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PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAN #0850/01 3451000
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111000Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3116
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEWMFC/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0210

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANTANANARIVO 000850 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: TRYING TO AVOID THE WORST 
 
REF: 09 ANTANANARIVO 846 
 
Classified By: DCM ERIC STROMAYER FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Madagascar's halting mediation and 
transition process has derailed dramatically following 
publication of Tuesday's "Maputo III" resolutions and 
Rajoelina's immediate, extreme, and negative reaction to them 
(reftel).  Probably using the resolutions and the unfortunate 
letters signed and sent by his opposition to Ban Ki-Moon and 
the Danish Prime Minister as a pretext for walking away from 
an increasingly unworkable cohabitation, Rajoelina declined 
local ambassadors' appeal on December 10 to turn the other 
cheek and resume discussions with his adversaries.  They did, 
however, apparently talk Rajoelina out of taking another 
dangerous step back to unilateralism, at least for now. 
Rajoelina proposed privately to ambassadors scrapping the 
entire Maputo process and instead moving quickly to 
legislative elections within three months, which all 
ambassadors rejected as unwise, unilateral, non-consensual 
and certain to provoke swift condemnation, sanctions, and 
enhanced isolation from all quarters.  Chissano had asked the 
local ICG to "prevail" on Rajoelina to move forward with 
discussions based on Maputo III, but not necessarily 
accepting its resolutions.  Chissano also advised that 
Rajoelina had rejected his offer to engage in shuttle 
diplomacy to try and break the impasse.  On the other hand, 
the prospect of the AU organizing a December 17 higher-level 
ICG meeting here in Antananarivo, with Chissano and other 
mediators present, has given a glimmer of new hope that a 
further deterioration might be avoided, at least until then. 
The local ICG released a statement on December 11 calling for 
restraint and the avoidance of all unilateral actions. 
Meanwhile, the ongoing stranding of Madagascar's opposition 
political leaders in Maputo -- from which Malagasy airspace 
remains closed by Rajoelina's order -- is another unfavorable 
factor.  While 'Tana remains outwardly calm, rumors are 
swirling regarding the possible naming of a military Prime 
Minister, the naming, by the military itself, of a new 
military directorate or partial military government, etc.  A 
possible move to Mauritania-style early elections may be a 
new solution, but only if consensus among the Malagasy can be 
achieved first. Local ambassadors now are trying to "avoid 
the worst", rather than any more ambitious solutions to 
Madagascar's worsening political impasse.  AGOA eligibility 
is understood here to be (all but) dead, as the various 
protagonists stubbornly continue to put their individual 
interests ahead of the people's.  End Summary 
 
¶2. (C) In his December 9 evening address to the nation, 
Rajoelina reiterated intransigent points he had made 
previously to the press, categorically rejecting the Maputo 
III resolutions and condemning the delegations who had 
reached them as "traitorous".  He refused to directly address 
the issue of alleged pending arrest warrants for the 
participants (denied to diplomats by all government contacts) 
or the airspace closure to traffic from Mozambique (confirmed 
by civil aviation authorities).  Late on December 9, the 
Foreign Minister invited Ambassador Marquardt to organize 
local ICG ambassadors to meet Rajoelina at 1600 on December 
¶10.  Local ICG ambassadors (US, French, Russian, Chinese, EU 
Presidency/German, Libyan, UNDP, and South African) met 
beforehand to coordinate before seeing Rajoelina.  There was 
a consensus that the only way forward was via a cooling of 
tempers, and a resumption of dialogue to move forward to a 
transition government, including the safe return ASAP of the 
movement leaders stranded in Maputo and the return of 
Chissano and/or other mediator(s).  The group released a 
statement on December 11 calling for restraint and the 
avoidance of all unilateral actions. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The French Ambassador categorically stated that 
Rajoelina will not declare unilaterally a military PM-led 
government, but then said "the ICG must strongly dissuade him 
from considering it."  He also tabled the notion of Rajoelina 
establishing a technocratic government while announcing that 
he would not run for President himself, which the group 
rejected as too little, too late.  Similarly, his suggestion 
 
