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P 171344Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3151
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEWMFC/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0219

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000868 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/E MARIA BEYZEROV 
PARIS FOR WALLACE BAIN 
LONDON FOR PETER LORD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018 
TAGS: PGOV MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR'S TGV: MAPUTO PROCESS DEAD, EYES TURN 
TO MILITARY 
 
REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 858 
     ¶B. ANTANANARIVO 853 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Madagascar's transition president Andry "TGV" 
Rajoelina formally has ended the troubled mediation and 
consensus-building process that has struggled haltingly 
forward since international mediators first arrived here in 
February.  In a televised interview on December 16, he 
outlined his plan to hold legislative elections on March 20, 
stating that his current government would manage the country 
in the interim.  This follows a presidential communique 
issued on December 15, in which he presented arguments on the 
"impossibility of cohabitation", and is consistent with his 
warning to ambassadors on December 9.  The December 11 
ministerial note barring the return of the participants in 
the December 3 Maputo III conference remains in effect, but 
he did offer hope that it would be lifted in the near future 
(as well as an admonition for them to behave if they want 
back).  Whenever they do come back, the stranded politicians, 
including the co-presidents, will not be returning to 
government; whether transition Prime Minister Mangalaza is 
also jobless is entirely unclear.  In his address, TGV 
attempted to paint the end of AGOA as a sanction that would 
harm only the Malagasy people, again shrugging off any 
responsibility for its termination. 
 
¶2. (C) Over the coming weeks, the military will struggle to 
reconcile the nation's desire for a calm holiday season with 
their recognition that Rajoelina's latest unilateral position 
has the strong potential to push the worsening political and 
economic crisis to the boiling point; supporters of a 
military intervention appear increasingly likely to prevail, 
though their probable timing is unclear.  Equally unclear is 
how the so-far-mute opposition movements eventually will 
react, as they balance the possibility of complete exclusion 
from a shortened transition with the pervasive fatigue that 
dominates public opinion; our guess is that they will react 
strongly, at the time of their choosing, and that prospects 
for consensus around TGV's latest proposal are nil.  Now -- 
before the next escalation in January -- is the ideal time to 
push the international community into applying more pressure 
through further sanctions and assistance cuts, and beginning 
the conversation on targeted sanctions against individual 
members of TGV's movement. The status of the ICG-Madagascar 
process is also now unclear, although the need for an 
international consultation mechanism -- with or without the 
Malagasy -- is now stronger than ever.  END SUMMARY. 
 
RAJOELINA: "COHABITATION IS IMPOSSIBLE" 
--------------------------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) After a long day of rumors that the travel ban on 
Maputo III participants would be lifted, and a week of 
uncertainty over the long-term intentions of his fractious 
administration, Rajoelina took to the airwaves on December 16 
at 2000 for over an hour to definitively quell speculation. 
He called for a "truce" over the holidays, and claimed that 
was the reason the planned December 17 ICG meeting had been 
postponed (or cancelled?).  His version of a truce, however, 
turned into a unilateral -- and seemingly final -- break from 
the five-month long "Maputo process" that had resulted in 
agreement on a plausible, if troubled, unity government in 
Addis Ababa on November 7.  Per the speech, Rajoelina's 
current unilateral cabinet will remain in place until 
legislative elections are held on March 20, 2010, at which 
point the majority party will select a Prime Minister and 
form a government.  The re-entry ban remains in place at this 
writing, until such a time as unspecified security conditions 
are met, and when those stranded in South Africa "act 
responsibly, wisely, and with respect to national 
solidarity". 
 
¶4. (SBU) Rajoelina requested that the international community 
"not get too involved in Madagascar's problems", painting the 
unsuccessful negotiations thus far as a failure of 
international mediation and suggesting that the Malagsy 
themselves can now take over from it.  He stated that the 
 
ANTANANARI 00000868  002 OF 003 
 
 
March elections will be financed with GOM funds, and 
announced that the National Independent Electoral Commission 
(CENI) would be set up with the assistance of "politicians" 
(representing perhaps the only salvaged part of the Maputo 
accords), but refrained from elaborating on the extent to 
which opposition parties would have a say in its design.  On 
AGOA, he asserted that its termination -- which he still 
seems to think can be avoided -- would be a "reprisal" 
against the Malagasy people, and requested that the U.S. 
consider "the Malagasy people" who need the assistance most. 
 
