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DE RUEHAN #0858/01 3491334
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P 151334Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3134
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEWMFC/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0217

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000858 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/E MARIA BEYZEROV 
ADDIS ABABA FOR AMBASSADOR BATTLE, JOEL MAYBURY 
PRETORIA FOR WALTER PFLAUMER, YVONNE GONZALES 
PARIS FOR WALLACE BAIN 
LONDON FOR PETER LORD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018 
TAGS: PGOV MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR'S TGV: NONCOMMITTAL ON ICG AND STRANDED 
POLITICIANS 
 
REF: A. 09 ANTANANARIVO 853 
     ¶B. 09 ANTANANARIVO 856 
     ¶C. 09 ANTANANARIVO 846 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At a meeting on December 15 with several 
local COMs, Transition President Andry "TGV" Rajoelina 
remained noncommittal on the return of his stranded political 
rivals (still in South Africa), and expressed his concern 
that the African Union had invited Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka 
themselves to return to Madagascar for the planned 
International Contact Group (ICG) meeting on December 17.  He 
repeated the arguments of his Security Minister concerning 
the December 11 entry ban (reftel A), adding specifically 
that he would be unable to guarantee these delegations' 
security if an ICG meeting is held in Antananarivo.  The COMs 
were divided afterward over his ambiguity, with only France 
and Mauritius taking the optimistic view that his lack of a 
firm response meant he intends to allow them to return (this 
evening, per questionable French sources).  On December 15, 
SADC informed the French Embassy in Botswana that Chissano's 
participation would be contingent on 1) the immediate, 
uncondition lifting of the travel ban, and 2) a formal 
invitation for Chissano himself from the Malagasy.  Given the 
uncertainty surrounding the ICG's organization and 
attendance, Post recommends Department push to postpone the 
ICG until January, possibly in another country. END SUMMARY. 
 
LET THEM BACK! 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador Marquardt, with the Ambassadors of France, 
Germany, Mauritius (representing SADC), and the interim head 
of the European Commission, met with Transition President 
Rajoelina and Foreign Minister Ny Hasina Andriamanjato at 
0900 on December 15.  The ambassadors' primary message was 
that the GOM must allow the three other movements' 
delegations to return to Madagascar in time for a planned 
meeting on December 17 of the International Contact Group. 
In addition, they relayed concerns from senior mediator 
Jaoquim Chissano, who stated (prior to a later pronouncement 
from SADC, see para 5) that he will not attend without a 
formal invitation directly from the GOM, in light of recent 
statements implying that he facilitated a "coup d'etat" at 
the recent Maputo III summit (reftel C).  Ambassador 
Marquardt also used the forum to clarify that the time had 
run out on AGOA as of December 15, directly contradicting 
rumors among GOM members that the USG was "bluffing". 
 
¶3. (C) Rajoelina was polite in response, but presented little 
new information.  In support of the travel ban, he cited the 
same concerns as his Minister of Internal Security regarding 
"public order and internal security", adding that he would be 
unable to guarantee the security of these delegations if the 
ICG meeting is held here on December 17.  He also 
specifically inquired about rumors, featured in today's 
newspapers, that Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana were personally 
invited by the AU to return to Madagascar for the ICG 
meeting.  Lacking a representative from the AU, the COMs 
remained circumspect, although we had already seen a copy of 
the invitation letter AU official Ramtane Lamamra sent to 
Ravalomanana which appears, curiously, like a personal 
invitation to Ravalomanana himself.  Although it is unlikely 
that Ravalomanana or Ratsiraka would attempt a return at this 
time, Rajoelina saw it as yet another attempt to undermine 
him (or as a new pretext to continue stonewalling): "we're 
here to solve this crisis, not create a new one". 
 
¶4. (C) In defending his defiant posture vis-a-vis the Maputo 
III "resolutions", he referred again to recent "provocations" 
such as the other movements' letter to the UN/SYG and the 
Prime Minister of Denmark on the Copenhagen summit, and the 
practical difficulty of working with his co-presidents over 
the last month. (NOTE: It would be a stretch to say that 
Rajoelina had even tried to work with the co-presidents, 
 
ANTANANARI 00000858  002 OF 002 
 
 
choosing instead to exclude them from his "presidential" 
activities and refusing them adequate workspace in GOM 
facilities. END NOTE).  He was visibly frustrated by the 
French Ambassador's recent highly-publicized calls to "let 
(the other delegations) return", which have been featured in 
local media, stating that "some Ambassadors talk too much". 
In response to Ambassador Marquardt's comments on the 
termination of AGOA, Rajoelina had little to say beyond 
denying any personal responsibility, and repeated once more 
that it would be the Malagasy people, not his government, 
that suffers - entirely missing the irony of his comments as 
the purported leader of a "popular revolution".  After about 
20 minutes, he thanked the ambassadors, and ended the meeting. 
 
AN ICG AT WHAT COST? 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) DSespite Ambassador Marquardt's repeated questioning 
of the wisdom of holding this ICG under current 
circumstances, French Ambassador Jean-Marc Chataigner has 
made it clear that his government wants it to take place on 
schedule, and he continued, as of this morning,to believe 
both that the missing delegations will be allowed to return 
in time, and that the meeting will serve a useful purpose 
despite the ever-widening chasm between Rajoelina and his 
rivals.  There are numerous problems, however, that may not 
be addressed in time.  On December 15, SADC Executive 
Secretary Dr. Tomaz Salomao informed the French Embassy in 
Botswana that Chissano's participation would be contingent 
upon "the immediate, unconditional lifting of the travel ban" 
against Maputo III participants, and the a "clear indication 
that the participation of Chissano is desired by the HAT". 
The AU's organizational abilities are in serious doubt as 
well, with their inadvertently direct invitations of 
Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka, the lack of a meaningful agenda 
for the meeting, their dogged support for implementing Maputo 
III in the face of evidence that it's a non-starter, and 
widespread perceptions that this is a French initiative in AU 
clothing.  Rajoelina indicated today that he will be unable 
to guarantee security for the still-stranded delegations if 
they return, and he was non-committal on Chissano's 
participation.  We had confirmation as of 1700 local today 
that the stranded delegation did not travel to Madagascar 
today. 
 
BEST TO POSTPONE 
---------------- 
 
¶6. (C) COMMENT:  This meeting is ill-prepared and unnecessary 
at the present time.  Post recommends that we seek to 
postpone the meeting until January, allowing time for the 
stranded politicians to return, their heads to cool, and 
proper preparation to take place.  In addition, with French 
Minister of Cooperation Joyandet coming and no high-level 
representation from Washington (and perhaps none from other 
capitals either -- and Chissano and other mediators unlikely 
to attend), this event risks sending an image of French 
domination.  If the ICG is postponed, Joyandet may come 
anyway, on a bilateral mission that will be understood as 
such.  END COMMENT. 
MARQUARDT