ANTANANARI 00000850  002 OF 004 
 
 
that the ICG formally reject Maputo III as out of line with 
previous agreements gained no traction.  Regarding the 
possibility of mass popular street action in response to 
current events, the prevailing view was that no political 
faction has a mass following prepared to do so, and most 
Malagasy are tired of this situation and simply want to move 
forward with their lives -- and the approaching holidays. 
The ICG agreed that if Rajoelina decided to create a 
unilateral government, no country would be able to support 
it, and it would probably be only be a matter of time before 
the military took action, the possible consequences of which 
remain unclear.   Both the American and French Ambassadors 
stressed to the group that they had strongly urged the 
military leadership in recent meetings not to take any action 
that would make matters worse, and felt their message had 
been well understood. 
 
¶4. (C) The South African Ambassador advised that he had 
received materials on the course of the meetings in Maputo 
from his government and had just completed a phone call with 
President Chissano in London.  Chissano said he had had 
numerous phone conversations with Rajoelina over the last 
week and had urged conciliation.  Rajoelina had been included 
via this means, not excluded as he claimed.  In an effort to 
break the impasse he had offered to engage in shuttle 
diplomacy but Rajoelina had rejected his offer.  Chissano had 
called on the South African Ambassador to get the local ICG 
to "prevail on Rajoelina" to compromise and walk back from 
the extreme position he had taken.  Chissano also wants the 
ICG to pressure Zafy (when he returns) to give up designs on 
the mining ministry, and said Zuma, Guebeza, and Kabila, as 
SADC troika, will pressure Ravalomanana to drop his claim on 
the decentralization ministry. 
 
¶5. (C)  The ICG ambassadors then met Rajoelina for over one 
hour on December 10.  He was accompanied by FM Andriamanjato, 
Advisor Norbert Lala Rasirihonona, and S-G Resampa. 
Rajoelina made no preliminary remarks, allowing the 
ambassadors successively to make strong points on the need to 
turn the other cheek, bring his interlocutors back, eschew 
unilateralism, resume the Maputo process, take the Maputo III 
resolutions as nothing more than discussion material rather 
than as decisions, and find a way out of this continuing 
crisis.  The US ambassador advised him that time was almost 
up for AGOA eligibility, just the first of a number of 
deadlines that Madagascar will miss if they do not come 
quickly to reason. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Rajoelina responded after the tour de table that he 
was finding the co-presidency/cohabitation "delicate and 
difficult," and was considering scrapping it in favor of 
moving quickly to legislative elections within three months. 
For organizing those elections, he said he would want 
international support, and stressed that the creation of the 
independent electoral commission (CENI) which would run them 
would be inclusive and consensual.  He explained that the 
elected deputies would then select a prime minister and a 
government (without explaining how Madagascar would have 
moved magically from a presidential to a parliamentary form 
of government). 
 
¶7.  (C)  The ambassadors then took turns reacting negatively 
to his unexpected proposal, explaining that it would be seen 
as unilateral and a massive step backwards after months of 
collaborative efforts by the international community to move 
toward a consensual resolution of the crisis.  The US 
ambassador categorically rejected any American support for 
elections organized unilaterally, and said he doubted the UN 
or anyone else would react differently.  He advised that the 
cohabitation, while manifestly imperfect and unwieldy, had 
hardly been given a chance to succeed, given that it had 
never even met (except twice in the presence of ambassadors, 
at their request).  The French ambassador called Maputo III 
"a paper rag" that he could take inspiration from if he 
wished, but whose "decisions" were not decisions at all and 
were not binding on him or anyone else.  Others implored 
Rajoelina to turn the other cheek in response to the UN and 
Danish letters and Maputo III, and to resume discussions in 
 