THE MILITARY: HAPPY HOLIDAYS? 
----------------------------- 
¶5. (C) Rajoelina limited his commentary on the military to 
simply saying that "it is not divided, and there is no war 
here", glossing over an unauthorized December 15 press 
conference by nine colonels in support of the Maputo process, 
which has publicly raised fresh concerns of division in their 
ranks.  A potentially violent confrontation between them and 
other colonels loyal to TGV was only narrowly averted in the 
hotel where the conference occurred, and this required the 
direct personal intervention of Army Chief General Andre. 
The Ambassador met with the CHOD immediately after he 
returned from this incident, at the CHOD's urgent request. 
The CHOD was indirect and meandering in laying out his grim 
perception of the current political landscape, repeating 
several times the likelihood of a "social explosion" and 
suggesting that he might have to get involved to stave it 
off.  Rumors to that effect are rampant, but there is still 
no evidence of unmanageable divisions sizable enough to cause 
a rupture in the armed forces such as seen in March 2009. 
Calling the army "the last rampart," General Andre seems 
willing to intervene only if he believes there is no other 
alternative. 
 
¶6.  (C)  However, two broad trends have emerged.  First, the 
military has no desire to disrupt the holiday season, and 
will seek to avoid action as long as there is any plausible 
reason to postpone.  This dilatory principle has generally 
guided their behavior through many months now of alleged 
intervention plans.  Second, however, is a concern that 
Rajoelina grossly overplayed his hand with irresponsible 
behavior over the last week, and a belief that intervention 
now could forestall greater opposition unrest in the coming 
weeks.  If it turns out that Rajoelina did just cross a red 
line sharply worsening the political and economic crisis (and 
here the pending AGOA announcement may be key), supporters of 
military intervention may prevail, regardless of the 
holidays; some may also see tactical advantage in doing so. 
While the CHOD and Minister of the Armed Forces fall into the 
camp supporting a wait-and-see approach, this second option 
appeals to some military and civilian leaders who have been 
sidelined since March 2009.  While this timing issue remains 
unclear, what is clear is that the military is now the only 
force capable of restoring order, now that TGV has ordered 
the international community to butt out.  Their intent in 
restoring order would be to do so bloodlessly. 
 
THE OPPOSITION: ANGRY, BUT IMPOTENT 
----------------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) The shared exile of the Maputo III participants has 
served only to boost their solidarity in the face of 
Rajoelina's intransigence.  There have been no large protests 
or civil disobedience in recent weeks (aside from continuing 
peaceful, daily meetings of some of Ravalomanana's 
supporters), but supporters of Zafy in particular have been 
traveling to Antananarivo to get better organized in the 
absence of their leadership.  A planned meeting of the three 
movements opposing TGV was thwarted in Tamatave on December 
¶16.  After six months of relative calm in the capital, 
however, it is not clear how much support they can rally for 
renewed protests, particularly with the holidays approaching, 
nor is it clear that they have any other leverage against 
Rajoelina's regime. 
 
A NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY 
----------------------------------- 
¶8. (C) COMMENT: With the Maputo process now formally dead, we 
 
ANTANANARI 00000868  003 OF 003 
 
 
will engage with the local international community in 
Madagascar to examine possible ways forward.  With AGOA all 
but terminated, MCC gone since November, our non-humanitarian 
programs suspended, and all IFI assistance frozen, the USG 
has little further financial leverage in Madagascar.  France, 
however, has yet to freeze or terminate any of its extensive 
programs, including military cooperation.  Likewise, the 
European Commission has stretched the Cotonou Article 96 
process well beyond the original November 6 deadline; now 
would be an ideal time for them to take a firm stance and 
make cuts (which the German ambassador told us today will 
happen in short order after the holidays).  In addition, we 
believe that it is now time to begin discussing targeted 
travel and financial sanctions against Rajoelina and his 
regime with SADC, the African Union, and our key partners. 
 
¶9. (C) At time of writing, reaction to Rajoelina's rupture 
has been limited to relatively bland press reports; we expect 
more substantive commentary over the next 48 hours, but also 
perceive an artificial restraint caused by the continuing 
travel ban and the general desire not to upset the coming 
holidays.  We will meet December 18 with COMs from France, 
Germany, Mauritius, South Africa, the EU, and the United 
Nations to discuss their reactions.  Here and in capitals, it 
is important to maintain unity within the international 
community, particularly if Rajoelina takes to fanning the 
AGOA flame over the next two weeks; if he does, we must 
demand solidarity from our partners in the form of strong 
statements and additional consequences for TGV's new 
approach.  The messy ICG-Madagascar process that has existed 
since April is now also in doubt, although the need for some 
international consultation/soordination mechanism -- with or 
without Malagasy assent and/or participation -- is now 
greater than ever.  END COMMENT. 
MARQUARDT