P 080951Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3099

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000840 
 
DEPT FOR DS, D, P, M, S/CT, CA, AND INR 
DEPT FOR DS/AF/IP 
DEPT FOR DS/ITA/AF 
DEPT FOR AF/E 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2032 
TAGS: ASEC CASC MP PGOV PREL PTER MA
SUBJECT: EAC CONVENED TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE SUSPENSION OF AGOA 
 
REF: ANTANANARIVO 00810 
 
Classified By: RSO BENT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D 
 
¶1. (C) An Emergency Action Committee (EAC), chaired by the 
ambassador and DCM, was convened on December 8 to assess 
potential security consequences if Madagascar's AGOA 
eligibility is terminated later this month. There was a 
general consensus amongst the EAC members that although there 
might eventually be protests associated with the loss of 
AGOA, they would not necessarily target U.S. interests or 
happen instantaneously.  More likely suspension will 
contibute to general dissatisfaction with the HAT government 
and President Rajoelina (TGV), and actions might not be 
evident until after the holidays and when the concrete 
economic effects of the loss are felt in January or February. 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador Marquardt opened the meeting with an update 
of ongoing discussions in Maputo, where progress at forming 
an inclusive transition government has been limited despite 
the talks having been extended from the planned one day 
meeting to five days.  If this last opportunity to form a 
consensus government does not succeed, it is likely that 
Madagascar will indeed lose its AGOA privileges and with them 
some 50,000 jobs that support possibly 500,000 people. 
 
¶3. (C) Should AGOA be lost, it is expected that there will be 
a barrage of negative press against the ambassador and/or the 
Mission/Embassy/USG. But the Public Affairs Officer noted 
that despite the slanted and uneven Malagasy press, most 
citizens will understand the reality of the situation - that 
the loss will have occured as a result of the shortcomings of 
the HAT and failure of the Malagasy political elite to take 
responsibility. It is believed that the Malagasy people are 
severely disappointed with HAT President Rajoelina, who came 
to power via a coup promising a better life for the poor and 
progress for Madagascar. Although many Malagasy viewed the 
former President Ravalomanana (R8) as corrupt and imperfect, 
the abuses of power by and under the HAT since his departure 
are seen as far more extensive.  The HAT governnment's tenure 
has decreased donor aid, stalled tourism and investment, and 
now could increase unemployment dramatically. Overall, there 
is an overwhelming feeling of despair amongst the Malagasy as 
prospects for economical security decline. 
 
¶4. (C) Although some limited AGOA-related protests may be 
anticipated, the general EAC consensus was that they will be 
against High Transition Authority (HAT) President Rajoelina 
and his government, rather than against U.S. interests. As no 
announcement will be made until late December, it is likely 
that the news will be overshadowed by the holidays and that 
protests will not be organized until January. Additionally, 
EAC believes that no protests will commence until the 
economic results of the loss of AGOA are felt concretely in 
the form of actual layoffs. The Econ Officer noted that 
possibly 40-50 percent of AGOA jobs (approximately 20,000) 
would be cut by the end of January and the remainder in 
February. The officer also noted that longer-term worker 
dissatisfaction over job losses could be mitigated initially 
by the immediate benefits of severance packages. There was 
also consensus that the workers themselves would not be the 
force behind any protests, which more likely would be 
orchestrated and paid for by opposing political parties 
against the HAT. A few members mentioned that once the heat 
would be turned on TGV, he would in turn attempt to scapegoat 
the U.S. 
 
¶5.  (C) Another worrisome outcome of the AGOA pullback with 
be the effect on the already burgeoning crime rate in 
Madagascar (REFTEL). As noted over the last two years, the 
frequency and level of crime has increased significantly, 
especially in the run-up to the holidays. As the financial 
effects of loss of AGOA are felt, we anticipate a further 
deterioration. The mission LES staff have expressed their 
fears of being targeted as they occupy a fairly comfortable 
middle class status.  Folowing the last EAC, adequate 
measures are already in place to respond to rising crime. 
 
¶6. (C) The EAC agreed that if indeed AGOA is cut, the formal 
announcement should be generated in DC and not locally by the 
Embassy. A proposal was put forward to push for more 
statements in a multilateral context rather than unilaterally 
by the U.S. mission or the ambassador.  We should push for 
the UN and other missions to emphasize that AGOA suspension 
is just a part of an overall pattern of negative donor 
responses to the continuing political impasse in Madagascar, 
with further sanctions and consequences if the impasse 
continues. Noting the power of word of mouth, chat rooms and 
other informal methods of communication in Madagascar, the 
Mission will distribute a one-page "fact sheet" in English, 
French and Malagasy with talking points regarding continuing 
U.S. engagement in and contributions to Madagascar's 
development.  This will be shared with all employees and 
dependents, as well as outside the mission. The ambassador 
stressed that the U.S. Government is still engaged in 
significant assistance to Madagascar, through programs like 
the Peace Corps and USAID, and asked the Mission community to 
continue to promote understanding of those efforts. 
Additionally, we will continue and accelerate high-profile PD 
efforts to call media and public attention to such programs. 
 
¶7. (C) The EAC recommended that if workers do seek to 
protest, they should be allowed to do so at a location that 
does not compromise mission security.  RSO will work with 
local security forces to establish parameters for such 
protests while protecting the Chancery and mission staff. 
Similar plans will also be developed for the USAID Offices, 
which are co-located with the European Union in the Zital 
Building.  EU sanctions are the likely next shoe to fall 
(after the New Year) and so protests at that location are 
also a possibility.  RSO will also review and update 
provisions for the ambassador's personal and residential 
security. 
 
 
MARQUARDT