ANTANANARI 00000850  003 OF 004 
 
 
good faith.  Norbert Lala responded at length that Maputo II 
did indeed represent unacceptable decisions taken, and that 
it - along with the UN and Danish letters -- was a major 
affront to the Maputo process by having diluted the powers of 
the presidency to an unacceptable degree.  Rajoelina then 
circulated a prepared, signed letter to ambassadors that 
deplored the behavior of the other leaders, denounced the 
letters they had signed, and rejected Maputo III in its 
entirety.  He did, however, agree to consider the 
ambassadors' views before taking any next steps.  The U.S. 
ambassador asked the last questions of Rajoelina:  when will 
he allow the opposition and his own prime minister to return 
from Maputo, and would he confirm the nonexistence of arrest 
warrants against them?  Rajoelina offered only a curious, 
broad smile in reply.  Norbert Lala said "they can return 
when they so desire." 
 
¶8.  (C)  Foreign Minister Andriamanjato, who had not spoken 
at the meeting with Rajoelina, came alone to the CMR 
afterwards.  As usual, he portrayed himself as the moderate 
in Rajoelina's camp, claiming that he alone had argued 
against the closure of Malagasy airspace to traffic from 
Mozambique and was still pressing for the return of those 
stranded there (which he expects to occur quickly).  He also 
explained that he thinks that the cohabitation could lead to 
civil war by having four uncooperative leaders all trying to 
pull strings within the military beneath them, and that is 
why they are now inclined to scrap it.  Unity within the 
military is essential to avoiding civil war, he said, and he 
is not certain himself that they are united behind Rajoelina. 
(Note:  we are fairly certain that they are not united behind 
anyone or anything.)  Andriamanjato then admitted, 
surprisingly, that the Maputo III resolutions had simply 
provided a pretext for derailing a process that they no 
longer support anyway.  He said that the meeting nonetheless 
had been effective in stopping Rajoelina from advancing his 
proposal to move unilaterally to early legislative elections: 
 afterwards Rajoelina dropped a planned televised address 
announcing his new approach.  The difference, said 
Andriamanjato, had been the strong solidarity among the 
ambassadors, including what he called the "unexpected 
firmness of the French" against early, unilateral elections. 
The ambassador stressed that the key factor in moving ahead 
is consensuality.  If the Malagasy agree among themselves 
that the wobbly cohabitation is not workable, then they need 
to decide consensually on a different approach.  Time, 
however, is wasting, and the AGOA decision is now almost sure 
to be negative given the course of recent -- and apparent 
future -- events; Andriamanjato just nodded.  He also said 
that the AU's proposal for a December 17 ICG in 'Tana is 
under consideration by the president.  The ambassador 
recommended that they agree to the meeting, invite Chissano 
back as soon as possible to prepare it, start communicating 
constructively among themselves about possible ways forward, 
and not do anything stupid to derail the process further. 
 
¶9. (C)  Comment:  The French Ambassador told Ambassador 
Marquardt on December 11 that the French may be looking now 
toward a Mauritania-style move to quick -- but necessarily 
consensual -- elections in order to put this cohabitation 
nightmare to rest.  At today's meeting of the full diplomatic 
corps, there was considerable resonance expressed for a 
quicker -- but still consensual -- escape from the current 
impasse via elections than the Maputo process would provide. 
It was acknowledged that there would be a conscious trade-off 
between quality of elections and speed, but many appeared 
willing to entertain it.  While the prospect of the December 
17 ICG might keep matters calm until then (assumig Rajoelina 
accepts the initiative), there appears to be a growing gap 
between the evident drift to a completely new approach 
(favored by many Malagasy, not just Rajoelina) and Chissano's 
expressed intention to come back merely to put the finishing 
touches on the Maputo process (i.e. implement the 
co-presidency, finish the allocation of ministerial 
portfolios, etc.).  Overall, there has been a palpable shift 
in diplomats' thinking here, away from more ambitious 
solutions and toward simply "avoiding the worst."  It seems 
that, if the Malagasy can avoid a meltdown over the coming 
 
ANTANANARI 00000850  004 OF 004 
 
 
week, the holidays will then take over and allow more time 
for solutions to emerge by early January.  End comment. 
MARQUARDT