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PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAN #0846/01 3431331
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091331Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3107
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0208
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000846 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/E MARIA BEYZEROV 
PARIS FOR WALLACE BAIN 
LONDON FOR PETER LORD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019 
TAGS: PGOV MA MZ
SUBJECT: AFTER MAPUTO III: A FOOLISH RAJOELINA ON THE 
OFFENSIVE 
 
REF: A. 09 ANTANANARIVO 831 
     ¶B. 09 ANTANANARIVO 833 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Relations between Madagascar's four main 
political movements have taken a sharp turn for the worse 
following the latest "partial" summit in Maputo (ref A). 
Under the direction of President Chissano, former presidents 
Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka, and Zafy agreed on a compromise to 
unblock the formation of a transition government, rebalance 
the contentious "Presidential Council", and provide for the 
rapid implementation of the other "Maputo institutions" 
(septel).  Transition President Andry "TGV" Rajoelina refused 
to participate except by telephone, however, and is now 
alleging "high treason" against what he sees as an attempt to 
sideline him.  He has even closed the air space from 
Mozambique to prevent the alleged "traitors" from returning 
to Antananarivo.  UN contacts present in Maputo have 
indicated that the latest declaration does indeed represent 
progress, and that Rajoelina was kept informed during the 
summit.  Rajoelina may simply be appealing to his fractious 
support base, but this time he may have overplayed his hand, 
and has left himself little room to compromise. The 
ambassador demarched his foreign minister and 
secretary-general on December 9 to appeal for calm and ask 
that no more fuel be thrown on the fire.  French Minister 
Joyandet reportedly passed the same message to Rajoelina by 
phone.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) "Maputo III", the fourth international "summit" of 
Malagasy political movements, took place from December 3 to 8 
in Maputo, Mozambique, and ended with the signature of a 
declaration and a series of brief "resolutions" tweaking the 
August 9 Charter of the Transition and the November 7 
Addendum (full text in septel).  Despite yesterday's 
immediate,  vitriolic response from Rajoelina, who chose to 
participate over the weekend only by phone rather than travel 
himself, the deal takes some sensible steps forward in 
resolving the current impasse, notably over cabinet 
assignments and the immediate constitution of the other 
Maputo institutions (Congress, CNR, and Senate/CST).  After 
dividing up the bulk of the ministerial nominations among the 
four movements (and giving five to "other forces" from 
outside the four), the document outlines a more neutral 
procedure for the contentious justice, communications, and 
internal security portfolios, involving nominations by one 
party, and selection by another.  While imperfect, it is the 
first time that specific ministerial portfolios have been 
assigned to specific movements in writing; previous documents 
stopped short of such details. 
 
¶3. (C) Despite his telephonic participation over the weekend, 
however, Rajoelina was swift in denouncing moves to weaken 
the presidency in Resolution number one.  In the November 7 
Addis Addendum, the movements devised an executive with a 
President (Head of State) and a "Presidential Council" 
composed of two co-presidents - one each from the Zafy and 
Ravalomanana movements.  Resolution 1 from Maputo III, 
however, subtly states that the Presidential Council is 
"composed of the President and the two Co-Presidents".  This 
addresses the Co-Presidents' concerns that they had been 
sidelined and unfunded since November 7, but it amounted to 
"treason" for Rajoelina, as an attempt to eviscerate his 
powers as Head of State.  In a communique issued December 8, 
however, Rajoelina denounced the effort entirely, stating 
that the summit participants had "unilaterally modified the 
dispositions concerning the President of the Transition and 
the Presidential Council by including the President in the 
Presidential Council", and that this modification is "null 
and void as it is contrary to the principles of consensus and 
inclusivity(...)".  The communique states that "the formation 
of a government...is an attack on national sovereignty", and 
that the changes to the Presidential Council is an expression 
of the three movements' wish to "eliminate Andry Rajoelina as 
head of state". 
 
