END SUMMARY. 
 
ELECTIONS ARE THE ANSWER - JUST NOT NOW 
--------------------------------------- 
¶2. (C) On December 16, Rajoelina unilaterally abandoned the 
consensus-based "Maputo Process" in favor of a rush to 
elections in March 2010; the opposition, key civil society 
actors, and most of the international community has condemned 
the move either publicly or privately as unlikely to resolve 
the crisis (reftels A and B).  France's initial statement on 
the election plan (citing the need for transparency, an 
independent electoral commission, and international 
monitoring) has been interpreted locally as tacit support. 
French FM Bernard Kouchner himself publicly stated his 
support for "free and monitored" elections in a separate 
statement from Paris.  Recent reporting from Embassy Paris 
(reftel D) also indicates that sources in the Elysee believe 
that the focus of the January ICG should be "on establishing 
conditions for elections that will establish a parliament 
that can revise the constitution, leading to new presidential 
elections".  Despite the obvious difficulty of holding 
elections in this political climate, the French position at 
the ICG will evidently be in favor of the Rajoelina plan. 
The French delegation to the ICG will be led by Cooperation 
Minister Alain Joyandet. 
 
¶3. (C) Post agrees that the ultimate goal remains free and 
fair elections, but we disagree on how this will best be 
achieved; it is impossible to hold credible elections in this 
environment, and the international community should instead 
focus on a return to multi-party dialogue.  Relations between 
political factions are at their worst since August, and 
opposition politicians are not likely to participate in the 
planned Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), nor 
in the election that will follow.  Opposition leaders are 
currently observing a "holiday truce", but intend eventually 
to proceed with their plan to form a three-party parallel 
government based on the Maputo Charter of the Transition. 
They have rejected Rajoelina's authority to sack opposition 
representatives in the short-lived unity government, and do 
not recognize his new Prime Minister, Colonel Camille Albert 
Vital.  Despite the "truce", the sole remaining high-profile 
political detainee (Ralitera Andrianandraina) remains in 
pre-trial detention (for eight months now), and on December 
21 the government suspended a news program on 
pro-Ravalomanana radio station "Fahazavana".  On several 
occasions in December, claims of military unity have been 
 
ANTANANARI 00000887  002 OF 002 
 
 
sorely tested, first by an unauthorized press conference by 
nine pro-opposition Colonels (December 15), and most recently 
with an abortive attempt by a handful of soldiers to "take 
over" a base in Antananarivo (on December 28) to demonstrate 
their opposition to Rajoelina.  Once the holiday truce 
concludes after the New Year, agitation against the de facto 
government is likely to increase; these problems will not be 
resolved by a rush to hold elections, and may be made worse. 
 
TALKING POINTS 
-------------- 
¶4. (SBU) Following are key talking points for the ICG meeting. 
 
- The United States continues to support a consensual, 
inclusive political solution for the transition period, 
leading to free and fair elections as soon as possible. 
These elections must be managed by an inclusive and 
independent electoral commission, with credible effort made 
to ensure opposition participation, equal access to public 
media during the campaign, and a peaceful, secure environment 
in which to conduct elections. 
 
- Rajoelina's recent actions represent a unilateral departure 
from the Maputo process that will only serve to prolong the 
political, social, and economic crisis, and postpone a real 
solution.  His appointment of a new PM on December 20, and 
removal of opposition members of the transition government, 
have only served to worsen relations among Madagascar's 
political movements. 
 
- In this tense political climate, it will not be possible to 
hold free or fair elections, particularly as the opposition 
will most likely boycott the entire endeavor.  While 
elections remain the ultimate solution to this crisis, and 
should be the primary focus of a consensual transition 
government, this rush to hold them in March 2010 will only 
exacerbate current tensions among political actors. 
 
- Now is the time for all members of the ICG, and the 
international community, to terminate assistance to the de 
facto government, particularly military assistance, and to 
consider targeted travel and financial sanctions against 
high-ranking members of the regime. 
 
MARCH ELECTIONS: A RISK NOT WORTH TAKING 
---------------------------------------- 
¶5. (C) COMMENT: If the opposition changes tack in January and 
decides to accept the Rajoelina government, participate in 
elections, and renounce further demonstrations, a March 2010 
poll could be a positive step forward.  More likely, however, 
the problems detailed in paragraph 3 will persist, and may be 
made worse by renewed arrests, increased censorship, conflict 
within (or among) the security forces, or heavy-handed police 
tactics.  The French position is based on a reading of the 
current situation that focuses on popular fatigue and 
political apathy, resulting in ever-weaker support for the 
opposition; in this view, expedient, if imperfect, elections 
would at least break the current impasse and provide a path 
towards democratic resolution.  Given the current political 
climate, however, a more likely outcome is that the 
opposition boycotts the election, further poisoning the 
political climate for the next three months while Rajoelina 
pursues a pyrrhic electoral victory.  Better to promote an 
immediate return to dialogue, with the recognition that a 
solution will take time and compromise, than give false hope 
that a rush to the polls can solve Madagascar's problems. END 
COMMENT. 
MARQUARDT