¶4. (C) The December 8 communique ends by stating that 
Rajoelina "will consider the will of the three movements to 
part from the Charter of the Transition...and will take 
necessary measures".  By that evening, these measure began 
taking form: the delegations' return flight from Mozambique 
was blocked before taking off, and official sources in 
Madagascar Civil Aviation (ACM) have confirmed to EmbOff that 
an order has been issued blocking flights from Mozambique; 
 
ANTANANARI 00000846  002 OF 002 
 
 
media sources indicate that the ban extends to March 2010. 
In addition, sources within the MOJ have confirmed that 
arrest warrants have been issued for members of the 
delegations that participated in Maputo, although specifics 
are not yet available.  French Ambassador Chataigner stated 
to Ambassador Marquardt that the de facto Vice-Minister of 
Interior told him she was unaware of any such warrants.  He 
also reported that Cooperation Minister Joyandet had called 
Rajoelina directly to call for calm and restraint in the 
current situation 
 
¶5.  (C)  In response to this sudden deterioration, Ambassador 
Marquardt initiated a demarche this afternoon on Foreign 
Minister Andriamanjato and Rajoelina's Secretary-General 
Resampa, both of whom also denied the existence of arrest 
warrants (although they argued that a case could be made for 
issuing them).  However, their alleged existence has been 
widely reported in the press and is taking on a life of its 
own.  In that meeting with ambassador and DCM, Andriamanjato 
called the situation "alarming" and walked through a 
typically lengthy chronology of how they got to this new low 
point.  In reply, the ambassador agreed the situation was 
alarming and bluntly called on the Rajoelina faction and 
especially on Rajoelina himself to refrain from any further 
escalation of tensions through any more ill-considered press 
statements.  Andriamanjato said they would like the ICG to be 
convened in Antananarivo as soon as possible to put the 
process back on track.  While neither endorsing nor rejecting 
this proposal, the ambassador cautioned that time was very 
short before AGOA and other consequences start to bite.  He 
argued that the Maputo participants should be permitted to 
return safely from Maputo as soon as possible for a collegial 
discussion of their proposals with Rajoelina in order to form 
a government immediately.  The ambassador placed the blame 
for the failures of Maputo with Rajoelina for refusing to go 
there in the first place, knowing as he did that there could 
be no discussion on Malagasy soil with Ravalomanana or 
Ratsiraka present.  That said, he advised them to look 
forward, not backwards, and to elect simply not to react to 
incendiary statements or actions that might come from the 
other side.  He said that the outside world would hold 
Rajoelina individually responsible for whatever happens here: 
 as he took power and is now the sole president, the onus of 
providing the necessary leadership is primarily on him now. 
They took note and expressed thanks for American interest and 
engagement in solving Madagascar's problems, stating that 
they would meet Rajoelina immediately after the meeting and 
make sure he learned of our views and concerns. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  The ambassador also precipitated an urgent meeting 
of the local ICG on Thursday morning to take stock and 
consider joint actions that might help put the derailed 
government formation process back on track. 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT: There is now a sense that Rajoelina has 
overplayed his hand to appease domestic supporters.  The 
flight cancellation is an ominous sign that Rajoelina may 
have given up on compromise, due to perceptions that the 
pre-Maputo III cabinet impasse is intractable, or that the 
Maputo III resolutions themselves are another compromise too 
far.  A December 3 letter to the Danish Prime Minister (which 
hit the papers on December 8), in which the other movements 
request that Rajoelina not be seated at the Copenhagen 
climate summit or be issued a visa, no doubt caused anger 
within hsi camp, but they do not fully explain the abrupt 
shift in it - particularly as Chissano kept him in the loop 
by phone during the talks.  The recent "assassination 
attempt" provides further grist for the mill among 
Rajoelina's more virulent supporters, but there is no doubt 
that key players in his camp are fully aware of the negative 
impact that a full "rupture" will have on international 
engagement, AGOA, and any progress towards holding elections 
in the near future. In an interview published today, 
Rajoelina called the Maputo III resolutions "a coup d'etat" 
and stated that he "is no longer solely responsably" if the 
political impasse results in sanctions.  He also asserted 
that "it is the three former presidents who want to destroy 
the country."  It remains unclear what possible gymnastics 
would allow him to move from that extreme position to forming 
a government with the traitors, if and when they are allowed 
to return to Madagascar.  END COMMENT. 
MARQUARDT